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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters on public and development economics that
study incentives in public policies from the perspective of microeconomics. It is
devoted to understanding behavioural responses in public policies that are relevant
to its design in each domain, including trading in market with frictions, enrolment
in education and child marriage practice for young girls, and childcare resource
allocation in family.
Chapter 1 studies how transaction tax policy affect market with frictions. Trans-
action tax in property market, with tax rate decreasing in holding period of prop-
erty, received attention from governments in Asia for moderating speculation since
2000s. Using administrative transaction record of property, this chapter studies the
behavioural response to the transaction tax in the timing of transaction, tax inci-
dence and selection of buyers in Hong Kong and Singapore. I find that the inherent
tax incentives, in the form of tax notches, induced tax avoidance behaviour in the
timing of transaction, and average buyer and seller are willing to wait 3-4 weeks to
avoid 1% of transaction tax. Exploiting discontinuity in tax liability at daily level,
I find that the tax policy has impact on transaction activity that links closely to
its rate and lower the overall chance of a property sold. Buyers bear significant tax
burden on seller specific tax even when tax-free sellers are abundant in the market
both evidence suggest strong search friction in property market. I also find that the
differential tax rate in holding duration produce selection effect among buyers with
different ex ante probability of trade in the taxable holding period. This chapter
contributes to understanding the nature of transaction tax in markets with search
friction.
Chapter 2, a joint work with S Roy, studies the impact of matrimonial laws
introduced by the British in colonial India during 1800s and early 1900s. Legal
reforms on marriage practices, including laws on minimum marriage age and female
infanticide, were introduced in British Provinces - district that were under British
direct rule. Exploiting quasi-random variations of districts that were former British
Provinces within each post-independent Indian states, this chapter studies their
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impact on female education and under age marriages in post-Independent India.
From independent sources of large-scale micro data, including administrative records
from schools and representative household surveys, we find that in former British
Provinces females have 5% lower chances of marrying under the current legal age,
and 1.6% higher chance of attending school at 10-16 years old. Child Marriage
abolition Act was introduced in 1931, which raised the minimum age of marriage
for female to 14. With newly digitized data on district level marriage pattern from
Census of India 1901-1931, we find that the act distorts the marriage market in the
short-run by increasing the likelihood of girls marrying at young age as it was pre-
announced before its implementation, while district more aware of the law exhibit
lower child marriage in the long run. It suggest that expansion of education for girls
in India has demand side constraints from child marriage practice that has historical
root.
The introduction of prenatal sex-detection technologies in India has led to a
phenomenal increase in abortion of female fetuses. Chapter 3, a joint work with
S Anukriti and Sonia Bhalotra investigates their impact on the relative chances of
girls surviving after birth, fertility and parental investments. We find that it lead to
reduction in excess female mortality, erosion of gender gaps in parental inputs such
as breastfeeding and immunization, and moderation of son-stopping fertility. For
every five aborted girls, we estimate that roughly one additional girl survives to age
five. Our findings have implications that sex-selective abortion not only account for
counts of missing girls but also for the later life outcomes of girls.
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Chapter 1
Behavioural response to time
notches in transaction tax:
Evidence from stamp duty in
Hong Kong and Singapore
To moderate speculation in housing market, multiple Asian cities implemented
transaction tax notches on holding period of property. Using administrative trans-
action record of property trading, this paper studies the behavioural response in the
timing of transaction, tax incidence and selection of buyers using the policy changes
in Hong Kong and Singapore. Tax notches on holding period generate significant
tax avoidance bunching in the timing of transaction, and properties were less likely
to be resold even one year after the tax last applies, suggesting plausible crowd out
of transactions. I construct and use a new dataset on government estimated rental
rate to estimate the tax incidence and find evidence that buyers bear significant
tax burden even when tax-free alternatives are available in the market. Evidence
shows that time notches on holding duration produce selection effect among buyers
with different ex ante probability of trade in the taxable holding period. Estimates
suggest that traders on average are willing to wait for 3-4 weeks to avoid 1% of
transaction tax, and each week of delay in transaction would generate loss in the
trading surplus at 0.3 % of property value.
1.1 Introduction
Transaction tax on short holding duration of real estate properties has become a
popular policy tool for governments in east and south east Asia since 2010. Hong
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Kong, Singapore, Macau, Taiwan and China introduced transaction tax with rates
that vary with holding duration to deter speculation in the housing market.1 Typi-
cally, residential property transactions are subject to an additional tax from 4-16%
of the transaction price if the property is re-sold within 2 to 4 years. Moreover, the
tax rate declines with the time seller holds the property. One intriguing feature of
these tax instruments is that they have a flat tax rate for an extended period of time
(e.g. 6 months), which then sharply decline once the time threshold is passed and
thus constitute salient time notches. While transaction tax in the property market
is present in many countries, there is very little evidence exist in the public finance
literature for how would the market reacts to transaction tax and particularly those
that are designed with objectives beyond raising tax revenue. This paper provide
empirical evidence on understanding how the market react to transaction tax that
have explicit inter-temporal design.
Is transaction tax on short holding duration an appropriate tool to stabilize
the housing market? Speculators and middlemen re-sell faster than home-owners
(Bayer et al., 2011), thus transaction tax on property with short holding duration
may impose additional cost for speculators and create selection of buyers in the
market. On the other hand, it distorts the trading behaviour for all traders including
home-owners, by either the distinct tax avoidance incentives and the potential tax
burden for new buyers. Recent studies in the UK shows that expected transaction
tax increase of 1% in the property market could generate significant re-timing of
transactions up to three weeks (Best and Kleven, 2015). The high transaction tax
rate and sharp tax notches implemented in Asia may thus creates incentives for
buyers and sellers to re-time their transaction, and discouraged welfare improving
transactions if the cost of re-timing is too high.2 In a way similar to the analysis
of capital gain tax, properties could be “locked-in” by the tax, which could lead
to equilibrium effect on transaction price where little is known empirically (Dai
et al., 2008). Using comprehensive administrative record in property transactions
of Hong Kong and Singapore, this paper analyses both the re-timing of transaction
and extensive margin crowd out that conceptually constitute the two main sources
of welfare cost of transaction tax with differential tax rate on holding duration.
1Hong Kong and Singapore introduced transaction tax that varies with holding duration in
2010; Macau and Taiwan had followed through in 2011.
2The design is similar to the long-term versus short-term capital gain tax in the U.S. (Shack-
elford and Verrecchia, 2002; Hurtt and Seida, 2004); Vermont had implemented capital gain tax
on land with a similar declining tax rate with holding duration to deter speculation since 1970s.
Daniels et al. (1986) argues that the capital gain tax on land had restricted supply and raise land
price.; Ontorio had implemented land speculation tax in April 1974 on gains on property transfer
within a 10 year horizon, and as the a fixed percentage of exemption is applied every full year, it
created tax notches each year same as the tax notches analysed in this paper. (Smith, 1976)
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The government of Hong Kong introduced the “Special Stamp Duty” on 20th
November 2010, in which for any residential properties purchased thereafter and
resold within 2 years, transaction tax rates of 5-15% were applicable. Using the
administrative record of property transaction in Hong Kong from 2009-2015, I con-
struct the full transaction history of residential properties from 2009-2015. Com-
paring properties that are subject to the “Special Stamp Duty” to those that are
not, I provide graphical evidence on significant bunching in property transactions
when properties were held for exactly 2 years as the tax rate drop from 5% to 0%.
With an regression discontinuity design, I find that properties subject to the tax
are less likely to be traded in the first three years since purchase by 13 percentage
points, taking into account of re-timing of transaction. This gives evidence to the
significant reduction in transaction at the extensive margin generated by the tax
even when tax avoidance is feasible, which implies non-trivial cost of transaction
re-timing in the housing market.
Contrasting cash buyers versus buyers who took a mortgage, I first provide evi-
dence that cash buyers on average are more likely to sell their property in the first
year by 4.6% before the reform. Using an event study setup, I find the introduction
of Special Stamp Duty increase the percentage of buyer with mortgage by 5.5%,
suggesting the Special Stamp Duty creates selection among the new buyers. The
tax distorts the trading behaviour on both type of buyers at the intensive margin
regarding tax-avoidance behaviour, while the extensive margin crowd-out is much
larger among the cash buyers.
To estimate the tax incidence, I use difference-in-differences strategy comparing
transactions carried out under the taxable holding period (before 2 years) to those
sold after the taxable period, as well as its counterpart for properties that are not
subject to the Special Stamp Duty at all. This controls for time-varying factors
in the housing market that may be correlated with the execution time of the tax.
To control for property heterogeneity, I construct a new data set on government
estimated rental rate for properties being traded in 2009-2015. This makes sure the
tax incidence is identified by comparing properties observationally equivalent but
subject to different tax liability, a methodology that is close to Besley et al. (2014).
I find that with transaction tax rate of 5% the buyer bear 4% of the burden, but
from that on every 5 % additional tax buyer only bear 1%. The significant burden
on buyer in a market where tax-free alternative is available suggests that buyer’s
property specific valuation is quantitatively important in housing transactions.
Under a simple search and match framework with Nash bargaining between buyer
and seller with the option to re-time their transaction similar to that in Slemrod et al.
15
(2016), I apply the bunching estimation method in recent public finance literature
(Best and Kleven, 2015; Chetty et al., 2011; Saez, 2010) to identify the time cost
of deferring transaction. Exploiting both the time notches in the “Special Stamp
Duty” and the “Seller’s Stamp Duty” introduced in Singapore at January 2011,
where its design is highly similar to the “Special Stamp Duty” in Hong Kong, I
provide estimates on the time traders are willing to wait to close the contract for
tax saving purpose.
I find that traders on average are willing to wait for 3-4 weeks to avoid 1% of tax.
The empirical estimates provide a way to quantify the welfare loss arising from delay
in transactions, and it suggests that each week of delay in transaction would generate
0.3% loss of the average value of the property traded. It also provides quantitative
benchmark for calibration in macroeconomic models that explicitly model dynamics
in housing market with forward looking buyers and sellers, for example when the
market thickness changes with seasonality or when moving decision is endogenous,
that buyers and sellers have to decide to enter the market now or later (Ngai and
Tenreyro, 2014; Ngai and Sheedy, 2016). Taking into account of both the extensive
margin crowd out and the cost of re-timing transactions, I find that the “Special
Stamp Duty” imposed 0.31% of welfare loss in terms of property values per holding.
The paper is divided as follows. The context of holding duration tax in Hong
Kong and Singapore is described in Section 1.2. The data and empirical strategy
are described in Sections 1.3 and 1.4 respectively, followed by results in Section 1.5.
Section 1.6 presents the conceptual framework to understand the welfare effect of
the tax. Section 1.7 present the estimate of delay cost using the framework. Section
1.8 conducts welfare analysis. Section 1.9 discuss some further implications of the
tax instrument.
1.2 Transaction tax on holding duration: Context
Transaction tax on real estate properties are termed stamp duty tax in Hong Kong
and Singapore. It is applicable to both residential and commercial properties, where
the tax rates varies according to the bracket of the transaction price, with progressive
marginal tax rate on price ranges from 1.5 % to 4.25%.3 While the marginal tax
rate in each price bracket differs, there are no notches in which the average tax rate
changes at sharp price cutoffs (e.g. in contrast to that in the UK stamp tax system).
3Figure 1.A.3 plots the tax rate in Hong Kong as a function of price. Leung et al. (2015) studies
the extent of tax avoidance to kinks in the static non-linear tax schedule.
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1.2.1 Special Stamp duty tax - Hong Kong
With the aim to prohibit speculative purchases and make residential properties more
affordable, the Hong Kong government introduced the Special Stamp Duty (SSD)
for residential units on 20th November 2010.
The Special Stamp Duty regulates that for any residential properties obtained
after 20th November 2010, an additional transaction tax would be levied if its next
transaction occur within 24 months from its last transaction.4 For units that are
resold within 6 months a tax rate of 15% is charged, 10% for 6-12 months, and 5%
for 12-24 months. At each of these cutoff date, average tax rate drop one day before
and after the time notch.5 On 27th October 2012 the government raised the tax
rate and increased the holding duration where the tax is chargeable to 3 years. For
properties resold within 6 months, tax rate of 20% is levied, while for those held for
6-12 months tax rate of 15% is charged. For properties in which the holding period
were from 1 to 3 years, the tax rate become 10%. The tax schedule as a function of
holding duration is plotted in Figure 1.1.
Statutorily, both buyer and seller are jointly liable for paying tax. In any efficient
bargaining between buyer and seller, buyer paying the tax would maximize the total
surplus of the transaction.6 It is also a common practice in the housing market in
Hong Kong for buyer to pay the stamp duty tax, therefore in the following analysis
I implicitly assume that buyer is responsible for paying the tax.
The Special Stamp Duty was completely unanticipated by the market in both
phases, and apply immediately to those properties traded thereafter.7 Property
obtained before the government announcement of the policy is not affected. Non-
residential units are also not subject to the Special Stamp Duty.
1.2.2 Seller’s Stamp duty tax - Singapore
Singapore first introduced the Seller’s Stamp Duty on 20th February 2010. Under
the Seller’s Stamp Duty, residential properties sold within one year is taxed at 1-3%
of the transaction prices, depending on the price bracket of the property. The exact
4This tax is levied on top of the underlying tax schedule.
5The duration of holding is defined as the time lapse between two legal documents that are
subject to stamp duty tax, which includes most provisional agreements signed
6Since this minimize the transaction price on paper and thus lower the amount of tax paid out
of the joint surplus.
7There are conditions in which the tax could be exempted: 1. the property is transferred to
close relatives; 2. re-selling by financial institutions under the condition of mortgage default 3.
transfer of property to government/charitable organizations 4. mandated selling by the court 5.
selling of inherited properties 6. selling under bankruptcy 6. transfer of residential properties
between related corporate body http://www.ird.gov.hk/chi/faq/ssd.htm
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tax rate is a function of the transaction price - which creates a tax structure similar
to the one studied by Slemrod et al. (2016) in Washington D.C., where there is a
simultaneous decision problem in tax avoidance by adjusting transaction price or
time. Properties sold with holding period beyond one year face 0% rate from the
Seller’s Stamp Duty.
For properties obtained between 30th August 2010 to 13th January 2011, the
taxable holding duration were extended to 3 years. Moreover, notches were intro-
duced in 1 and 2 year, where the average tax rate drop by 1/3 at the 1 and 2 years
cutoff. Therefore the size of the tax notch varies with the price bracket, for exam-
ple, for properties with price smaller than 180,000SGD, selling within the first year
implies 1% of tax rate, and the time notches have reduction in average tax rate of
0.33% in both the 1 and 2 years cutoffs.
In 14 Jan 2011, the tax rate were raised to 16% for selling within the first year,
12% for property sold in 1-2 year, 8% for property traded in 2-3 year, and 4% for
property traded between 3-4 year. This tax structure follow exactly the same as
that in Hong Kong, with a smaller drop in average tax rate at size of 4%. Also, the
period that subject to the tax is longer than that in Hong Kong.8 The tax schedule
of the Seller’s Stamp Duty after 14 Jan 2011 is plotted in Figure 1.11.9.
1.3 Data
This paper uses government administrative transaction record of properties in Hong
Kong, covering 2009-2015. The data contains information of more than 3 million
contracts that is filed at the Land Registry for registration of tax purposes and is
titled Memorial Day Book. It contains sets of contracts signed and lodged to the
Land Registry for formal registration, including provisional/formal agreements of
sales and purchases, assignment of the properties and mortgage agreement. The
agreement of sales and purchases for residential property provide information on
the date, address, value of the transaction as well as stamp duty paid. For each
property I observe the history of transaction from 2009, I could therefore construct
the duration of holding before its next sold, a key variable for the analysis that
follows. From 2009-2015 there are 480,351 residential transaction records.10
The holding duration where the Special Stamp Duty applies counts from the
first agreement that is registered to the Land Registry, which could either be a for-
8Source: Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (2011)
9The transition of the seller’s stamp duty for properties worth less than 180,000 SGD is sum-
marized in Figure 1.11
10See data appendix for more detailed description.
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mal or provisional agreement of sales and purchases. While provisional agreements
were signed before the formal agreement as common practice, only those that had a
significant lag between the two would require registration of the provisional agree-
ments.11 In the empirical analysis I correct for the date of purchases to the date of
which the provisional agreement is signed, if such provisional agreement exist in the
Land Registry record.
For each residential transaction, I match it with the mortgage record filed to
the Land Registry, a common procedure for transaction where the property were
purchased under mortgage. This allows for construction of an indicator for whether
the buyer purchase the properties with cash or with mortgage.
I collect data on the rateable values, the government estimates of open mar-
ket rents adjusted according to property specific characteristics, for each properties
being bought and resold within the period 2009-2015, dated at October 2015. Rate-
able values are used for tax purpose, as property owner are liable to pay the rate for
each property which is around 3-5 % of the rateable values, similar to the council
tax in the UK. The Rating and Valuation department states that the value adjust
for property characteristics, including age, size, location, floor, direction, transport
facilities, amenities, quality of finishes, building maintenance/repair and property
management.12 This provides a single measure of observables of property to control
for property heterogeneity in the empirical analysis. It is important to note that the
assessment of the rateable value is not affected by any sales restrictions or ownership
status of the property.
I also obtained administrative record for Singapore residential properties trans-
action record from the Real Estate Information System of the Urban Redevelopment
Authority of Singapore, from 1995 to 2015, which consists of 431,359 records during
the period.
1.4 Empirical Setup and Measure
1.4.1 Extensive margin response
I first use regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of the Special Stamp
Duty on the probability that a property is being resold before 2 years where the
transaction is taxable and up to 3 years where the transaction is not taxed. This
quantifies the extent in which the Special Stamp Duty change the trading pattern.
11Usually the provisional agreement had to be registered if its lapse with the formal agreement
is mroe than 14 days
12It is published for the public every year from March to May upon search.
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Specifically, I exploit the fact that for properties purchased one day before the
20th November 2010, there is no tax liability on all holding duration while those
purchased right on the 20th November it is liable for the tax. By comparing the
behaviour of purchaser before and after the application of the tax locally, who face
almost identical demand condition in the market following the purchases, one could
identify the behavioural response that comes from the side of seller. Moreover, with
the assumption that purchaser who signed the agreement one day before and after
the application of the tax are similar in their selling behaviour in the absence of
tax conditional on observables, one could identify the treatment effect of the tax
schedule on the trading pattern.
In particular, the Special Stamp Duty introduced on 20th November 2010 had
taxable period of 2 years, and with distinct tax rate at transaction of holding period
before and after the cutoff of 6 months, 1 year and 2 years. I thus construct indicator
Ty of whether a property is traded within y years since last purchased, where y
belongs to 6 months, 1 and 2 years.
To measure the extent of extensive margin response, one must take into account
of the re-timing in transaction due to tax avoidance incentives. If transaction could
be perfectly re-timed by incurring cost that is low relative to the surplus of the
transaction, one would observe that the probability of a property being resold not
to be affected at horizon after 2 years. However, if re-timing is costly and the
magnitude of tax is large relative to the size of surplus, then the tax on holding
duration could cause significant crowd out, which could in turn have first order
impact in welfare. I thus further construct the indicator Ty for the 3 year horizon,
allowing for one year of potential re-timing of transaction.
I estimate the following linear RDD regression for each property i and spell j
around 20th November 2010,
Ty,ij = α + βt˜+ ρDt + β2Dt ∗ t˜+ ηij (1.1)
where t is measured in days. t˜ = t − tˆ where tˆ represent 20th November 2010,
thus t˜ is the time difference in days from 20th November 2010. Dt is an indicator
for t ≥ tˆ. Ty,ij is an indicator if a property holding is resold within y years since its
purchase.
The coefficient of interest is ρ, which capture the difference in probability of
re-trade in y years locally between purchaser who are subject to the tax and those
who are not.
20
1.4.2 Tax incidence
The reduced form effect of tax burden on buyers and seller could be estimated with
the following equation
ln Pijt = β1 ∗Hij,6 ∗ postij + β2 ∗Hij,6−12 ∗ postij + β3 ∗Hij,12−24 ∗ postij
+ σs + γtln RVi + γt2ln RV
2
i + δt + it (1.2)
where Pijt is pre-tax price for property i of spell j at time t.
13 Hijs is an indicator
for property i held for s months, postij is an indicator that equals 1 if Special Stamp
Duty is applicable to the property spell ij, i.e. bought between 20th Nov 2010-27th
Oct 2012. σs is month of holding FE at broad group category of 0-6 months, 6-12
months, 12-24 months and beyond 24 months. δt is fixed effect for the time in which
the transactions occur, this allows us to control for any changes in average buyer’s
valuation affected by the tax.
RVi is rateable value of property i measured at Oct 2015. As described in the
data section, this is the government estimated open market annual rental value
in October 2015, which summarizes many property specific characteristics. This
control for most relevant heterogeneity of the property. As rent-price ratio can
varies in the long run (Gallin, 2008), I allow for arbitrary time variant fundamental
relation between rental rate and transaction price by allowing γt and γt2 to varies
over time at month level. In general, I could include an polynomial of ln RVi at
higher order level, but as shown as the robustness section, the inclusion of 3rd or
higher order makes very little difference to the empirical results.
1.4.3 Transaction Re-timing
To capture the overall effect and discontinuity in probability of trade generated by
the Special Stamp Duty, I estimate the following hazard function flexibly at week
intervals:
Tijt =
J∑
j=0
wjIj + it (1.3)
where Tijt is an indicator of whether a trade happen for property i at time t
at the jth week since it was last purchased. Ij is a set of fully flexible dummy
variables that capture the baseline hazard.14 Equation 1.3 is estimated separately
13A spell is defined as a holding that start since a transaction occurred
14Estimating Equation 1.3 by OLS is equivalent to the Kaplan-Meier estimator
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for residential properties in Hong Kong purchased in 3 periods: 1) 1st January 2009
- 20th November 2010 where there is no tax liability as function of holding duration;
2) between 20th November 2010-26th October 2012 where time notches are present
in the 6, 12, 24 months and 3) on or after 27th October 2012 where time notches
are present in 6, 12, 24, 36 months. As far as the data allows, I estimate equation
1.3 taking J up to 158 weeks. That allows one to capture any re-timing effect up to
the third year.
The degree of re-timing would be captured by the estimate wj where j equals
the time of the notch. One would expect the probability of trade to be much higher
right on the notch, and if there is any market friction that prevent trading happening
exactly at time t¯, one would also see that for the immediate weeks after the notch
the estimate wj would still be higher than the counter-factual wj as estimated using
properties without the tax liability. Correspondingly, one would observe wj would
be lower than counter factual for weeks immediately before the time notch.
Similarly for Singapore I estimate the hazard function of trade up to 5 years as
the data allows, to capture any re-timing effect following the time notch at the 4
years since purchase.
1.4.4 Type selection
To identify the selection effect of the Special Stamp Duty on new buyers, I estimate
the proportion of transaction where mortgages are filed in each week before and
after the introduction of the tax. I estimate the following event-study equation
using transactions of residential properties that has price below HKD 6,800,000, a
price range with minimal change in loan-to-value ratio limit in the mortgage market
for period 3 months before and after 20 November 201015
mit = β + β1 ∗
24∑
b=−24
wbIb + µi + γdm + it (1.4)
mit ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator equal to 1 if the property i at time t is purchased
by mortgage buyer. Ib is an indicator of whether the transaction it occurred bth
weeks before or after the application of Special Stamp Duty phase 1. To increase
the power and control for seasonality, I estimate the following regression:
15If any of the exogenous reduction in loan-to-value ratio limit in this period have effect on
mortgage demand, the estimate in this section provide a lower bound of the selection effect. See
Figure 1.A.4 for a graphical summary of change in loan-to-limit ratio since 2009 in various price
range.
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mit = β + β2 ∗ Afterit + µi + γdm + it
further including district-month of the year fixed effect γdm by extending the
sample from July 2009 to March 2011, and property fixed effect µi to control for
unobserved characteristics of the property.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Re-timing and extensive margin response
Figure 1.2 plots the RDD graphs on the probability of re-sale in different time
horizon since purchase by the day of the property was being obtained. The outcome
variables are accumulative in each of the panels in Figure 1.2, thus the probability
of being resold in 3 years in panel (a) is by definition larger than the probability
of being resold in 6 months in panel (d). It is clear from all the panels in Figure
1.2 that there is a sharp discontinuity on 20th November 2010. For purchasers who
purchase one day after 20th November 2010, the probability of resold in 6 months,
1 year, 2 years and 3 years are all significantly lower than those before it.
Table 1.1 reports the RD estimate of equation 1.1. Column (1) shows the coeffi-
cient for the effect of the tax on probability of re-sold in 3 years, where the estimate
for ρ is -0.133 and is highly statistically significant, suggesting that purchaser who
are subject to the tax are less likely to trade in 3 years by 13 percentage point. The
baseline probability of a property being resold in 3 years is 29 percentage point, in
which the treatment effect suggest a very large drop in the transaction at extensive
margin. On the other hand, the estimates for ρ in column (4) for probability of
resold in 6 months is exceptionally large at -0.0743 in relation to its baseline mean
which is 7.59 percentage point, suggesting that the Special Stamp Duty reduced
trade at very short duration dramatically.
I further estimate equation 1.1 by the type of buyers with or without mortgage.
The treatment effect for buyers on the chance of resold in 3 years, for those without
any mortgage is 16.6 percentage point, and is bigger than those without mortgage,
where the treatment effect is 11.6 percentage point. This provide evidence that
the tax has a stronger extensive margin effect on purchaser who are more likely to
re-trade in early period.
Table 1.3 reports estimate of equation 1.1 for the holding duration conditional
on a property holding is resold before 31st December 2015. Column (1) reports the
estimate for all property holdings, while the average holding duration conditional
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on sales is 733 days before the treatment, the Special Stamp Duty increase the
holding duration conditional on sales by 334 days. Comparing column (2) and (3),
the magnitude of the treatment effect is of the same order of magnitude for property
holding that is associated with or without mortgages.
Table 1.4 reports estimate of equation 1.1 on the probability of a property being
resold in 5 years for the effect of Seller’s Stamp Duty Phase 3 on 14 Jan 2011,
where the maximum taxable holding period is up to 4 years and therefore capture
the extensive margin effect taking potential re-timing of transaction into account.
The coefficient estimate is -0.058, which suggest that property were less likely to be
re-traded in 5 years by 5.8 percentage point. The related RDD graph is plotted in
Figure 1.A.7.
I also conduct the test on continuity of the density around the cutoff date as
suggested by McCrary (2008). Panel (a) and (b) of Figure 1.A.8 plot the density
of trading day around 20th Nov 2010 for Hong Kong, and the graphs suggest that
there is discontinuity in the density of trade around this period of time. The density
mass of the transaction on the day the policy announced on 19 Nov 2010, which is a
Friday, is not significantly higher than previous Friday, implying there is very little
manipulation in the conventional sense. It suggests that the discontinuity is mainly
driven by reduction in transaction after the application of the policy, which is by
itself an outcome of the tax policy. The graphical evidences from Figure 1.2 display
no discontinuous change in the outcomes to the left of the cutoff, again confirming
that the RD estimate is unlikely to be confounded by manipulation.
1.5.2 Tax incidence
Table 1.5 shows the coefficient estimates for equation 1.2 for transaction price of
residential properties sold in 2009-2015 in Hong Kong. Column (1) leaves out (log)
rateable values as control while column (2) includes it. The coefficients of interest
are post*sold 6m, post*sold 6-12m and post*sold 1-2year. The estimate for post*sold
6m is -0.0103 %, implying that property traded with 5% tax are associated with
1.03 % lower price for seller, and the buyer pay 3.97% higher price for the property
that are observationally equivalent to property that are not subject to the tax in the
same market. The coefficient post*sold 6-12m is -0.0505 and statistically significant,
suggesting that property that are subject to 10% special stamp duty were traded at
price 5.05% lower, and thus buyers are paying 4.95% higher price for the property.
For property that are sold within the first 6 months are sold on average 8.85 % lower
seller price, where it is subject to tax rate of 15%. This suggest that buyer pays
around 6.15% higher price.
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The difference between the estimates for post*sold 6m,post*sold 6-12m is around
0.038 and the difference between post*sold 6-12m and post*sold 1-2year is around
0.04. For every additional increase in the tax rate from 5% to 10% and 10% to 15%,
the buyer only bear around 1 % of the additional tax, while the seller receive price
that is 4% lower.
Comparing column (1) and (2), there are significant selection in the value of
properties being traded under high transaction tax. In column (1) where I did not
include rateable value as control, the post*sold 6m coefficient is positive, in line
with the pattern observed in Figure 15, in which the median transaction price is
plotted against the holding duration. The coefficient become significantly negative
once we control for rateable values, suggesting that selection on observables explains
a large proportion of the positive coefficient in column (1). Similarly, the coefficient
post*sold 6-12m is not statistically significant and is close to zero in column (1),
while it turns into negative and significant once I control for rateable value. This
suggest that properties at a higher price range have a larger mass for having surplus
beyond 10%.
Figure 1.A.10 plot the relationship between the log price and log rateable values
for the sample in 2009. It shows the log rateable value is highly correlated with
transaction price in a stable manner. In Table 1.6 I examined whether second
order polynomial is a good fit for Rateable value as control for observables in the
transaction price. I estimate equation 1.2 using 1-4 order polynomials from column
(2)-(5). Upon the 2nd order polynomial, the estimates are very robust to adding
additional polynomial terms. This suggest that 2nd order polynomial is a very good
fit for rateable value to predict transaction price.
1.5.3 Transaction re-timing
Figure 1.5 plots the coefficients of wj in equation 1.3 for properties that are pur-
chased between January 2009 to 19th November 2010 and from 20th November 2010
to 26th October 2012. There is significant re-timing for transaction, and sharp dis-
continuities are observed in each of the time notch. There are three salient patterns
1) the tax schedule unambiguously decrease the probability of trade within the first
2 years of purchases; 2) the probability of trade increase dramatically at exactly
2 year, the last tax notch where the tax rate drop to 0; 3) the excess probability
of trade is decreasing gradually after the 2 year time notch. Pattern (2) and (3)
together provide sound evidence that many trades in the market are intentionally
shifting their trading time to avoid the 5% tax rate within the 1-2 year window of
holding period.
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The reduction in the probability of trade within the first 2 years is proportional
to the magnitude of the tax. Within the first year, the decline in the probability
of trade is around 0.2-0.4%, which is almost equal to the pre-treatment average. In
the 1-2 year period, the treatment effect is around 0.15%, and the probability of
trade after the application of Special Stamp Duty is decreasing as one approach the
2 year time notch. Figure 1.4 plots the densities of holding duration for properties
purchased in the two different periods and it shows highly similar pattern.
Figure 1.8 plot both the hazard function of trade and the coefficients of weekj in
equation 1.3 by whether the transaction has affiliated mortgages. Panel (a) plotted
the hazard function by type of buyers for properties obtained under period that is
unaffected by the tax, which shows cash buyer are more likely to trade within the first
year, while starting from the second year the difference diminished or even reversed.
The treatment effect of tax plotted from panel (b) shows that the Special Stamp
Duty has a much stronger impact on cash buyer than buyer who filed mortgages,
mainly due to the fact that cash buyer has a larger baseline probability of trading
below 1 year. The probability of trade in the 1-2 years period on both type of
buyers are indistinguishable after the application of the tax. And both exhibit
similar degree of bunching towards the 2nd year time notch.
1.5.4 Selection of buyer
Figure 1.9 plot the estimates of coefficients of time t in equation 1.4. The base
group is on the third week of November 2010. The coefficients are not statistically
significant from zero before the introduction of Special Stamp Duty, and also exhibit
no trends. The estimates of the time coefficients after third week of November 2012
are slightly positive and become statistically significant at around 0.05 percentage
point after the 5th weeks.
Table 1.7 shows the estimation results of equation 1.4. Column (1) report the
coefficient that cover sample of 2 months before and after the introduction of Special
Stamp Duty. The estimates suggest that after the introduction of the special stamp
duty tax, 1.7% of the buyer are buyers who would filed mortgage, compare to period
in which the Special Stamp Duty was not in place. Column (2) and (3) extends the
sample to 3 and 4 months before and after the Special Stamp Duty and the coefficient
is largely similar in magnitude.
Column (4) extends the sample to July 2009 to March 2011, and control for
district-month of the year fixed effect to control for seasonality in the last quarter
of the year. The estimate become 2.92%, which is very close to estimates in column
(1)-(3). Column (5) control for property fixed effects, and the coefficient become
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even bigger at magnitude of 5.52%. The evidence suggest that after the introduction
of the Special Stamp Duty among the new buyer there is 2-5% more of those filed
mortgages.
1.6 Conceptual framework
In this section I provide an empirically relevant framework to understand the welfare
implication of transaction tax on holding duration. The market response and welfare
cost of transaction tax with time notches largely depends on the time preferences
of representative buyers and sellers. (Slemrod et al., 2016) If buyer and seller has
low adjustment cost in transaction time, a time notch may generate significant
bunching toward the side with lower average tax rate to avoid tax. (e.g. the right
hand side of the time notch in Figure 1.1) This means the tax would shift the timing
of transaction, but few matched transactions would be forgone. On the other hand
if adjustment cost is high, there would be limited tax avoidance behaviour, but
transaction with low surplus would be crowded out from the market depending on
the size of the tax rate.
Central to this, I present a stylized model on buyer and sellers simultaneous
decision on transaction price and trading time, simplifed from Slemrod et al. (2016).
In the empirical section I would show that its prediction match the basic pattern
of the market reaction, and argue that it provides a framework for identifying the
adjustment cost in time for transaction. In the model, buyers and sellers explicitly
prefer early trading date.16 The trade-off in the optimal trading time at the intensive
margin naturally features intertemporal decision between tax saving and disutility
associated with delaying transaction.
Consider a pair of matched buyer and seller who value the property by H and
u respectively, at time t counting from the seller last bought the house. The buyer
and seller bargain over the price and trading time through Nash bargaining. A tax
notch is set by the government, where the transaction is taxable at rate τ¯ if the
trade is executed at time T when T < t¯, otherwise tax rate
¯
τ applies where
¯
τ < τ¯ .
The seller’s surplus in a transaction is
Sv = p− u− kv(T − t)
where seller receive price p over losing the reservation value u. kv(T − t) capture
the time preference of the seller, and T − t is the time between the transaction and
16Where in Slemrod et al. (2016) it is modelled as buyer and seller having an ideal trade-date,
a setup that is more relevant when considering an increase in tax rate after a fixed date
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the match was first formed. Assume that kv > 0 so that the seller prefer trading
earlier. kv is thus the utility cost in delaying transaction per unit of time. kv(T − t)
could be considered as first order local approximation for a general function of T
and t.
Similarly, the buyer’s surplus is
Sb = H − p(1 + τ)− kb(T − t)
where the buyer get the valuation H, pay the price p, and are subject to tax rate
τ , where τ ∈ {¯τ, τ¯}. kb(T − t) capture the time preference of buyer, with kb > 0 so
that the buyer also prefer to trade sooner than later.
The trading time T and price p is determined by Nash Bargaining that maximize
the joint surplus, i.e.
maxT,p (Sb)
1−θ(Sv)θ
If trade happen at time T, transaction price would follow the first order condition
(1 + τ)(1− θ)Sv = θSb, explicitly given by the following
p(T, t,H, u) =
 θ1+τ¯H + (1− θ)u if T = tθ
1+
¯
τ
[H − kb(t¯− t)] + (1− θ)(u+ kv(t¯− t))] if T = t¯
(1.5)
To maximize the joint-surplus, only T = t¯ and T = t would be chosen, therefore
a match between buyer and seller, depending on the respective size of H and u,
would decide upon: 1) trade immediately at time T = t, 2) bunch at the time notch
T = t¯, or 3) no trade at all.
To understand better the trade-off, a pair of buyer and seller would choose to
trade exactly at the time t¯ if
Sb(T = t¯) + Sv(T = t¯) > max{Sb(T = t) + Sv(T = t), 0}
When
¯
τ = 0, the condition in which the match would wait until t¯ to trade could
be further reduced into
p(t, t,H, u)∆τt > (kb + kv)(t¯− t) (1.6)
where ∆τ = τ¯ −
¯
τ . The left hand side of equation 1.6 is the tax saving of
executing the transaction at time t¯ instead of time t, while the right hand side of
the equation is the total utility cost of delaying the transaction by t¯− t unit of time.
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Proposition 1 Assume that H and u follows some joint distribution of G(H, u), if
time preference for trade is weak, i.e. kb+kv is small, then more transactions would
trade exactly at t¯, less transactions are carried out at t < t¯
Proposition 1 says that when time preference is weak, the buyer and seller has
little to lost by delaying the trade date. This also implies that we may observe very
few transactions realizing before t¯. One thing to note is that the shifting in timing
of transaction need not depends only on the time preference of the seller even if the
tax is seller specific. In an economy where the seller has distinct characteristics than
the buyer, in terms of demographics or economic wealth18, both the time preference
for buyer and sellers affect how the market response to the tax.
Proposition 2 At the notch of which
¯
τ = 0, and some joint distribution of H and
u G(H, u)
1. the probability of trading at time t decrease as t get closer to t¯, for t < t¯
2. The observed reduction in probability of trade at t < t¯, where the tax rate drop
to 0 after t¯, is larger than the case with a tax policy that applies tax rate τ for
all trading time t
When
¯
τ = 0, the decision between trading immediately or delaying transactions
depends on the relative rate of decline between the saving of tax with the utility lost
of delaying. In general, the disutility decline with the rate kb+kv when one get closer
to t¯, while the savings by tax decrease by the rate ((1 − θ)kv − θkb)∆τt < kb + kv.
Thus the probability of trade at time t for t < t¯ is decreasing in t.
The condition in which the three decisions are determined are illustrated in
Figure 1.A.12. It plots the combination of different H and u with the relevant
constraints when
¯
τ = 0. In the absence of tax, trade would happen for H and u
when surplus is strictly positive.
When a transaction tax τ is introduced, only matches with surplus higher than
τ percent of the reservation value of seller are traded. However if a time notch in t¯
is present, some matches that would yield non-positive surplus under tax τ would
then have positive surplus by waiting until t¯ to trade (i.e. area B in Figure 1.A.12).
The empirical prediction in Proposition 2 can seen by conducting comparative
static with respect to t. For matches formed far away from t¯ implies a higher
17The general case where
¯
τ 6= 0 is p(t, t,H, u)∆τt > (kb + kv)(t¯− t)−∆pt
¯
τ
18e.g. Lawrance (1991) finds that poorer households has higher rate of time preference
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(kb + kv)(t¯− t). The line H − u ≥ k(t) and the downward sloping dotted line would
both move to the right. The area B + W would unambiguously decrease, and the
area T +A would increase. When matches are formed far away from the time notch
t¯, the probability of trading at time t thus increase.
Consider an exogenous increase in τ . Less transactions has the surplus over
reservation value ratio higher than the tax rate, but at the same time it lower the
cutoff of pd in which it worth trading exactly at t¯.
1.6.1 Selection on buyers and effect on equilibrium price
The application of transaction tax with rates that decrease with holding duration
could create selection on type of buyers and changes the outside option of buyer in
the search process.
If buyers have predetermined characteristics θ that could predict average trading
time of the property in the future, buyers with different θ would foresee to face a
different tax rate in expectation. In particular, the valuation of a buyer at the time
of buying could be represented as
H = φ(θ)
¯
u(τ) + (1− φ(θ))u¯− z(τ) (1.7)
where φ(θ) is probability of trade happen at t < t¯ in the absence of tax,
¯
u(τ) is
the present discounted value of selling in period t < t¯, u¯ is the present discounted
value of selling in period t > t¯, as long as
¯
u < u¯, there would be more buyer with
characteristics θl in the market, with θh > θl and φ
′(θ) > 0
Furthermore, by reducing the probability of buyer matched with seller with pos-
itive surplus, the tax can affect the outside option of the buyer in the bargaining
process. For example, the outside option z(τ) could be decreasing in τ if the tax
reduce the effective supply. On the other hand if the selection effect reduce the num-
ber of buyers in the market, it may increase the chance the buyer meeting another
seller with positive surplus, in that case z(τ) would be increasing in τ . Formally
endogenizing the outside option for buyer is beyond the scope of this paper.
1.7 Estimating waiting time and welfare cost of
delayed transactions
To quantify the effect of the tax notch on trading time, I estimate the average waiting
time for traders in the market t¯ − t(H, u), where t(H, u) is defined by rewriting
equation 1.8 in the following form for each pair of H and u:
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p(H, u)∆τt = (kb + kv)(t¯− t(H, u))) (1.8)
t(H, u) could be interpreted as the cutoff trading time for a transaction with
price p(H, u). If the seller meet a buyer at time t where t ∈ {t(H, u), t¯}, the optimal
trading time would be at time t¯. For a given tax notch τ , expectation of the cutoff
trading time and t¯ across all the potentially profitable trades, E(t¯− t(H, u)|H−u >
τu), would be the average waiting time for which the market would be willing to
delay the transactions to time t¯.
Assume that the density of arrival time of matches is l(t), and the density of
trading time in the presence of tax τ is g(t), which could be estimated from the
data, the excess mass B at t¯ could be represented as
B ≈
∫
H−u>τu
∫ t¯
t(H,u)
l(t)dtdG(H, u) = g(t¯)(E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > τu) (1.9)
where G(H, u) is any joint distribution function of H and u. 19
The approximation is more accurate if the extensive margin response near the
time notch is negligible. Under existence of extensive margin response locally at
the time notch, the bunching estimates could provide a upper/lower bound of the
quantity of interest, (E(t¯ − t(H, u)|H − u > τu), by scaling the excess bunching
mass with the density of the counter-factual density with tax rate 0 or with tax rate
τ , which I provide more discussion on it in the appendix. 20 Following the existing
literature as in Best and Kleven (2015) and Chetty et al. (2011), I estimate the
counter-factual density g(t) using the following equation:
bj = c(j) +
k=t¯+R∑
k=t¯−R
δkI[j = k] + µj (1.10)
where bj is the bin count in holding duration for jth weeks, c(j) is a 7th order
polynomial in terms of number of weeks, and I[j = k] is a set of dummies for R week
before and after the tax notch at t¯. 21 The prediction of this equation, c(t¯), is going
to provide an estimate of the counterfactual density g(t¯), conceptually by excluding
19The estimate would be robust to the case where buyer and seller have exponential discounting
with first order linearization, in that case kb = Hρb and kv = uρv, where ρb and ρv are discount
rates of the buyer and seller respectively
20In the case of there is significant extensive margin response in at time t¯, the estimate provide
a bounding on (E(t¯− t(H,u)|H −u > τu). A detailed discussion is presented in the section 1.A.3.
21In practice I include the dummy variables for holding duration from 330 to 400 days to estimate
the excess mass at 1 year notch, and 694 to 864 days for the 2 years notch.
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the weeks immediately before/after t¯. Thus we could compute the estimate using
equation 1.9.
Eˆ(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > τu) ≈ Bˆ
ˆg(t)
where Bˆ is computed using the observed excess bin count around t¯.
The ratio of waiting time to tax bear an intuitive interpretation for estimating
the utility cost of kb + ks as percentage of trading price, by taking appropriate
expectation over equation 1.8 and rearranging terms:
∆τ
E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > τu) =
kb + ks
E(p|H − u > τu) (1.11)
1.7.1 Results
Figure 1.13 panel (a) plots the actual and estimated counter-factual density of the
2 years notch of the Special Stamp Duty, for properties purchased between 20th
November 2010 to 26th October 2012. Using the gap between the actual density
and the counter-factual to calculate the excess mass, I find that on average the cutoff
waiting time, E(t¯ − t(H, u)|H − u > τu), is 17.39 week when the size of the notch
is 5%.
Panel (b) plot the actual and estimated counter-factual density of the 4 years
notch of the Seller’s Stamp Duty, for properties purchased between 14 January 2011,
in which the 3rd phase of the Seller’s Stamp Duty begins, to those that are purchased
before 14 January 2012. I restrict plotting the data to the one year windows because
for those properties that are purchased in mid-2012 the transaction after 4 years since
purchased is still not being observed at the time of writing. I find that the bunching
estimates of the average cutoff waiting time is 13.32 week, slightly smaller than the
estimate from the Special Stamp Duty but is associated with a smaller tax notch at
4%.
Using equation 1.11, one can apply the estimates obtained for E(t¯− t(H, u)|H−
u > τu) and the related size of tax notch to identify kb+kv
E(p)
which is the proportional
welfare cost of delaying a transaction by a week. From the 2 years tax notch of
the Special Stamp Duty phase 1, the implied kb+kv
E(p|H−u>τu) is 0.29%, while from the
last tax notch of the 3rd phase of Seller’s Stamp Duty, the implied estimate for
kb+kv
E(p|H−u>τu) equals 0.3%, suggesting delay in a single transaction would results in
lost of trading surplus by 0.3% of the value of the transacted property.
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1.8 Welfare analysis
Following the conceptual framework, the welfare gain from transaction in the econ-
omy per unit of property held less than 3 years when the tax rate is 0 is given
by
W (0) =
∫
t
∫
H−u>0
(H − u)dG(H, u)dL˜(t) (1.12)
With tax rate τ > 0, the welfare is given by
W (τ) =
∫
t
∫
A,T
(H − u)dG(H, u)dL˜(t) +
∫
t
∫
W,B
(H − u)
− (kb + kv)(t¯− t)dG(H, u)dL˜(t) + λR(τ) (1.13)
where A, T denote the value of H, u such that trading immediately is optimal,
W,B denote the value of H, u where wait is the optimal decision, as shown in Figure
1.A.12. Denoting the tax revenue by R(τ) and the shadow value of tax revenue as
λ, the change in welfare is given by
W (τ)−W (0) + λR(τ) =
−
∫
t
∫
NT
H−udG(H, u)dL˜(t)−
∫
t
∫
W,B
(kb+kv)(t¯− t)dG(H, u)dL˜(t)+(λ−1)R(τ)
(1.14)
To bound the welfare loss, I use the estimates of kb+kv from the previous section.
The welfare cost associated with the second term, for which a property were forced
to wait until 2 years, could be approximated by
∫
t
∫
W,B
(kb + kv)(t¯− t)dG(H, u)dL˜(t)
≈ (kb + kv) ∗ E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > τu)
2
2
∗ P (H − u > τu) ∗ l(t¯) (1.15)
We could obtain an estimate of P (H − u > τu) ∗ l(t¯) by the probability of a
property trade per week after for t < t¯, which is roughly 0.0005 under the 5% tax.
Assuming the the tax rate was 5% everywhere with t¯ equals to 2 years, the welfare
cost associated with the second term is 17.36
2
2
∗ 0.29% ∗ 0.0005 ∗E(p) = 0.02% ∗E(p)
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of the average value of property in the market.
To quantify the welfare loss at the extensive margin, it would be important to
understand how trading surplus is distributed among transactions that were crowded
out. For example, at a tax rate of 5%, all the transaction that were crowded out
must have surplus lower than 5% of the seller’s reservation value. Whether the
trading surplus concentrated mostly towards 0% versus 5% determine the size of
the lost in trading surplus.
To understand better the distribution of trading surplus, I take advantage of
the fact that under the same context both the Special Stamp Duty and the Seller’s
Stamp Duty generate exogenous variation in tax rate that results in different trading
hazard at various tax level. The hazard rate of trade at a particular tax level depends
on likelihood that trading surplus in proportional sense, z ≡ H−u
u
, is greater than
the transaction tax level. In particular, at different tax rate τ and τ ′ abstracting
from the re-timing close to the notch, with h(τ) being the hazard rate of trade at
time t with tax rate τ , we can calculate the density of the trading surplus
lim
τ ′→τ
h(τ)− h(τ ′)
h(0)− h(τ¯)
1
(τ − τ ′) == −j(τ |0 < z < τ¯) (1.16)
for any τ and τ ′ that is close, τ < τ ′, and τ¯ > {τ, τ ′}. 22
That is, by comparing the rate in which the hazard rate decline with respect
to tax rate, one could infer the density of the conditional distribution of the sur-
plus. Moreover, with enough data point at each tax rate, one could estimate non-
parametrically the density of the trading surplus.
For the Special stamp Duty, I get estimates from the earlier section on h(τ)
where τ ∈ {0, 5, 10, 15}
In practice, I use the hazard rate h(τ) where τ = {0, 5} to estimate the condi-
tional density at τ = 0, and use τ = {5, 10} to estimate the conditional density at
τ = 5 so and so forth.
The results for both trading surplus in Hong Kong and Singapore is presented
in graph 1.A.11, and the shape is very similar using the two procedures. It suggest
that the trading surplus decline very rapidly at around 4-10%, and there is little
mass above the threshold of 10%.
Using a linear approximation of the density between 0% and 5%, I find that the
22
lim
τ ′→τ
h(τ)− h(τ ′)
h(0)− h(τ¯)
1
(τ − τ ′) = limτ ′→τ
(P (z > τ)− P (z > τ ′))l(t)
(P (z > 0)− P (z > τ¯)(τ − τ ′)l(t)
= −j(τ |0 < z < τ¯)
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conditional expectation of the trading surplus is E(H−u
u
|0 < H−u
u
< 0.05) = 2.23%.
Therefore the extensive margin lost would be −0.13 ∗ 2.23% = −0.29% of the value
of property.
In total, the lower bound of welfare loss would be the sum of the intensive and
extensive margin, which amounts to 0.31% of the value of a representative property.
This is the welfare loss per each new holding, and is increasing in the number of
properties purchased in which the policy is in place. Given that very little tax
revenue is generated from the tax schedule, this suggest non-trivial welfare loss to
the property market as a whole.
1.9 Discussion
1.9.1 Comparison with capital gain tax
The extensive margin response or lock-in effect shown previously, in comparison to
previous literature, is reasonably large. For example, Shan (2011) finds that 10,000
USD increase in capital gains tax liability reduces semiannual sales by 0.1 percentage
points. Take the upper bound on the special stamp duty tax and assume the tax rate
of 15% apply to all the transaction below 2 years, for a residential property at median
price approximately 4,000,000 HKD, this only translates into 0.77 percentage point
reduction in sales rate every half year, which in turns translate into 4.5 percentage
point reduction in probability of sales in three years. This is only one-third of the
extensive margin response from the RDD estimate. 23 It suggests that transaction
tax have larger impact of on the extensive margin of transaction than capital gain
tax in terms because the tax applies regardless of the magnitude of appreciation of
the asset.
1.9.2 Simulation of short-holding trades and equilibrium
price effect
To evaluate the effect on equilibrium price from reduction in effective supply of
short-holdings properties, I proxy for the short-run supply by
SSdt =
150∑
j=1
wˆjtNd,t−j
231− (1− 0.0077)6 = 0.045, where (1− 0.0077)6 is the probability of a property remain unsold
in 3 years.
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where Nd,t−j is the number of transaction in district d in week t − j.24 The
effective supply is proxied by probability of the properties being sold in the market,
wj,t−j, multiplied by the number of properties purchased in period t − j in district
d.
wj,t−j is time-varying. For the three period with different tax liability, from Jan
2009 to 19 November 2010, 20 November 2010 to 27 October 2012, 27 October
2012 to 31 December 2015, it equals to the estimated coefficient wj in equation
1.3 estimated for properties purchased in the relevant period. The evolution of the
variable SSdt is plotted in Figure 1.10. During the period, predicted short-run re-
sales drop continuously from December 2011 to December 2015. The continuous
decline in predicted re-sales in 2012 coincides with rise in transaction price even
within each districts, and the increase in transaction price come to a slow down in
the last quarter of 2012 together with the increase in the predicted re-sales.
1.10 Conclusion
In this paper I show that tax notches at holding duration in Hong Kong and Sin-
gapore generate distinct incentives for buyer and seller in re-timing the transaction,
on average for 3-4 weeks for each 1% of tax savings. Combined with the actual
significant size of the tax, it reduced the probability of a property being traded by
13 percentage point even one year after the tax dropped to zero, which could be
due to the search frictions in the property market. Buyer share up to 41-80% of the
burden of the transaction tax, which may have high social cost in a policy that gives
larger welfare weight to buyer than seller. This paper also provides evidence on the
selection effect of this type of tax instrument. Tax on holding duration were used
as public policy tool to deter speculation in the 1970s in North America, but very
little were known about the tool before the new wave of introduction of similar tax
instrument in east Asia in 2010s. This paper suggest that the aggregate welfare loss
could be large for an understudied tax instrument that survived through history.
24Number of district is 3, the largest natural division for Hong Kong
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1.11 Figures
Figure 1.1: Tax on holding duration: Hong Kong
Notes: The graph plots the transaction tax rate as function of holding duration of properties since
last purchased (the Special Stamp Duty), which applies to residential properties obtained after
20 November 2010 in Hong Kong (the solid line), and for those obtained after October 2012 (the
dotted line). It is levied on top of the basic stamp duty rate that does not depend on the holding
duration of a property.
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Figure 1.3: RD: Conditional average holding duration
Note: The graph plots the holding duration for residential properties in Hong Kong purchased in
the window of 20 Aug 2010 to 20 Feb 2011, conditional on the properties being resold before Dec
2015. The dotted lines are fitted linear trend in the conditional holding duration in the respective
horizon, estimated separately for period before and after 20 November 2010.
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Figure 1.4: Duration of residential property holdings: 2009-2015
(a) Purchased before and under SSD phase 1
Notes: The graphs plot the distribution of holding duration for properties obtained in 2009 in
Hong Kong, between 1 to 158 weeks. Each dot represent the frequency count of a bin width of
7 days period. The blue/circle dots plot the density of the holding duration for those obtained
between January 2009 and 20 November 2010, where no tax rate is applied as function of holding
duration. The red/triangle dots plot in addition the density of the holding duration for those
obtained between 20 November 2010 to November 2012, where the 1st phase of special stamp duty
applies. Sample includes all residential properties transactions as described in the data appendix.
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Figure 1.5: Hazard function of trade: holding duration by week
Notes: The graph plots the hazard function estimated using OLS of weekly dummies for the
holding period, where the outcome variable is an indicator of a trade happening in week t, with a
panel of trading record at each week since a property is obtained using the transaction history for
properties. The blue dots plot the hazard rate at each week for properties purchased from January
2009 to 19 November 2010, and the red dots plot the hazard rate for properties purchased from
20 November 2010 to 26 October 2012. Trading date is adjusted to the date of the provisional
contract first signed when applicable. The hazard functions are estimated separately for properties
obtained in each period.
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Figure 1.6: Hazard of trade: Special stamp duty phase 1 and phase 2, Hong Kong
Notes: See note of Figure 1.5. The graph plots the hazard rate for properties purchased between
20 Nov 2010 to 27 Oct 2012 and from 28 Oct 2012 to 31 Dec 2015.
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Figure 1.7: Pre-tax price regression: coefficient plots
(a) Broad category
(b) Monthly non-parametric
Notes: Panel (a) - The graph plot the post ∗H coefficients of the price regression in column 2 of
Table 1.5; the coefficient of post∗Hi,j indicate that the property is sold within the i and j month of
holding the property; Outcome variable is log of pre-tax price; Controls includes holding duration
FE in broad group, date of sales FE (Year-month), 2nd order polynomial of log of rateable values
and its interaction with year-month dummies; Panel (b) - The graph plots the post ∗ ithmonths
of holding duration coefficients of the price regression in column 2 of Table 1.5 in the flexible
specification; the coefficient of post ∗ ithmonth indicate that the property is sold on the ith month
of holding the property; Outcome variable is log of pre-tax price; Controls includes holding duration
FE in broad group, date of sales FE (Year-month), 2nd order polynomial of log of rateable values
and its interaction with year-month dummies.
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Figure 1.8: Hazard function of trade: by mortgage buyer and cash buyer
(a) Hazard of trade: pre
(b) Hazard of trade: post
Notes: See note of Figure 1.5. Panel (a) present the estimate for the hazard function for transaction
spell that has an associated mortgage record and those that do not have an associated mortgage
record. Panel (b) present the estimate for the hazard function for properties purchased under
Special Stamp Duty phase 1, between 20 November 2010 to 26 October 2012.
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Figure 1.9: Effect of SSD on selection of type of buyers: event study
Notes: The graph presents estimates for equation 1.4. Sample include transaction in 20 Aug 2010
to Jan 20 March 2011 for properties purchased with price below HKD 6800000. Control includes
districts fixed effects.
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Figure 1.10: Predicted number of short-run resales
(a) All
(b) Midterm
(c) Longterm
Notes: The graph plots the predicted number of sales from properties purchased in the past 3
years, using the number of transaction in jth week before time t, weighted by the estimates of
hazard function wj , according to the tax liability of t− j. It cover data from the December 2011
to Dec 2015. The dash-line plot the median (log) transaction price in the district in week t.
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Figure 1.11: Tax on holding duration: Singapore
Notes: The graph plots the tax rate for residential properties under the Seller’s Stamp Duty as
function of holding period, for properties purchased in different period in Singapore from Phase
1 to Phase 3. In Phase 1 and 2 the Seller’s Stamp Duty to be paid follows the rate at which the
marginal rate is {1, 2, 3}% in the three brackets of {≤ 180000, 180000− 360000,≥ 360000} SGD in
the 1st year; for Phase 2 it follows the same tax structure of rate { 23 , 43 , 2}% in the 2nd year and
{ 13 , 23 , 1}% in the 3rd year.
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Figure 1.13: Estimation of average cutoff of waiting time
(a) Hong Kong SSD phase 1: 2 years notch
(b) Singapore SGSSD phsae 3: 4 years notch
Notes: Panel (a) - The graph plot the frequency of holding period at the bin of week same as Figure
1.5, for residential properties purchased between 20 Nov 2010 to 27 Oct 2012 in Hong Kong, and
from 52th to 158th week. The data excluded are from 92th week to 124th week. The excess mass
are defined as mass above the counterfactual density from 104 to 124th week. Panel (b) - The graph
plot the frequency of holding period at the bin of week same for residential properties purchased
between 14 Jan 2011 to 14 Jan 2012 in Singapore. Excess mass defined from 208th week to 213th
week. 49
1.12 Tables
Table 1.1: RDD: HK SSD Phase 1
Outcome: Probability of resold in
3 years 2 years 1 year 6 months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RD estimate=1 -0.133∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.0743∗∗∗
(0.00934) (0.00947) (0.00477) (0.00358)
Observations 52137 52137 52137 52137
Baseline mean 0.290 0.225 0.135 0.0759
Notes: Sample includes residential properties purchased from 20 Aug 2010-20 Feb 2011 in Hong
Kong. Cut off is defined for purchases before or after 20 November 2010, the specification allow
differential linear trend function for properties purchased before and after 20 November 2010.
Column (1) includes all transactions; Column (2) includes transactions that has no mortgage record
associated; Column (3) includes transactions that has mortgage record associated. Standard errors
are clustered at the level of day of purchase.
Table 1.2: RDD: HK SSD Phase 1, by type of purchases
Outcome: Resold in 3 years
All No mortgage Mortgage
(1) (2) (3)
RD estimate=1 -0.133∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗
(0.00934) (0.0160) (0.00968)
Observations 52137 16687 35450
Notes: Sample includes residential properties purchased from 20 Aug 2010-20 Feb 2011 in Hong
Kong. Cut off is defined for purchases before or after 20 November 2010, the specification allow
differential linear trend function for properties purchased before and after 20 November 2010.
Column (1) includes all transactions; Column (2) includes transactions that has no mortgage record
associated; Column (3) includes transactions that has mortgage record associated. Standard errors
are clustered at the level of day of purchase.
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Table 1.3: RDD: HK SSD Phase 1, conditional holding duration
Outcome: Cond. holding duration
All No mortgage Mortgage
(1) (2) (3)
RD estimate=1 334.1∗∗∗ 371.3∗∗∗ 314.2∗∗∗
(18.98) (31.35) (21.77)
Observations 15650 4731 10919
Baseline mean 733.9 649.0 772.9
Notes: Outcome variable is the holding duration in days conditional on the property is resold before
31st Dec 2015. Sample includes residential properties purchased from 20 Aug 2010-20 Feb 2011 in
Hong Kong. Cut off is defined for purchases before or after 20 November 2010, the specification
allow differential linear trend function for properties purchased before and after 20 November 2010.
Column (1) includes all transactions; Column (2) includes transactions that has no mortgage record
associated; Column (3) includes transactions that has mortgage record associated. Standard errors
are clustered at the level of day of purchase.
Table 1.4: RDD: Singapore SSD Phase 3
Outcome: Resold in 5 years
All HDB Private
(1) (2) (3)
RD estimate -0.0577∗∗∗ -0.0866∗∗∗ -0.0382∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0199) (0.0181)
Observations 6271 2487 3784
Notes: Sample includes residential properties purchased from 15 Dec 2010-15 Feb 2011 in Singa-
pore. Cut off is defined at purchased after 14 Jan 2011, the specification allow differential linear
trend function for properties purchased before and after 14 Jan 2011. Column (1) includes all
transactions; Column (2) includes transactions where the buyer address is from HDB housing;
Column (3) includes transactions where the buyer address is from private address. Standard errors
are clustered at the level of day of purchase.
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Table 1.5: Estimation of tax incidence
Ln of pre-tax price
(1) (2)
post=1 -0.105∗∗∗ -0.00137
(0.00469) (0.00175)
post=1 × sold < 6m=1 0.273∗∗∗ -0.0885∗∗∗
(0.0477) (0.0218)
post=1 × sold 6-12m=1 0.147∗∗∗ -0.0505∗∗
(0.0426) (0.0242)
post=1 × sold 1-2 years=1 -0.00948 -0.0103∗∗
(0.0127) (0.00452)
Observations 97017 94503
Year-month of sales FE Y Y
ln Rateable value*month FE N Y
ln Rateable value2*month FE N Y
Notes: Sample include properties bought between Jan 2009 and 26 Oct 2012, and are sold before
31 December 2015. post is an indicator for property bought between 20 Nov 2010 to 26 Oct 2012.
Column (2) includes 2nd order polynomial of log rateable values and its interaction with date of
sales (Year-month) dummies. Standard errors are clustered at property level;
Table 1.6: Robustness of price regression: polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
post=1 -0.105∗∗∗ -0.00182 -0.00137 -0.000824 -0.00102
(0.00469) (0.00181) (0.00175) (0.00175) (0.00175)
post=1 × sold < 6m=1 0.273∗∗∗ -0.0507∗∗ -0.0885∗∗∗ -0.0988∗∗∗ -0.0942∗∗∗
(0.0477) (0.0225) (0.0218) (0.0220) (0.0220)
post=1 × sold 6-12m=1 0.147∗∗∗ -0.0306 -0.0505∗∗ -0.0549∗∗ -0.0566∗∗
(0.0426) (0.0247) (0.0242) (0.0243) (0.0243)
post=1 × sold 1-2 years=1 -0.00948 -0.00324 -0.0103∗∗ -0.0115∗∗ -0.0115∗∗
(0.0127) (0.00478) (0.00452) (0.00449) (0.00447)
Observations 97017 94503 94503 94503 94503
Degree of polynomial 0 1 2 3 4
Notes: See notes of Table 1.5. Column (2)-(5) controls for time varying polynomial of log rateable
value of properties with 1-4 degree respectively. Standard errors clustered at property level.
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Appendix
1.A Appendix of chapter 1
Figure 1.A.1: Timeline of the stamp duty tax policy change in Hong Kong since
2010
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Figure 1.A.2: Timeline of the Seller’s Stamp Duty policy change in Singapore since
2010
10 Feb 2010: 1st phase of 
seller stamp duty
30 Aug 2010: 2nd phase of
seller stamp duty
14 Jan 2011: 3rd Phase of
seller stamp duty
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Figure 1.A.3: Property stamp duty tax schedule of Hong Kong in various time point
Note: Unit in thousands
Figure 1.A.4: Changes in mortgage loan-to-value limit ratio
Note: For residential properties
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Figure 1.A.5: Use of transaction tax on holding period in Asia
Note: The graph plots the region/country that had implemented transaction tax on residential
properties on holding period since 2010 in Asia, by the maximum transaction tax rate and when
the last notch of the tax applies, of each phase of it being implemented.
57
Table 1.A.1: Probability of selling within 2 years since purchases
Probability of selling in:
6 months 1 year 2 years
(1) (2) (3)
Mortgage -0.0418∗∗∗ -0.0461∗∗∗ -0.0206∗∗∗
(0.00136) (0.00170) (0.00201)
Observations 201709 201709 201709
District FE x x x
Week of purchases FE x x x
Notes: Sample includes residential properties purchased between January 2009 to 19 November
2010. Outcome variable is an indicator of the property being resold within jth month since
purchase. Mortgage is an indicator for a transaction having an associated mortgage record.
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Figure 1.A.6: RDD plot: Probability of resold in 3 years - by mortgage record
(a) With mortgage
(b) Without mortgage
Note: See note of Figure 1.2. Panel (a) plot the holdings in which there is an associated mortgage
record. Panel (b) plot the holdings in which there is no associated mortgage record.
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Figure 1.A.7: RDD: Singapore SSD Phase 3
Note: The graph plots the probability of a property being resold in 5 years since its purchased,
by the day they are last obtained. The vertical line represent 14 Jan 2011. The dotted line are
estimated linear trend in probability of resold in 5 years, separately for properties obtained before
and after 14 Jan 2011.
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Figure 1.A.9: Median price conditional on holding duration
(a) Median price
(b) Ln median price
Notes: The graph plots the median price (current price) and median log price of residential prop-
erties traded at each holding period at week interval. The blue dots represent properties purchased
between Jan 2009 to 19 Nov 2010. The red dots represent properties purchased between 20 Nov
2010 to 26 Oct 2012. The vertical lines represent holding period in which time notch is present in
the Hong Kong Special Stamp Duty Phase 1, at 6 months, 1 year, 2 years intervals.
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Figure 1.A.10: Ratio of transacted price and government estimated rental rate
Notes: The graph plots the relationship between transacted price and the government estimate
rateable values measured in 2015, for properties purchased and traded in 2009. It also shows fitted
line using 2nd order polynomial.
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Figure 1.A.11: Estimated distribution of trading surplus
Note: The graph plots the estimated density of the trading surplus distribution using equation
1.16, using the 1st phase of Special Stamp Duty and the 3rd phase of the Seller’s Stamp Duty,
computed from the hazard rate of trade in the flat region in each of distinct period with different
tax rate within the same tax scheme. The red line plot the point estimates of the trading surplus at
{0, 0.050.1} using the trading hazard of properties purchased under the Special Stamp Duty phase
1 in Hong Kong. The blue line plot the point estimates of the trading surplus at {0, 0.04, 0.08, 0.12}
using the trading hazard of properties purchased under the Seller’s Stamp Duty phase 3 in Singa-
pore.
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1.A.1 Explanatory note for conceptual framework
Figure 1.A.12: Illustration of trade off between waiting and trade immediately
u
H
H − u ≥ 0
H − u ≥ k(t)
H ≥ (1 + τ)u
H ≥ 1+τ
τθ
k(t)− 1−θ
θ
(1 + τ)u
W
T
NT
A
B
The area filled with dots is the strictly no trade area. The grey area represent
the area in which trading would not happen in a universal transaction tax at rate τ ,
but with the time notch design bunching expand the possibility of trade; the light
grey area represent the case in which trading immediately dominates the bunching
response. Area W and T are trade would have happen, while all the cases in W
would choose to wait until the time notch instead of trading immediately.
When a transaction tax τ is introduced, only matches with surplus higher than
τ percent of the reservation value of seller are traded. This typically reduced the
number of transactions (i.e. area NT and B on the graph). However, with a specified
time notch, a newly created area B exist that would yield positive surplus if the buyer
and seller wait until t = t¯ to trade. The size of this area would depends on the utility
cost of delaying transaction kb + kv.
The dotted line with negative slope indicate the trade off of bunching versus
trade immediately even for those matches that would yield positive surplus if traded
immediately. For matches that lies on the area W, both H and u are high, and
thus the agreed price after bargaining would also be high, this implies that the
proportional tax would be exceptionally costly for these transaction to happen.
Therefore for matches in area W (and B) they would wait until time t to trade to
evade the tax.
On the other hand, on the left of the downward sloping dotted line, H and u are
smaller than those on the right, which implies a smaller price under Nash bargaining.
The tax to evade is too small relative to the total unit cost of waiting kb + kv, and
thus for matches in area T (and A), trade would happen immediately.
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When there is an exogenous increase in τ , area A and T would decrease, but the
cutoff H − u ≥ k(t) remains unchanged, and thus area of B (and also W) would
indeed increase. Increase the tax rate would increase the number of people who wait
until t¯ to trade.
1.A.2 Proofs for the conceptual framework
Proposition 1
To see proposition 1, assume an arbitrary joint distribution of H and u - g(h, u),
and the density of match formation at time t - f(t). Note that for every pair of H
and u, we can map it into a price p. Then we can define the density of the conditional
price distribution of p, the price distribution undistored by the tax conditional on
H − u > (kb + kv)(T − t) ∩H − u > 0, as P (p, k, t). Then there is a critical price
where the amount of buncher is given by the mass of price where for each time t
being greater than pd(τ, t, k)
pd(τ, t, k)∆τt = (kb + kv)(t¯− t) (1.17)
Thus the amount of buncher is
B =
∫ t¯
0
∫ ∞
pd(τ,t,k)
P (p, k, t)Prob(H − u > (kb + kv)(T − t))dp f(t)dt (1.18)
dB
d(kv + kb)
=
∫ t¯
0
−P (pd(H, u, τ, t, k)) dpd
d(kv + kb)
f(t)dt+∫ t¯
0
∫ ∞
pd(τ,t,k)
P (p, k, t)
dProb(H − u > (kb + kv)(T − t))
d(kv + kb)
dp f(t)dt (1.19)
where
∫ t¯
0
−P (pd(H, u, τ, t, k)) dpdd(kv+kb) f(t)dt < 0 as
dpd
d(kv+kb)
> 0,
and dProb(H−u>(kb+kv)(T−t))
d(kv+kb)
dp < 0. Thus if kv + kb is smaller, then the amount of
bunchers is larger.
Propositions 2
We prove the case where τt¯ = 0
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Define (1 + τ)u = L(τ, u) and 1+τ
τθ
k(t) − 1−θ
θ
(1 + τ)u) = U(τ, t, u) and some
arbitrary joint distribution of H and u - g(h, u)
Probability of trade at time t =
Prob(L(τ, U) < H < U(τ, t, θ, u))∫ k(t)
τ
0
∫ U(τ,t,θ,u)
L(τ,U)
g(h, u)dhdu
(1.20)
Since the upper bound of the two integrals are decreasing in t, where the joint
density is strictly positive and independent of t, we have dProb(L(τ,U)<H<U(τ,t,θ,u))
dt
< 0
Probability of forgone trade at time t =
∫ ∞
k(t)
τ
∫ k(t)+u
u
g(h, u)dhdu+
∫ k(t)
τ
0
∫ (1+τ)u
u
g(h, u)dhdu
(1.21)
where dProb(forgone)
dt
=
∫∞
k(t)
τ
g(k(t) + u, u)k′(t)dhdu < 0
which is decreasing with t
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1.A.3 Explanatory note on the bunching estimates
Define the distribution of timing of arrival of a match (q) for a seller is L(t) =
Prob(q ≤ t), then the density of the time of sales is
P (T ≤ t) =Prob(q ≤ t)Prob(H − u > 0)
=L(t)
∫
H−u>0
dG(H, u)
=F (t)
Define f(t) as the pdf of F(t)
f(t) = l(t)
∫
H−u>0
dG(H, u)
and g(t) as
g(t) = l(t)
∫
H−u>τu
dG(H, u)
Then the expected waiting duration could be estimated using Bˆ,fˆ(t¯) and gˆ(t¯)
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B =P (T = t) ∈ {
¯
B, B¯}
B¯ =
∫ t¯
0
Prob(q ≥ t(H, u) ∩H − u > 0)dL(q)
=
∫ t¯
0
∫
q≥t(H,u)∩H−u>0
dG(H, u)dL(q)
=
∫ t¯
0
∫
H−u>0
I[q ≥ t(H, u)]dG(H, u)dL(q)
=
∫
H−u>0
∫ t¯
0
I[q ≥ t(H, u)]dL(q)dG(H, u)
=
∫
H−u>0
∫ t¯
t(H,u)
dL(q)dG(H, u)
≈
∫
H−u>0
∫ t¯
t(H,u)
l(t¯)dqdG(H, u)
=
∫
H−u>0
∫ t¯
t(H,u)
dqdG(H, u)l(t¯)
=
∫
H−u>0
[t¯− t(H, u)]dG(H, u)l(t¯)
=
∫
H−u>0
[t¯− t(H, u)] dG(H, u)∫
H−u>0 dG(H, u)
l(t¯)
∫
H−u>0
dG(H, u)
=E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > 0)l(t¯)
∫
H−u>0
dG(H, u)
=E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > 0)f(t¯)
and
¯
B =
∫ t¯
0
Prob(q ≥ t(H, u) ∩H − u > τu)dL(q)
=E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > τu)g(t¯)
This implies
E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > 0) ≥ Bˆ
f(t¯)
and
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E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > τu) ≤ Bˆ
g(t¯)
And as p(τ,H, u)τ = t¯− t(H, u)
E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > τu) = E(p(τ,H, u)τ |H − u > τu)
= τE(p(τ,H, u)|H − u > τu)
= τ
E(p(τ,H, u)|H − u > τu)
E(p|H − u > 0) ∗ E(p|H − u > 0)
≥ τ E(p(τ,H, u)|H − u > τu)
E(p|H − u > 0) ∗ E(p(τ,H, u)|H − u > 0)
=
E(p(τ,H, u)|H − u > τu)
E(p|H − u > 0) ∗ E(τp(τ,H, u)|H − u > 0)
=
E(p(τ,H, u)|H − u > τu)
E(p|H − u > 0) ∗ E(t− t(H, u)|H − u > 0)
≥ E(p(τ,H, u)|H − u > τu)
E(p|H − u > 0) ∗
B
f(t¯)
Thus
Bˆ
g(t¯)
≥ E(t¯− t(H, u)|H − u > τu) ≥ E(p(τ,H, u)|H − u > τu)
E(p|H − u > 0) ∗
B
f(t¯)
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1.A.4 Explanatory notes on welfare analysis
The welfare cost of having traders wait for the time notch is represented by the term∫ t¯
0
∫
W,B
(kb + kv)(t¯− t)dG(H, u)dL˜(t) (1.22)
This could be reduced to
∫ t¯
0
∫
W,B
(kb + kv)(t¯− t)dG(H, u)dL˜(t) =
≥
∫ t¯
0
∫
W
(kb + kv)(t¯− t)dG(H, u)dL˜(t)
=
∫
H−u≥τu
∫ t¯
t(H,u)
(kb + kv)(t¯− t)dG(H, u)dL˜(t)
= (kb + kv)
∫
H−u≥τu
∫ t¯
t(H,u)
(t¯− t)dL˜(t)dG(H, u)
≈ (kb + kv)
∫
H−u≥τu
∫ t¯
t(H,u)
(t¯− t)l(t¯)dG(H, u)
= (kb + kv)l(t¯)
∫
H−u≥τu
∫ t¯
t(H,u)
(t¯− t)dtdG(H, u)
= (kb + kv)l(t¯)
∫
H−u≥τu
(t¯− t)2
2
dG(H, u)
= (kb + kv)l(t¯)E(
(t¯− t)2
2
|H − u ≥ τu) ∗
∫
H−u>τu
dG(H, u)
≥ (kb + kv)l(t¯)E((t¯− t)|H − u ≥ τu))
2
2
∗
∫
H−u>τu
dG(H, u)
= (kb + kv)
E((t¯− t)|H − u ≥ τu))2
2
∗
∫
H−u>τu
dG(H, u)l(t¯)
which is the expression in the main text, and conceptually excluding those traders
with surplus less than τu but who chose to trade at t¯.
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1.B Data appendix
Hong Kong
• Source The data used in this paper originated from the Memorial Day Book
provided directly by The Land Registry of Hong Kong, and standardized by
the author.
• Transaction Record The data used in this paper contains the ”Agreement
of Sales and Purchases” and its variations in the Memorial Day Book.
• Sample construction The data used in the current version of the paper
does not include transactions that has multiple unit of real estate properties
transacted in one single contract that constitute very small amount of all the
contracts. The original data contains transactions of all real estate proper-
ties that are chargeable for stamp duty, that include properties for all uses
including for example car parks and lands; the residential sample used in the
current version of the paper is determined by the full address with official list
of residential estates and other publicly available information, supplemented
by information from the Rating and Valuation Department.
• Date of purchase The date of purchase is defined as the day in which the
contract is signed, instead of the day it arrives in the Land Registry, under the
column of ”Date of Instrument” as opposed to ”Date of Delivery”. If there
is a provisional agreement appears in the Memorial Day Book for the same
property under the exact same price of formal agreement of sales and purchases
and there is no other formal agreement of sales and purchased between the
provisional agreement and the formal agreement in which it has the exact same
price, it is considered as under the same transaction. The day of purchases is
thus corrected for the day in which the provisional agreement is signed.
• Mortgage record For mortgages approved by financial institution, the Land
Registry contains an entry and it appears in the Memorial Day Book. The
description of mortgage entry in the Memorial Day Book allows identification
between first time mortgage of the property, and for those transaction in which
there is a mortgage entry record appearing in the 3 months that follows, before
any other formal transaction record appears, it is defined as associated with a
mortgage record.
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Singapore
• The transaction in which a property is transacted on the same day with exact
same price is omitted from the data which is likely due to an entry mistakes
in the original data from the Urban Redevelopment Board, a procedure also
applied in Giglio et al. (2015)
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Chapter 2
British colonial gender laws and
gender differential human capital
investment in India
1
We study the long run impact of historical legal reforms on matrimonial law intro-
duced by the British within British provinces in 1800s and early 1900s on female
education and under age marriages in post-Independent India, exploiting quasi-
random variations of districts that were former British Provinces within each post-
independent Indian states. From three independent sources of large scale micro data,
that includes administrative records from schools and representative household sur-
veys, we find that in former British Provinces females have 5% lower chances of
marrying under the current legal age of 18 years, and 1.6% higher chance of attend-
ing school between the ages of 10-16 years, than those in the Princely States, where
legal reforms in family matters were scant before 1947. We further digitize data on
marriage status of population between 0-15 years at district level, from historical
Census of India 1901-1931, to estimate the impact of Child Marriage abolition Act
(1931) which raised the minimum age of marriage for female to 14. We find that the
announcement of the law in 1929 before its implementation increased the likelihood
of girls getting married at 5-15 years old by 2.8 percentage point, while districts
that were more aware of the law exhibit lower child marriage in the long run. This
provides evidence that the colonial matrimonial laws reduce child marriages in the
long run, and that the regional differences in child marriage practices in India has
a strong historical root.
1This chapter is a joint work with S Roy.
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2.1 Introduction
Gender inequality in education is part of traditional cultures in many developing
countries, where women get married earlier, are less educated and have poorer health
outcomes than men (World Bank, 2012). Besides being a serious concern in terms of
equality of opportunity, it may also has adverse implication to economic development
(Klasen, 2002a).2 This paper investigates whether the regions of India that have
historically had legal institutions that fostered women’s rights have better gender
outcomes in the modern day. The analysis provides the basis for direct policy
interventions on gender-biased social norms and practices in society. This is the
first paper, to our knowledge, that investigates historical legal reforms to understand
their long-run impact on gender outcomes.
The paper contributes to the literature on the impact of colonial institutions on
modern day outcomes. While the literature on colonial institutions mainly focuses
on changes in modern institutions (Acemoglu et al. (2001); Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005)), our paper is closer to within country analysis, as in Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou (2013) and Dell et al. (2015), showing that modern economic outcomes
can be explained by the persistence of informal institutions. We contribute to the
literature by studying the long-run impact of colonial institutions on household
decisions on education and marriage, holding modern institutions constant. First,
we map gender inequality in terms of education and marriage in modern India to
historical political institutions. Next, we closely examine the short run and the long
run impact of legal reforms introduced in two different polities.
After England took over India in 1858, India was divided into two different
administrative institutions: the Princely States and British Provinces. This division
ceased to exist post-independence; the State Re-Organisation Act 1956 re-divided
India on the basis of linguistic identity. This led to a quasi-random distribution
of Princely States and British Provinces within each modern state that made up
independent India. Herein, we compare, within each modern state, the gender
differential human capital investment between the regions that were under direct
British rule and those that were Princely States in pre-independent India. Most of
the variations in formal institutions are at the state level in India after independence.
This implies that a comparison between regions within a state would allow us to
control for almost all differences in formal institutions. Furthermore, the re-division
of India along the lines of linguistic ethnicity allows us to further compare the
2Klasen (2002) finds that gender inequality in education is correlated with slower economic
growth, both directly by lowering average human capital, and indirectly through its impact on
investment and population growth.
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impact of colonial social reforms on groups that share very similar ethnic identities.
We compare gender-related outcomes between regions that were once under the
direct rule of the British, termed as British Provinces, and regions that were ruled
by hereditary Indian rulers, known as native states or Princely States. We find that
in former British Provinces, 5% fewer females marry under the current legal age of
18 years, and females have 1.6% higher chance of attending school between the ages
of 10-16 years than those in the Princely States. This shows that regions that have
different historical experiences behave differently, even after coming under the same
common law.
Our hypothesis is that the legal reforms introduced by the British rulers forcibly
changed the behaviour of the natives in the British provinces resulting in a positive
long term effect on gender equality in India today. Before examining the long term
effect of British laws, we first test the short run impact of the law using historical
data to determine whether the introduction of legal reforms in British provinces in
the past changed the behaviour of the natives in that region in the past. To exam-
ine this we use historical census data on marriage and literacy from 1911-1931 to
estimate the impact of Child Marriage Restraint Act (1929) using the difference-in-
differences strategy. The Child Marriage Restraint Act 1929, passed on 28 Septem-
ber 1929 in the British India Legislature of India, fixed the age of marriage for girls
at 14 years and boys at 18 years. It is popularly known as the Sarda Act, after its
sponsor Harbilas Sarda. It came into effect six months later on April 1, 1930 and
it applied to all of British India. This created significant incentives for families to
marry their children before April 1930. We use the Census data of 1911 to 1931 to
capture the effect of the announcement of the law, with the Princely States as our
control group. We find that announcement of the law increased the likelihood of
girls married at age 5-10 by 2.8 percentage point more among the natives in British
provinces, compared to the natives in the Princely States.
Next, we examine whether the regions that exhibited excess marriage in 1929-30
have different marriage and education outcomes today as compared to the regions
that did not. One may argue that the British provinces where the natives married
their girls off early in response to the announcement of the child marriage abolition
bill being passed were different in an unobservable way and this also affected mar-
riage outcomes in the long run. Therefore, we instrument for the awareness of the
law by using distance from the birthplace of the reformers who advocated for the
law. The relevance of the instrument comes from the assumption that a reformer
would have family links to the place of birth and would be more likely to go and
spread their propaganda against child marriage in their birth place. So, the people
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living in places (even urban places) that are far away from the places of birth of the
reformer are less likely to be aware of the law and hence are less likely to respond
to the legislation. We use the instrument to estimate the impact of long run effect
of Sarda Act (1931) on marriage under legal age and schooling decision in 2002,
controlling for regional variation in the practice of child marriage up to 1921.
The OLS estimates of the long run impact of the Sarda Act show that regions
that were more aware of the law in 1929-1930 were less likely to marry their girls at
young age for the cohorts born in 1958-1984. If a district had one percentage point
larger proportion of girls married between 5-10 years old in 1921, in later cohorts
female were 0.45% more likely to marry between 14-17; however, one percentage
point increase in the proportion of married girls from 1921 to 1931 predict that
female are 0.2% less likely to marry between 14-17 for subsequent cohorts. The
IV estimates show the same pattern and are larger in magnitude. Our estimates
provide evidence that the awareness of the law reduce the degree of child marriages
in the long run, it also suggest that a significant part of child marriage in India has
a strong historical root going beyond 1921.
Our findings highlight the importance of understanding social background when
we think about how society responds to the development of the labour market. Social
norms in society can persist for many years and can affect the decision to partic-
ipate in education and the labour market for certain demographic groups. Even
with the same formal institutions and economic environment, a society riddled with
prejudices may not take full advantage of its economic transformation and develop-
ment. Our paper also explains a significant part of the large regional variations in
the degree of gender bias in India. The regions that were formerly British Provinces
have better female education outcomes and fewer females marrying under the legal
age compared to former Princely State regions. This allows for both academic and
policy discussions about gender in India to go beyond geographical differences by
states or by social class. We provide some explanations regarding why such differ-
ences continue to persist, but are unable to clearly determine the impact of each
historical law. This would require a more elaborate analysis of historical data, which
we hope to accomplish in future work.
The paper is divided as follows. Historical background is provided in Section 2,
followed by a conceptual framework in Section 3. The data and empirical strategy
are described in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. The Results and Discussions are
provided in Sections 6 and 7, followed by a conclusion.
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2.2 Historical Overview
The British first arrived in India through a trading company called the East India
Company. They signed their first commercial treaty in the year 1612, granted by
the Mughal Emperor Jahangir. It was not until 1757 that the British had their
first military conquest. The East India Company had experimented with a number
of political arrangements to maximise their commercial profits and minimise their
administrative liabilities. Some states were brought directly under their control and
some states entered into political and commercial treaties with the British. This
experiment came to an end with the Great Revolution of 1857, when the British
Government took control. The British divided areas under British rule into two
territories: British India and Native (or Princely) States. British India represented
all territories under the Majesty’s dominion that were ruled by the Queen through
the Governor-Generals. The Native States represented independent kingdoms of all
the Indian kings who accepted British suzerainty. They came under the governance
of the Viceroy or the Governor-General, who was the head of the administration
in India and a representative of the Monarch in India. A clear distinction between
“dominion” and “suzerainty” was supplied by the jurisdiction of the courts of law:
the laws of British India rested upon the laws passed by the British Parliament and
the legislative powers of those laws vested in the various governments of British India,
both central and local; in contrast, the courts of the Princely States existed under
the authority of the respective rulers of those states (The Interpretation Act 1889,
British Parliament). Although the East India Company enforced indirect control
over the Princely States, the rulers of those regions were not passive figures. The
indigenous rulers had their own customs and laws which they insisted on pursuing.
(Ramusack, 2003).
India became independent in 1947, at which time it was still administratively
divided into regions of British India, regions ruled by other European colonisers like
the French or Danish and the Princely States. This division rendered it difficult for
the administrators to rule the country. The State Re-Organisation Act was passed
in 1956 that re-divided India on the basis of linguistic ethnicity. This is discussed
further in the identification section.
2.2.1 Social reforms
Before the British came to administer the Indian territories, matters of marriage,
maintenance, succession and legitimacy were solved using different religious laws for
Hindus (such as Dayabhaga and Mitakshara law), literary traditions of Ithna Ashari
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and Hanafi for Muslims, and several customary laws for tribal communities. When
the British took control of India, they promised not to interfere with personal laws
such as marriage, succession etc. (Carroll, 1983). However, they reserved the right
to intervene using statutory laws, which would override all religious laws in personal
matters. Social reforms that were introduced by the British depended upon the
discretion of the Governor-Generals in charge and the native social reformers (see
Chitnis and Wright (2007)). All the British reforms that were introduced by the
Governor-Generals were in direct conflict with the existing laws of Indian society
(Lord William Bentinck (1829), Carroll (1983)). Most of the social reforms were
not in the interest of the British, as they created tension between the natives and
their British rulers. However, the laws were passed after much deliberation by the
reformist Governor-Generals. The first of the most important social reforms intro-
duced in colonial India was the abolition of Sati in 1829. Sati was only practiced
by upper caste Hindus in Bengal, Rajputana and Central India. It was a practice
that involved a widow immolating herself on her husband’s funeral pyre. The re-
form was pushed forward by a native social reformer, Raja Ram Mohan Roy. Lord
William Bentinck introduced this law, arguing that the general masses of India were
uncivilised and would continue this custom if the British did not bring forward a
legal reform making it a punishable offence. In a speech in 1829, he pointed out
that Britain could afford to abolish Sati without fearing rebellion from the natives
because the majority of Indian soldiers in the British army belonged to the tribes
that did not practice Sati (Fisch, 2000). Since Sati was only practiced by few ethnic
groups in India, it was possible to extend the law outside British jurisdictions. The
British negotiated with the Princely States to abolish Sati - Rajputana was the last
native state to abolish it in 1861 (Ramusack, 2003).
Since then, most of the social reforms were implemented within British Provinces
but were not enforced in the Princely States. With the initiative of the educationalist
Pandit Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar, the British passed the Hindu Widow Remarriage
Act of 1856. Until then, widow remarriage among upper caste Hindus had been
prohibited, and Hindu widows were expected to live a life of austerity (Peers, 2013).
It was introduced with the rationale of reducing female infanticide (Law Commission,
1837) and was very unpopular among the natives. The law, however, deprived
childless widows of inheritance (Law Commission Report, 1856).
Although Sati was abolished in all of India, as a practice, it was not as widespread
as female infanticide and child marriage (Grey, 2013), which existed across all of
India and in all religions. Unlike Sati, the practice of female infanticide was not
restricted to upper caste Hindus. The abolition of female infanticide (1870) and child
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marriage were harder to implement as they went directly against the widespread age-
old customs of the natives across castes and tribes (Grey, 2011). The laws related
to these practices were again confined to the British Provinces. In 1891, the Age of
Consent Law was passed that raised the age of consent to 12 years. This bill created
a lot of tension among the native population (Chitnis and Wright (2007); Ramusack
(2003)). The reforms were slow. It took the British almost forty years to pass the
Child Marriage Abolition Act (also called the Sarda Act) in 1929, which raised the
age of consent to 14 years.
In our paper, we will closely examine the impact of the Sarda Act on both
historical and modern marriage outcomes. The Child Marriage Restraint Act 1929,
passed on 28 September 1929 in the British India Legislature of India, fixed the age
of marriage for girls at 14 years and boys at 18 years. It is popularly known as the
Sarda Act, after its sponsor Harbilas Sarda.3 It came into effect six months later on
April 1, 1930 and it applied to all of British India.4 With protests from the Muslim
organisation in undivided India, a personal law called as Shariat Act was passed
in 1937 that allowed child marriages among Muslims with the consent of the childs
guardian. Family matters were in general governed by personal religious laws such
as the Shastric law for Hindus, and Shariat law for Muslims etc. The British social
reforms mostly interfered with Hindu Shastric law, using statutory laws to override
customary religious laws (Carroll, 1983). Hence our analysis focuses on the Hindu
population of both the British provinces and the Princely States.
First we compare the impact of the Sarda Act on marriages in the British
Provinces and the Princely states. However, due to paucity of census data in 1941
and 1951, we can only analyse the immediate impact up to 1931, which capture
mainly the announcement effect of the law. To further analyse the causal impact
of the awareness of the law on marriage outcomes in the long run, we use an IV
strategy using distance from the birth places of the reformers who pushed for the
bill to be passed in the legislative assembly.
The Sarda Act was the first social reform that was brought about by the efforts
of organised women committees (Raman, 2009; Mukherjee, 2006). Pro-reform politi-
cians, such as Motilal Nehru, were caught off guard when the organised women’s
association met with leaders to ask for their support in the bill. The members of
All-India Women’s conference (AIWC), Women’s Indian Association and National
3Before the Sarda Act (1931), a cult group called Brahmo Samaj pioneered by Raja Ram Mohan
Roy abolished the marriage of girls below 14 years of age in 1872 under an act called as the Native
Marriage Act. But it only applied to the members of that group
4Hatekar et al. (2007) found that after the Sarda Act the probability of girls marrying below
the age of 14 years dropped dramatically among the upper caste using micro data from family
genealogies.
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Council of Women in India pressured politicians for their support to the bill, stand-
ing outside their delegations holding placards and shouting slogans such as ‘if you
oppose Sarda’s bill, the world will laugh at you’. It was also this group who pushed
for, and eventually succeeded in having Gandhi address the evils of child marriage in
his speeches. Apart from the members of organised associations, there were civil ser-
vants, academics and members of other reformist group such as the Brahmo Samaj
that propagated the ideas of child marriage as a social evil. The reformers came from
both the British provinces and the princely states (Mukherjee, 2006) . However, the
reformers could pass the child marriage reforms only in the British provinces (Sinha,
2006; Mahmood, 2002).
In contrast to the reforms in the British Raj, there were very few gender reforms
in the Princely States. The only Princely States that implemented gender-related
reforms were the Mysore and Kathiawar Agency of Baroda. Dewan Sheadari Iyer
of Mysore in 1894 abolished the marriage of girls below the age of 8, and marriage
between girls under 16 years old to men over 50. This law was less stringent than
the British Sarda Act. In the face of widespread discontent among the masses, the
Mysore Princely State mostly implemented this reform by occasionally prosecuting
the powerless lower castes (Ramusack, 2003). The political agent, Alexander Walker,
of Kathiawar agency tried to abolish female infanticide among the Jhareja and Jetwa
tribes, with little success. (Walker, 1856)
2.3 Conceptual framework
The social reforms implemented under the British rule in India may explain the
differences in educational outcomes between the former Princely State regions and
those that were under direct British rule, through more than one channel. We first
discuss how specific reforms in British India directly affected the decision-making
of the household, before discussing three potential mechanisms that could generate
the long-term persistence of gender inequality, years after Indian independence from
the British rule: the persistence of social norms, an information friction channel and
the impact on the re-allocation of household resources.
Early marriages bring monetary savings and reduction of effort cost to the fam-
ilies of daughters, as after marriage they will no longer need to be taken care of at
home. If parents are happy to see their daughters married at an early age, they
may only choose to educate their daughters when the net return on education is
very high. Raising the legal age of marriage increases the total amount of time the
daughters stay at home, and thus the cost of raising them. If there exists economic
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opportunities for skilled labour, the households will have an incentive to educate
their daughters to participate in the labour market to reduce the net cost of looking
after them for a prolonged period.
With the passing of the State Reorganisation Act, the Princely States and the
British Provinces came under the same jurisdiction and laws. Observed differences
in gender bias in education after this reunification could either be explained by
differences in the perceived return of education specific for female or the historical
persistence of cultural bias/dis-utility generated by female participation in activities
outside the household.
Our empirical exercise attempts to highlight that social reforms have a slow
but persistent effect. One possible explanation for the persistent gap may be due to
information friction. Correctly inferring the returns of education could be costly, and
households may only make inferences based on limited experiences of other members
of the same village. A larger initial stock of human capital among females could
help the community identify market opportunities that are suitable for females.
Thus, differences in initial human capital stock generated by historical reform in
British India could translate into differences in the perceived returns of education,
particularly when the return of human capital rose rapidly after trade liberalisation
in India.
An alternative explanation could be linked to current debates on the subject
of women empowerment (Duflo (2012) provided an in-depth discussion). Higher
female education may have a direct impact on resource allocation and decision-
making within the household (e.g. Quisumbing (1994) found that better educated
mothers invested more in girls; Breierova and Duflo (2004) found evidence of female
education on reductions in fertility and child mortality). If the mechanism holds,
an exogenous shock that increases female education would have intergenerational
persistence simply because better educated mothers allocate more resources to ed-
ucating their daughters. This intergenerational transmission mechanism will have a
larger effect if the other two mechanisms are also in operation.
With the mechanisms discussed, we test the hypothesis that regions that were
historically under British rule have better gender outcomes in the short run and
in the long run, compared to regions that were Princely States. In the following
sections, we discuss the data and empirical strategy used.
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2.4 Data
Our main source of information on the administrative division between the Princely
States and the British Raj is Baden-Powell (1892), which included a detailed map on
the division between the Princely States and areas under direct British rule together
with the year of acquisition for each district. As the landscape of the Princely States
and direct British rule was mostly settled by 1857, we define a district to be under
British direct rule according to Baden-Powell (1892), otherwise it is defined as a
Princely State. The geographical distribution is presented in Figure 2.2.
Our measure of human capital investment comes from two independent sources:
District Information System for Education and the National Sample Survey. The
District Information System for Education (DISE) provides administrative records
for enrolment at the school level in India. The data is designed to cover all regions
of India in terms of the administrative information for each school in each academic
year, including the number of students of each gender enrolled and the number of
classrooms in each school. As the distinction between the Princely States and regions
of direct British rule is mostly at the district level, we aggregate the information at
the district level.5 For the analysis, we aggregate all schools in each district in terms
of the number of students enrolled in each class by gender for each year between
2005-2013; this gives us estimates of the ratio of male to female students enrolled in
each class in each academic year for 433 districts. Summary statistics are reported
in Table 2.1. On average, the schools in India have 9 % more boys enrolled in Class
6 compared to girls. 6
The National Sample Survey (NSS) 64-66th round (2007-2008; 2009-2010) is
another important data source that allows us to measure school attendance at the
individual level. We focus on school attendance for children aged between 10-16
years old to study human capital investment decisions beyond basic literacy. It
gives us approximately 155,989 individual records (of 10-16 years old) regarding their
principal activities in the past 365 days, including school attendance, participation
in domestic work, and casual waged work. We report the summary statistics in
Table 2.2 for the sample we used. The average school attendance rate is 0.85, with,
however, very high variance.
We further look into the percentage of marriages under the legal age in the year
5We excluded Karnataka in the analysis in this sample due to the lack of data availability at
the time of writing.
6This is the ratio of raw enrolment, i.e. it does not take into account the gender ratio of the
population; taking the NSS estimates of the proportion of females from 10-16 reported in 2.2 as
0.464 (which is by itself a number that shows very high gender bias), there are 15 % more boys
than girls in this age range.
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2006-2007 at the district level from the District Level Household and Facility Survey
(DLHS Round 3) by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare of India. The data
reported marriages under the legal age of 18 for women and recorded all marriage
ceremonies held during the three years preceding the survey, covering 570 districts.
7 We use the micro data of the survey for the year 2002-2004 (DLHS Round 2) to
conduct analysis with respect to Hindu female who are beyond the age of 18 at the
time of interview, there are 86,214 individuals that we could merge where they are
now with the historical census data we have.
In addition, we obtained the district level GDP per capita from the Planning
Commission of the Government of India. The geographical controls, such as latitude
and distance to the coast8 for each district, are defined at the centroid of the districts.
To study the persistence of the marriage pattern and the impact of the Sarda Act
in 1929, we digitized the data from the Census of India regarding the population and
marriage status of male and females at the district level for 1901-1941, covering the
major British provinces and Princely States. 9 The census data are available at ten
years interval for 1901, 1911, 1921, 1931 and 1941. We mainly limit our analysis to
the data from 1911-1931, as the data were available for all major provinces and have
consistent definition of variables across years, while in 1941 data do not exist for some
regions and the definitions are inconsistent with those reported in previous years.
There are changes in district names since the independence. To map the historical
data to modern data, we geocode the historical district name, and compute which
modern district it falls into. If more than one historical district falls into the same
district in administrative division post-independence, we associate the average of
records from the historical districts to the modern district. This maps into 126
modern districts.
We document the reformers for the Sarda Act. The reformers were coded by
recording the names of the members from All India’s Women Conferences (AIWC),
Womens International Conference and National Council of Women in India who
were directly associated with the Sarda Act. The information came from various
journal articles on the Child Marriage Restraint Act, supplemented by information
from Wikipedia. Apart from the women members of organized women groups, other
reformists groups such as the Brahmo Samaj, members of civil service, journalists
and politicians were involved in supporting the Act and attempted to create a strong
public opinion against child marriage. These names were similarly extracted from
7The data is released through DevInfo 6.0 by UNICEF.
8Physical distance instead of travel distance.
9This includes Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Rajputana, Central Provinces, Central India Agencies,
Mysore, Travancore, Hyderabad, Ajmer and Punjab
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articles on the Child Marriage Restraint Act. For each reformer, we coded the birth
place, birth year, places where they were active and the reforms they were involved
in.10
2.5 Empirical strategy
To study the long run impact of social reforms on human capital investment, a
common challenge is to control for modern institutions and ethnicity. Different
ethnic groups may be starting with different social norms. Moreover, each ethnic
group may have different laws and social institutions that endogenously emerge
according to the customs and culture of the group. We will describe how the State
Re-Organisation Act of 1956 could help us control for both ethnicity and modern
institutions.
After independence in 1947, the State of India was divided into three main re-
gions: regions that were formerly British Provinces, regions that were under the
rule of hereditary Indian rulers, and regions that were formerly under other Eu-
ropean rulers. This division proved difficult for administrative purposes. Thus,
the government of India decided to divide India on the basis of linguistic ethnicity.
This proposal was very popular among the masses. The Telegu-speaking people
formed the state of Andhra Pradesh, Marathi-speaking people formed the state of
Maharashtra, and Kannada-speaking people formed the state of Karnataka, etc.
Linguistic ethnicity is an important determinant of identity in India. Modern
India is adversely affected by conflict and riots triggered on the basis of differences in
language. Since the 1920s, there has been conflict between Assamese and Bengali-
speaking people. In recent times, Bihari-speaking people have been targeted in
Assam. In Maharashtra, Marathi-speaking people target migrants from Bihar and
South India. In recent times, there has been a movement towards the compulsory
use of the Marathi language in Mumbai, including in the Municipal Corporation.
(see Baruah (2003); Weiner (2015); Murthy (2006); Menon (1989); Mitra (1995))
Therefore, each modern state in India has people speaking the same language
but with different historical experiences in terms of direct and indirect British rule.
Residents of each state were subjected to same state law after 1956; this is our
key source of identification. We argue that the distribution of Princely States and
British Provinces are quasi-random within each state. We assume that the British
did not select groups of people with a particular type of gender preferences within
ethnicities to subject them to direct British rule. People with the same ethnicity
10There are 36 reformers in our sample.
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tend to share norms. It is hard to imagine that people that were subjected to direct
British rule had systematically different gender preferences to those of the same
ethnicity living in native states at the beginning of the British India era.
In this section, we investigate the effect of Princely States (as opposed to being
directly ruled by the British) on modern gender differential human capital invest-
ment. The key differences between the two forms of control were the gender-related
social reforms that were highlighted in the historical section of this paper. However,
there are potential confounding factors, such as differences in income and geograph-
ical characteristics, which we try to control for.
We use the following specification to test the impact of the rule of Princely States
on the male/female enrolment ratio in the DISE data.
MFRsdct = α ∗ I[princelystates]sd +X ′sdξ + δs + γt + µsdt (2.1)
MFRsdct measures the ratio of male/female students enrolled in class c in district
d within state s in year t. α, the coefficient of interest, captures whether in Princely
States there are systematically more male children enrolled in school. δs is the state
fixed effect that captures the systematic differences between states, such as the
gender ratio, unobserved gender bias in social norms, and the provision of schools.
X ′sd is the district level controls that include the proportion of rural schools in district
d, the average number of classrooms in schools in district d, log GDP per capita (in
2000), and latitude and distance to the coast. γt is the year fixed effect that controls
for yearly variations in gender differences in school enrollment. 11
Moreover, we use the following specification to test the impact of the rule of
Princely States on school attendance and participation in waged work of women
aged 10-16 years in 2006-2010 using the NSS data.
ysdi = β∗I[princelystates]sd∗femalei+γs+φs∗femalesdi+X ′sdiη+D′sdσ+sdi (2.2)
Where ysdi is an indicator of school attendance/participation in waged work
12
as the principal activity in the 365 days before individual i in state s of district d
was interviewed. I[princelystates]sd is a district level indicator of whether district
d in state s belonged to a Princely State. The coefficient of interest is β, which is
the coefficient for interaction term between I[princelystates]sd and femalei, which
is a female dummy variable for person i. This captures whether females do worse in
Princely States compared to direct British-ruled regions. γs is the state fixed effect
11All standard errors are clustered at district level
12This includes casual wage labor and not regular salaried work, and should be more relevant
for the age range in our sample
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for school attendance that captures state level differences in school attendance, such
as different levels of provisions of schools. φs is a state-specific female fixed effect.
This state-specific female fixed effect would mostly capture the different degrees of
gender bias that exist in different states, which could be attributed to differences
in gender norms between different ethnicities or differences in the labour market
return of females. Xsdi is a set of socioeconomic controls that include the age of
the child, the age of the head of the household, and the square of the age of the
household head, an indicator for Muslim, Christian and other religions, an indicator
of rural areas, and an indicator of the landownership of the households. Dsd is the
geographic controls for district d in state s, which includes latitude and distance to
the coast.
Moreover, we use the district level aggregate of the District Level Household and
Facility survey to test the impact of Princely States rule on the number of girls that
marry under the legal age. We estimate the following equation:
Msd = σ ∗ I[princelystates]sd +X ′sdΦ + κs + τsd (2.3)
Msd is a continuous measure of the percentage of marriages under the legal age
in 2006-2007 for district d in state s, σ is the coefficient of interest as it tells us
whether in former Princely State regions, more marriage are carried out under the
legal age. Xsd is the district level controls that include latitude, distance to the
coast and log GDP per capita (in 2000). κs is the state-fixed effect which controls
for systematic differences across the states.
2.5.1 Response to Sarda Act
In this paper we argue that British legal reforms affected the behaviour of the natives
in British provinces by abolishing their traditional customs. To show the impact of
the British legal reforms on the behavior of the natives, we begin with the study of
the effects of the Sarda Act, the child marriage abolition law in 1929-1930. Figure 2.3
plot the percentage of male/female married in the age group of 5-10 and 10-15 from
1901-1931 for the whole of India. The marriage pattern were stable from 1901-1921,
while in 1931 the proportion of females married increase dramatically for all young
age groups, particularly among the female. This is most likely due to the anticipation
effect in the six months between its announcement and implementation. (Census
of India 1931) Figure 2.4 shows the geographical distribution for the proportion
of female married at age 5-10 in 1921, as well as the change from 1921-1931. It
is not clear that places that experienced the highest increase in child marriage in
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1931 were those that traditionally practiced child marriage in most numbers . Using
historical census data, we estimate the following equation to test whether historical
institutions explains the change in marriage pattern from 1921 to 1931.
Mpdt = α ∗ I[Britishdirectrule]pd ∗ I[t = 1931] + γp ∗ t+ φt + σd + τpdt (2.4)
Mpdt is the percentage of female who already got married at the age 5-10 in dis-
trict d of pre-independent province p (i.e. political division before State-Reorganization
Act) in year t between 1911-1931.13 I[Britishdirectrule] is an indicator which equals
1 if the district were under British direct rule.14 α captures the differential changes
in marriage pattern from 1921 to 1931 between former British direct rule regions and
Princely States. Assuming there is no other factors that affect marriage pattern of
the two regions differently between 1921-1931, α identify the effect of anticipation of
actual implementation of the law. We control for the province specific trend (γp ∗ t),
district fixed effect (σd ) and year fixed effect (φt).
2.5.2 Long run impact of Sarda Act
In this section we test the hypothesis that the awareness of the Sarda Act has long
run impact on female marriage and education outcome, as measured in the DLHS
2002 for Hindu female aged above 18.
The equation of interest would be
ysdi = βLsd + β2Msd,1921 +X
′
sdiσ + sdi (2.5)
ysdi are outcome variables measured in DLHS in 2002, for individual female i
in state s, district d. It includes outcomes for marriage and education: indicator
of marrying below the age of 14, marrying in the age range of 14-17 and marrying
under the age of 18, indicator for any level of schooling and a continuous measure of
years of schooling. Lsd is a measure of awareness of the Sarda Act for district d in
state s since 1929. If the awareness of the Sarda Act reduces the probability of early
marriage for female and increases the educational outcomes for females in the long
run, we expect β to be positive. β2 captures the accumulative effect of traditions
and historical reforms before 1921 that could explains outcome in 2002.
13It is defined as the number of married female at age 5-10 divided by the total number of female
at age 5-10, reported by the Census
14so I[Britishdirectrule] = 1 − I[princelystates], the variables we used in the specification
described earlier
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Without a direct measure of Lsd, we use Msd,1931 as proxy, and estimate the
following equation
ysdi = ηMsd,1931 + γMsd,1921 +X
′
sdiσ + µsdi (2.6)
Msd,1921 and Msd,1931 are the percentage of female who already got married at
the age 5-10 in district d of state s in year 1921 and 1931 respectively, constructed
by mapping new districts with their historical counterparts.
Given the historical context, Msd,1931 should be positively related to Lsd, in the
sense that in the districts with higher awareness of the law, more females in age range
of 5-10 would be married as measured in 1931. This implies that η in equation 2.6
would have the same sign of the effect of β in equation 2.5.15 One can argue that
there are unobserved factors that determine how much a district would react to the
legislation in 1929-1930, and influence the age of marriage and education in 2002
at the same time. For example a district could be conservative to begin with,where
many girls may have married in a rush in 1929-1930, while the same culture could
make girls more likely to marry young in 2002. Therefore to estimate the equation
2.6 consistently, we need instruments that determines the awareness of the legislation
of a district and are unrelated to unobserved factors that affect the female marriage
and educational outcomes after 1921.
The abolition of the child marriage in the 1920s was mostly influenced by women
and husbands of women in the All India Women’s Conference (AIWC). The mem-
bers of AIWC were the first ones to support the legalization of the abolition of the
traditional norm of child marriage. The members of the Women’s Indian Associa-
tion and National Council of Women in India also participated. But the leadership
of these two organizations was hesitant about state involvement in matters of mar-
riage and traditional customs. The AIWC fiercely promoted the legislation and
articulated arguments in favour of the legislation to be put forward in front of the
Joshi Committee, which was evaluating the bill proposed in the Central Legislative
Committee. To construct an instrument for the awareness of the act, we make use
of the birthplace of the reformers who advocated this law. The underlying assump-
tion being that the place the reformers were born is unrelated to the practice of
child marriage. Child marriage was prevalent throughout India across all castes and
religion. Individuals that have gone on to become feminist reformers were mostly
influenced by the peers in the cities or in the colleges where they might get educated,
15We can assume formally that Msd,1931 = αLsd + Msd,1921 + vsd, where α > 0. Then one can
rewrite ysdi = ηαLsd + (η + γ)Msd,1921 + X
′σ + ηvsd + µsdi. Therefore ηα = β, and η + γ = β2,
with the assumption that α > 0, η and β follow the same sign. Thus, η is well-identified but α
and β is only identified up to scale.
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which were mostly away from their birth places. The relevance of the instrument
comes from the assumption that a reformer would have family links to the place
of birth and would be more likely to go and spread their propaganda against child
marriage in their birth place first. So, the places (even urban places) that are far
away from the places of birth of the reformer are less likely to be aware of the law
and hence are less likely to respond to the legislation.
Equation 2.6 is then estimated using Dsd, the distance of district d to the nearest
birth place of any reformers, and I[Princelystates]sd, an indicator of Princely States
as instrumental variables.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 DISE
The OLS results for equation 2.1 of school enrolment are presented in Table 2.3.
Column 1 reports the estimates for equation 2.1 for the ratio of gross enrolment of
boys to girls in Class 6; the coefficient suggests that on average there are 2% more
boys enrolled in schools than girls in former Princely States versus British-ruled
regions. The availability of larger schools measured by the number of classrooms
predicts lower boy to girl enrolment ratio. We also included log GDP per capita to
control for the provision of schools and household budget constraints across districts
within the same state, however, it is only marginally significant. Column 2 reports
the same measure for Class 5, where the coefficient is very small and insignificant;
this suggests that the results in Column 1 are mainly due to the dropping out of
girls in higher grades rather than being driven by the differences in the gender ratio.
Girls reach the age of 12 when they reach Class 8. Older girls may be more helpful
for household domestic work for which parents might take them out of school. If a
community thinks that return of education of girls are low, then it is less likely for
the community to invest in secondary schooling of girls.
In Table 2.4, we report equation 2.1 estimated by each class from 1 to 8. Com-
paring across columns, it is clear that the gender enrolment ratio only starts differing
at Classes 6, 7 and 8, at which time the decision to attend school is more closely re-
lated to a human capital investment decision beyond basic literacy. The magnitudes
of the coefficients across Columns 6, 7, and 8 are quite consistent at around 2-3 %,
suggesting that Class 6 is a critical time when, if girls drop out of school, they may
not return, whereas those that stay in education are likely to proceed with similar
probability to boys.
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2.6.2 NSS
Table 2.5 reports the estimates of equation 2.2 on the main activities of children
aged 10-16 years from the NSS data. Columns (1)-(2) report the estimates for
school attendance, Columns (3)-(4) report the estimates for participation in waged
work, and Columns (5)-(6) report participation in domestic work. The estimated
interaction term Princely States*female is significant for school attendance, which
shows that girls in Princely States are 1.6 % less likely to attend school compared to
girls in British-ruled regions within the same modern state. We do not see similar
significances in other outcome variables once we include the state female fixed effect
to control for gender bias at the state level. The main effect of the Princely State for
paid work participation (Columns (3) and (4)) is only significant when we exclude
the interaction term with females, and the magnitude is small (0.5 % difference in
the probability of market participation between Princely States and British-ruled
regions). This could potentially be explained either by the lower age of marriage in
Princely States or a small difference in the availability of market work.
However, our estimates on school attendance cannot be solely driven by the
availability of market work. We further report estimates of equation 2.2 by Hindus
and Muslims, as the historical overview section has shown that there were stark
differences in how Hindus and Muslims responded to the social reforms in British-
ruled regions. Column (1) in Table 6 reports the estimate for Hindus only. The
coefficient is highly significant with a magnitude higher than that in the sample
including all religions - females among the Hindu population are 2.1 % less likely to
attend school in former Princely States, greater than the equivalent estimate of 1.6
% for the whole population. Moreover, the main coefficient of the Princely States is
positive and is marginally significant for Hindus, which means that males are more
likely to attend school in Princely States - this supports the hypothesis that the
fundamental cause of the observed difference is driven by the persistence of cultural
practices rather than the availability of education. On the other hand, the same
estimate for Muslims in Column (2), despite its smaller sample size, is not only
statistically insignificant but the sign of Princely States*female turns positive with
a very large standard error. Instead of explaining the difference by time invariant
inherent cultural differences between Hindus and Muslims, we tend to associate this
difference in our estimates by how cultures interact with the implementation of the
law in British-ruled regions before Independence.
In Figure 2.A.2 we plot the percentage of married female at age 10-15 for districts
that now belong to Madhya Pradesh - there were historically huge differences in how
Hindus and Muslims responded to the Sarda Act of 1929 and Age of Consent Law
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of 1891.
2.6.3 Marriage under legal age
Table 2.7 reports estimates of equation 2.3 using the district level aggregate of
the percentage of marriages under the legal age for females in 2006-2007. The
coefficients estimated are positive, highly significant and robust upon inclusion of
log GDP per capita (Column (1) and (2)). Our estimates suggest that Princely
States have approximately 5 percentage points more marriages under the legal age
for females. In Column (3) and (4), we report the results using the mean age of
marriage in 2002-2004 as an outcome variable; it can be seen that districts formerly
belonging to Princely States have a lower mean age of marriage by 0.4 years. An
average of 22.66 % of all marriages in India take place under the legal age for female
16; our estimated 5 percentage points difference between Princely States and direct
British-ruled regions explains a significant number of underage marriages in India.
2.6.4 Sarda Act using Census Data 1911-1931
Above we provide a mapping of gender inequality to different political institutions.
In this section we focus on the impact of the legal reforms under two different
political rule that affected behaviour in the past.
The estimates for equation 2.4 are presented in Table 2.8. The coefficient of
Princely states*1931 is statistically significant in column (2) where we control for
province specific trend. The coefficient estimate is 2.8, which shows that among girls
aged between 5-10, there are on average 2.8 percentage more girls among natives in
British provinces who got married in 1931. The natives in British provinces feared
the implementation of the act in the coming months and millions of girls under
the age of 14 were married off. This result is also well documented in the census
reports of the British. The Sarda Act applied to only British India, however in
Princely States such as Mysore and Baroda also tried to enact laws abolishing child
marriages. 17 We observe a slight bunching in female child marriages in the Princely
States, but in British provinces it is on average more severe.
Compare to Column (1), which we did not include province specific trend, the
coefficient in column (2) is more significant and with a larger magnitude, this sug-
gesting that provinces may have differential trends before 1931.
16From our district level aggregate not weighted by population share in each districts
17Mysore in 1894 abolished child marriage below the age of 8. Many reformers from Mysore who
pushed for the legislation of the Sarda Act could not raise the age of marriage for girls in Mysore.
Therefore, in Mysore there was a weak form of child marriage restraint reform.
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Table 2.9 reports the estimates for equation 2.6, both in OLS and IV using
distance to nearest reformers and Princely States dummy. Column (1) and (2)
in Panel (a) report the estimates for the outcome of marrying below 14, where
the coefficients for both Msd,1931 and Msd,1921 are insignificant, suggesting that the
historical marriage pattern does not explain the probability of marrying below 14 in
2002. Column (3) and (4) report the estimates for the outcome of marrying between
14-17, and the coefficient for Msd,1931 and Msd,1921 are both statistically significant
but of opposite sign. The estimate for Msd,1921 in column (3) for the OLS is 0.00445,
which could be interpreted as one percentage point increase in the proportion of
females married at the age of 5-10 in 1921 predicts a 0.45 higher probability of a
girl marrying below the legal age in 2002. The magnitude of the coefficient suggest
that a significant part of child marriage in India has a very strong historical roots,
going far beyond 1921.
Moreover, the estimates for Msd,1931 is negative and also statistically significant
in column (3). It shows that one percentage point increase in the proportion of
female married in 1931 (between 5-10) predict a smaller probability of a girl getting
married below legal age post-independence. Column (4) report the IV estimates,
and the coefficients for Msd,1931 and Msd,1921 both become larger in magnitude and
highly statistically significant, and remains in opposite sign. With the assumption
that an increase in child marriage in 1931 proxy for a high awareness of the Sarda
Act, the estimate provide evidence that the Sarda Act reduced child marriages in
the long run. In column (1) of Panel (b), we find that 1% more girls married at
the age 5-10 in 1921 predicts a 0.6% lower chance of females getting at least some
education measured in 2002; and 1% more girls married at the age 5-10 in 1931
predicting a 0.44% higher chance of females getting some education in 2002.
In table 2.10 we further control for state fixed effect. The coefficient for Msd,1921
remains significant and positive in most OLS specification, while the coefficient for
Msd,1931 remains negative but become statistically insignificant except in the OLS
regression for year of schooling in column (3) of panel (b). This may be due to low
power of the instrument once we control for state fixed effect.
We find regions that experienced bunching of marriages in 1931 have fewer girls
marrying below legal age and are more likely to have experienced schooling post-
independence, controlling for cultural variation across regions up to 1921. One
interpretation of this long run effect could be that in British provinces the natives
anticipated the implementation of the law in 1931 and did not wish to get affected
by it. Therefore, the generation most affected by the Sarda Act are the later gen-
erations, who are more likely to conform their behaviour to any new law. This may
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explain why regions that got affected by legal reforms imposed by a foreign admin-
istrative body behave differently than regions that are culturally similar but did not
get affected by the reform.
2.7 Discussion and robustness check
2.7.1 Robustness check - Princely States that potentially
undergone reform
As discussed in the previous section, it was documented that in two of the Princely
States (Mysore and the Kathiawar Agency of Baroda), there were reforms related
to child marriages independent of similar reforms in the British Provinces. In the
previous section, where we estimated equation 2.2 and 2.3 (school attendance in
NSS and marriage under the legal age), we did not exclude Mysore and the Kathi-
awar Agency of Baroda because their implementation is weak from the historical
description. We present the estimates for equations 2.2 and 2.3, excluding these two
Princely States as a robustness check, in Table 2.A.1 and 2.A.2.
In Table 2.A.1, we report the estimates for school attendance in the NSS data
excluding Mysore and Kathiawar Agency of Baroda in Column (2). The coefficient
of the Princely States indicator increases slightly from 1.6 to 1.8, which implies a
bigger difference in female school attendance among 10-16 years old between the
Princely States and the British Provinces. Similarly, in Table 2.A.2 we report the
estimates of equation 2.3 for the percentage of marriages under the legal age and
the mean age of marriage, excluding Mysore and Baroda. The coefficients again
increased slightly upon the exclusion of the two districts (in Columns (2) and (4)),
which is what one would expect if Mysore and Baroda had weak social reforms that
were similar in nature to those in the British Provinces.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper we show that two regions that have had different legal reforms in
the past behave differently when placed under the same modern institution. In
particular we find that girls are more likely to go to school in regions that have had
gender reforms in the past. If two regions are given the same opportunities in terms
of provision of schools, we argue that the region that has had gender related legal
reforms will have more females exploiting the opportunities. Our findings support
policy intervention that eliminates prejudice behaviour by showing its positive long
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term impact. Providing infrastructure by the social planner might not be enough
for economic growth, we also need to change the bottlenecks on the demand side.
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2.9 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Timeline of key historical events
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Princely States and British direct rule regions
Note: The shaded parts were districts that belonged to Princely States and the white parts are
districts that were under British direct rule.
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Figure 2.3: Marriage pattern in 1929-1930: time series
The graph plots the proportion of children married in each Census year, by gender and
age group, for India as a whole.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of proportion of female married at 5-10
(a) Girls married 5- 10 (%): 1921
(b) ∆ Girls married 5- 10 (%): 1931- 1921
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics of the DISE data
mean sd
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 1 1.079 0.093
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 2 1.070 0.099
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 3 1.068 0.107
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 4 1.069 0.115
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 5 1.076 0.130
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 6 1.088 0.157
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 7 1.094 0.176
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 8 1.103 0.195
Distance to coast 475.330 332.864
Proportion of rural schools 0.885 0.129
Princely states 0.261 0.439
Number of classrooms 4.418 1.778
Observations 2749
Number of districts 433
Note: Data aggregated at district level from DISE school records, forming a district level (un-
balanced) panel for 2005-2013; Kerala not in the sample; Princely states is a {0,1} indicator.
Distance to coast measured in kilometers from the centroid of each district.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics - NSS 64th and 66th round
1983
mean
female 0.467
Age 11.799
Scheduled caste 0.120
Scheduled tribe 0.166
Head female 0.082
Head literate 0.433
Head primary 0.139
Head complete primary 0.079
Head complete secondary 0.042
Head complete higher than secondary 0.010
Observations 52711
Note: Sample includes children in the NSS 64th and 66th round who aged 10-16 at the time
of interview. School attendance is an {0,1} indicator for whether the principal activities in
the past year of the child were attending school. Head literate, Head complete primary, Head
complete secondary, Head complete higher than secondary were indicators for the education
level of the household head, with base group illiterate. Land ownership is an {0,1} indicator
for whether the household owns any land.
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Table 2.3: OLS Regression of Boy / Girl enrollment ratio at class 5/6: 2005-2013
Outcome: Ratio of boy/girl enrollment
Class 6 Class 5
(1) (2)
Princely states 0.0201∗∗ 0.00839
(0.00993) (0.00722)
Number of classrooms -0.0201∗∗∗ -0.0131∗∗∗
(0.00565) (0.00476)
Ln GDPPC (2000) -0.0303∗ -0.0176
(0.0166) (0.0132)
Observations 2749 2749
State FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y
Note: Standard errors clustered at district level; The outcome variable is ratio of number of boys
enrolled to the number of girls enrolled in each district, year and class, from 2005-2013; Other
controls include latitude and distance to coast; Ln GDP per capita measured are district level
GDP measured at 2000
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Table 2.7: Marriage under legal age and mean age of marriage
Outcome: % under legal age Mean age of marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Princely states 5.186∗∗∗ 5.018∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗ -0.329∗∗
(1.361) (1.369) (0.147) (0.149)
Distance to coast -0.0141∗∗∗ -0.0136∗∗∗ 0.000601 0.000172
(0.00518) (0.00512) (0.000586) (0.000529)
Latitude 1.119∗∗ 0.967∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.0910∗
(0.523) (0.514) (0.0572) (0.0514)
Ln GDPpc 2000 -11.91∗∗∗ 1.192∗∗∗
(1.644) (0.164)
Observations 568 508 570 508
mean 22.66 23.74 19.44 19.21
State FE Y Y Y Y
Note: Sample include percentage of marriage under legal age for female*100 reported of each
districts, recorded from District Level Household and Facility Survey in 2006-2007 (from Dev-
Info 3.0); Mean age of marriage are district level mean age of marriage from DLHS 2002-2004
(from DevInfo 3.0); Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis
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Appendix
2.A Appendix of chapter 2
Figure 2.A.1: Geographical distribution of birth place of pro-Sarda Act reformers
109
Figure 2.A.2: Percentage of married female - 10-15 years old - Madhya Pradesh
(a) All religion
(b) Hindu - Muslim
Note: Data from Census of India 1891-1931 and cover Central Provinces and Central India
Agencies which belongs to Madha Pradesh today; the red line denotes the enactment of the
Sarda Act
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Table 2.A.1: Robustness check - exclusion of Mysore and Baroda: NSS Education
School School
(1) (2)
Princely states=1 0.00601 0.00556
(0.00580) (0.00580)
Princely states=1 × Female=1 -0.0160∗∗ -0.0186∗∗∗
(0.00630) (0.00650)
Observations 150084 146074
Include Mysore and Baroda Y N
Note: Sample includes children in the NSS 64th and 66th round who aged 10-16 at the time of
interview; Specifiation same as in Table 2.5
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Table 2.A.2: Robustness check - exclusion of Mysore and Baroda: Marriage
outcome: % under legal age mean age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Princely states 5.018∗∗∗ 6.067∗∗∗ -0.329∗∗ -0.375∗∗
(1.369) (1.367) (0.149) (0.151)
Distance to coast -0.0136∗∗∗ -0.0121∗∗ 0.000172 0.000217
(0.00512) (0.00516) (0.000529) (0.000532)
Latitude 0.967∗ 0.633 -0.0910∗ -0.0896
(0.514) (0.529) (0.0514) (0.0550)
Ln GDPpc 2000 -11.91∗∗∗ -11.75∗∗∗ 1.192∗∗∗ 1.190∗∗∗
(1.644) (1.668) (0.164) (0.167)
Observations 508 496 508 496
Include Mysore and Baroda Y N Y N
Note: Sample include percentage of marriage under legal age for female*100 reported of each
districts, recorded from District Level Household and Facility Survey in 2006-2007 (from Dev-
Info 3.0); Mean age of marriage are district level mean age of marriage from DLHS 2002-2004
(from DevInfo 3.0); Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis; Specification same as in
Table 2.7
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Table 2.A.3: Robustness check - exclusion of Princely States in the south: Marriage
outcome: % under legal age
All states Karnataka (exclu. Hyderabad) Kerala Exclu. Ke and Ka
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Princely states 5.018∗∗∗ -7.346∗∗ -7.188 6.550∗∗∗
(1.369) (3.247) (4.657) (1.485)
Distance to coast -0.0136∗∗∗ 0.0930∗∗∗ 0.0961 -0.0112∗∗
(0.00512) (0.0252) (0.0727) (0.00522)
Latitude 0.967∗ 3.128 -1.270 0.168
(0.514) (2.497) (1.458) (0.553)
Ln GDPpc 2000 -11.91∗∗∗ -8.846 -16.24 -11.03∗∗∗
(1.644) (9.318) (21.00) (1.674)
Observations 508 23 14 467
Note: Sample include percentage of marriage under legal age for female*100 reported of each
districts, recorded from District Level Household and Facility Survey in 2006-2007 (from Dev-
Info 3.0); Mean age of marriage are district level mean age of marriage from DLHS 2002-2004
(from DevInfo 3.0); Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis; specification same as in
Table 2.7
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Chapter 3
On the Quantity and Quality of
Girls:
New Evidence on Abortion,
Fertility, and Parental
Investments
1
The introduction of prenatal sex-detection technologies in India has led to a phenom-
enal increase in abortion of female fetuses. We investigate their impact on son-biased
fertility stopping behavior, parental investments in girls relative to boys, and the
relative chances of girls surviving after birth. We find a moderation of son-biased
fertility, erosion of gender gaps in breastfeeding and immunization, and convergence
in the post-neonatal mortality rates of boys and girls. For every five aborted girls,
we estimate that roughly one additional girl survives to age five. Our findings have
implications not only for counts of missing girls but also for the later life outcomes
of girls, conditioned by greater early life investments in them.
3.1 Introduction
Innovations in birth control technology have had substantial socioeconomic impacts.
The contraceptive pill, for instance, gave women unprecedented control over fertility,
preventing unwanted births and allowing women to determine the timing of births,
with dramatic consequences for their marriage and labor market choices (Goldin and
1This chapter is a joint work with S Anukriti and Sonia Bhalotra.
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Katz (2002), Bailey (2006)). The legislation of abortion has similarly empowered
women by enabling them to eliminate unwanted births (Gruber et al. (1999)). Birth
control technology has had far-reaching implications not only for women but also
for children, as parental investments tend to be greater in children that are more
“wanted” when they are born (Grossman and Joyce (1990), Gruber et al. (1999),
Donohue and Levitt (2001), Charles and Stephens Jr. (2006), Donohue et al. (2009)).
This paper investigates the impacts on child quantity and quality of another new
technology that has altered the demographic landscape in countries where sons are
valued more than daughters, namely, prenatal sex detection technology (henceforth,
ultrasound; see Section 3.2). An ultrasound scan can reveal fetal sex reliably at as
early as 12 weeks of gestation, enabling selective abortion of unwanted girls without,
in principle, risking the mother’s health (Epner et al. (1998)). We focus on India,
where ultrasound was introduced in the mid-1980s, before which abortion had been
legalized. The low cost and the non-invasive nature of ultrasound scans has led
to their widespread use for fetal sex determination, resulting in a staggering rise
in sex-selective abortion, equivalent to 6 percent of potential female births during
1995-2005 (Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010)).2
When fetal sex determination is impossible, parents can adjust the gender com-
position of their children in two ways. First, they could continue childbearing till
they achieve the desired number of sons. Several studies document son-biased fertil-
ity stopping behavior, which results in girls having more siblings than boys ((Clark
(2000), Bhalotra and van Soest (2008), Jensen (2012), Rosenblum (2013)). The
quantity-quality trade-off, driven by the budget constraint, implies that a gender
gap in outcomes will emerge simply because girls on average grow up in families
with fewer per capita resources, even if parents do not actively discriminate against
daughters. The second option is to subject girls to deliberate neglect, culminating
as excess girl mortality in early childhood (Das Gupta (1987), Pitt and Rosenzweig
(1990), Sen (1990), Rose (2000), Oster (2009), Bhalotra (2010), Jayachandran and
Kuziemko (2011)). In this paper, we test the hypothesis that the facility to detect
and, subsequently, terminate unwanted female fetuses in the post-ultrasound era
weakened both son-biased fertility stopping behavior and postnatal discrimination
against girls, measured by child investments and mortality rates.
It is challenging to identify the behavioral effects of prenatal sex detection tech-
nology when there is selection into conception or abortion. Moreover, the direction
of selection into conception and abortion is a priori ambiguous (Gruber et al. (1999),
2Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) estimate that 480,000 girls—greater than the number of girls
born in the United Kingdom each year—were aborted per year in India during 1995-2005.
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Pop-Eleches (2006), Ananat et al. (2009)).3 A second issue is that revelation of the
sex of the child may lead parents to deliberately lower fetal investments in girls
(Almond et al. (2010), Bharadwaj and Lakdawala (2013)). Any resulting gender-
biased miscarriage, by creating selection into birth, can make it harder to interpret
changes in post-birth investments as causal effects of availability of prenatal sex de-
tection (through it facilitating sex-selective abortion). We attempt to address these
challenges.
Our strategy combines supply-driven changes in ultrasound availability with
plausibly exogenous family-level variation in the incentive to sex-select. We con-
struct an indicator for cohorts born pre- versus post-ultrasound exploiting infor-
mation on the first imports of ultrasound scanners after tariff reductions in the
mid-1980s. We construct a second indicator for cohorts born after a major expan-
sion in availability associated with initiation of local production from the mid-1990s,
driven by relaxation of industrial licensing regulations. Previous work shows that
these supply-side changes resulted in a phenomenal rise in sex-selective abortion
(Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010)). Family-level variation in the incentive to conduct
sex-selection is captured in an indicator for the sex of the firstborn child. Previ-
ous research shows that (a) the sex of the firstborn child is quasi-random and (b)
that sex-selective abortion among second- and higher-order births is concentrated
in families with a firstborn daughter (Almond and Edlund (2008), Abrevaya (2009),
Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010)). The identifying assumption, which we verify, is
that, in the absence of ultrasound technology, trends in the outcomes would have
been identical across first-son and first-daughter families. We distinguish neonatal
and post-neonatal child survival rates because changes in prenatal investments are
more likely to exhibit in neonatal rates, while post-neonatal survival is more clearly
a function of postnatal investments.4
We use data containing the complete fertility histories of women to construct
indicators of births and deaths, as a result of which we can link biological siblings.
This allows us to use mother fixed effects to account for selection. In contrast to
earlier studies of abortion (Gruber et al. (1999), Pop-Eleches (2006), Ananat et al.
(2009)), we analyze parental investments in and survival of girls relative to boys.
Differencing by gender allows us to control for unobservable trends that equally
affect both boys and girls. Another useful feature of the data, that we exploit, is
3Pop-Eleches (2006) discusses studies of abortion in developed countries, highlighting that many
preceding his study do not adjust for selection. Selection into conception is a persistent issue in
analyses of birth outcomes; see, for instance, Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004), Bhalotra (2010),
Ananat and Hungerman (2012), and Brown (2016).
4Neonatal mortality refers to death within one month of birth and post-neonatal child mortality
means death after the first month of birth but before age five.
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that they contain the mother’s stated preferences, including desired fertility and
the desired number of sons versus daughters. We investigate the robustness of our
estimates to conditioning upon changes in these preferences in a flexible manner.
This allows us to more confidently attribute any changes in the outcomes to changes
in (ultrasound) technology rather than to other factors such as modernization, which
may have contemporaneously changed (stated) preferences.
We estimate reduced form equations for three sets of outcomes. First, we esti-
mate changes in the relative survival of girls. Since we know from previous research
that the introduction of ultrasound led to a sharp increase in female feticide, our ex-
pectation is that this substituted for postnatal discrimination against girls, leading
to a reduction in girl relative to boy mortality after birth. We examine results by
birth order and the socioeconomic status of parents so as to identify where in these
distributions the relevant changes occur. Second, we estimate changes in parental
investments in girls relative to boys, so as to tie any changes in survival to parental
behavioral choices. Third, we investigate impacts on fertility defined, as is usual,
as live births. In general, increased opportunities for abortion may lead to lower or
higher fertility (e.g., Ananat et al. (2009), Ananat and Hungerman (2012)). Abor-
tion mechanically reduces the number of live births conditional upon the number
of pregnancies; but the knowledge that a pregnancy can be aborted may stimulate
more pregnancies and the net effect on fertility is ambiguous a priori. However,
since ultrasound led to sex-selective abortion and not abortion per se, we can test
an unambiguous prediction, which is that there is less son-biased fertility stopping
post-ultrasound.
Our main findings are as follows. We find that the pre-ultrasound gender gap
in post-neonatal child mortality for second- and higher-order births in firstborn-girl
families relative to firstborn-boy families (equal to 2.17 percentage points (p.p.)) is
reduced by ultrasound technology. Similarly, there is closure of the gender gap in
sibling size between firstborn-girl and firstborn-boy families (which, pre-ultrasound,
was 0.14). Consonant with these results, we find a significant narrowing of gender
gaps in parental investments. A simple accounting exercise suggests that increases
in vaccination and breastfeeding in favor of girls explain 34 to 38 percent of the
observed decline in post-neonatal excess female mortality (EFM).5
Nevertheless, the decline in postnatal death of girls only partially offsets the rise
in female feticide. Our estimates imply that 60,879 excess postnatal female child
deaths were averted each year (via ultrasound-driven declines in male-biased fertility
5Note that vaccination and breastfeeding are only two of the many markers of parental invest-
ments. It is possible that parents also increased other investments in girls and that can further
explain the observed EFM decline; however, we do not have data on the same.
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and substitution of postnatal discrimination with prenatal discrimination), but that
the rise in the number of aborted girls was much higher. For every five girls that
“went missing” before birth, only one girl survived after birth who otherwise would
have died.
If sex-selective abortion is concentrated among families with stronger son pref-
erence then girls born in the post-ultrasound era will be more likely to be born into
families with weaker son preference, and this would then be a reason that they do
better. We investigate this and find no evidence of such sorting. Instead, there
are marked socioeconomic status (SES) patterns in sex-selection, with wealthy and
educated women being more likely to abort girls (Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010)).
So the average girl born post-ultrasound (relative to pre-ultrasound) is more likely
to be born into a low SES family.
The relative fertility decline in firstborn-girl families is driven by a shift from
having four or more children toward having three or fewer children. The EFM
decline is concentrated in first, second, and third children in firstborn-girl families.
In general, the absolute decline in excess girl mortality is larger among women
of low SES, while the decline in fertility among women with firstborn daughters is
broadly similar across socioeconomic groups. Previous work shows that sex-selective
abortion in India is more prevalent among educated and wealthy women (Bhalotra
and Cochrane (2010)). So, responses to ultrasound technology in terms of sex-
selective abortion, fertility, and postnatal investments in girls versus boys occur on
different SES margins. These results suggest that ultrasound availability generated
a shift in the distribution of girls in favor of low-SES families since more girls were
aborted in high-SES families and more girls survived to age five in low-SES families.
While a number of studies have sought to identify how changes in abortion law in
different countries have modified fertility and investment in children, the evidence on
how prenatal sex detection technology (which made sex-selective abortion feasible)
modifies fertility and investment in girls is more limited. Lin et al. (2014) show
that abortion legalization in Taiwan decreased neonatal female mortality for higher-
parity births conditional on SES and had no impact on post-neonatal mortality.
They also find a reduction in fertility at third and higher parity, and a shift in
the composition of births towards low-SES families. They do not examine health
investments. Almond et al. (2010) find, in contrast to us, that ultrasound access
in China increased neonatal EFM, which suggests that parents consciously reduced
prenatal inputs in girls. They find no impact on gender gaps in post-neonatal
mortality, and they do not examine fertility. Our finding of a post-ultrasound decline
in excess post-neonatal girl mortality is empirically relevant, given that the gender
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gap in post-neonatal child mortality in India is quite large—1.5 p.p. overall and 3
p.p. among children preceded by a firstborn girl (Table 3.A.8).6
The paper most closely related to ours is Hu and Schlosser (2015), that seeks
to answer a similar question, but using a different empirical approach. They model
gender gaps in malnutrition and mortality of children as a function of state-year
variation in the sex ratio at birth. However, the state level sex ratio at birth is jointly
determined with the outcomes. Once fetal sex detection is feasible, parents will
simultaneously decide whether to conceive, whether to use prenatal sex diagnosis,
whether to abort if the fetus is a girl, and how much to invest in male versus female
births that are taken to term. The joint outcomes, thus, are fertility, the sex ratio
at birth, post-birth investments in girls relative to boys, and girl relative to boy
survival. The identifying assumption in Hu and Schlosser (2015) is that changes
in the average sex ratio at birth within a state over time are uncorrelated with
unobserved factors that could differentially affect male and female outcomes. Since
we model excess female mortality by firstborn sex (which varies at the household
level), we can difference out all such omitted variables.
Hu and Schlosser (2015) find a narrowing of gender gaps in malnutrition but,
despite this, no change in excess girl mortality. They state: “These results are
somewhat at odds with our previous findings on nutritional outcomes, family size
and breastfeeding duration. Particularly puzzling is why we find a differential im-
provement in female nutritional status but do not see any significant increase in
female survival probabilities.”7 Using a different statistical approach, we find large
post-ultrasound changes in mortality rates that result in a significant closure of
the boy-girl mortality gap, specifically in firstborn-girl households where this gap is
marked for pre-ultrasound birth cohorts. In this way, we resolve the puzzle.8
6In comparison, before the 1985 abortion legalization, the average post-neonatal infant EFM in
Taiwan in 1981 was -0.11 p.p., i.e., not biased against girls (Yang et al. (1996)). Moreover, India
and China differ in the age distribution of missing girls. In China, the imbalance in the sex ratio
for under-5 children in primarily at birth (83 percent), while there is a more even spread across
early childhood in India (Table 3.A.9). In particular, post-neonatal EFM contributes 33 percent
in India but only 3 percent in China.
7page 1257 Hu and Schlosser (2015)
8This difference in findings appears to be for the following reasons. First, their sample includes
few pre-ultrasound cohorts. In one case they use children born just three years before the survey
date, and in the other extend this to ten years, which implies either no pre-ultrasound cohorts or,
for the earliest survey round, only a few. A second important factor is that they pool firstborn-
girl and firstborn-boy families. Previous research, cited above, shows that the introduction of
ultrasound led to sex-selection primarily in firstborn-girl families. The summary statistics we
present for EFM in the pre-ultrasound period similarly show that it was concentrated in firstborn-
girl families. For instance, the girl-boy differential in post-neonatal child mortality was 0.9 p.p.
for births preceded by a firstborn boy but 3 p.p. for births preceded by a firstborn girl. This
is an enormous difference, so a specification that forces equal coefficients for the two groups may
veil relevant changes. If we select a shorter sample like Hu and Schlosser (2015) do and if our
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More generally, we take this research agenda forward. The large changes in
girl relative to boy survival that we document contribute new evidence to current
debates on biased population sex ratios in India. Moreover, we investigate SES
gradients in the gender-differentiated survival and fertility responses to the intro-
duction of ultrasound technology. The dynamic implications of recent changes in
the quantity and quality of girls (relative to boys) in India depend on where in the
SES distribution these changes occur, for instance, because of marital hypergamy
(Edlund (1999)).
The results of this study are of considerable significance. First, we find that there
is increased post-neonatal survival of girls relative to boys post-ultrasound but that
this is more than offset by increased prenatal loss of girls due to feticide. So the num-
ber of missing women continues to increase, and this has implications for violence
against women, prostitution, sexually-transmitted diseases, marriage market imbal-
ances, and elderly care (Edlund (1999), Dre`ze and Khera (2000), Kaur (2004), Ed-
lund et al. (2007), Ahlawat (2009), Ebenstein and Sharygin (2009), Bhaskar (2011),
Amaral and Bhalotra (2016)). Second, we find that girls born in the post-ultrasound
era are receiving greater early-life investments, with pre-existing boy-girl gaps in im-
munization and breastfeeding narrowing considerably. This not only contributes to
their survival but is predictive of improvements in cognitive attainment, income, and
longevity for girls (Bhalotra and Venkataramani (2013), Bhalotra and Venkatara-
mani (2015), Currie and Rossin-Slater (2015), Bhalotra et al. (2016)), and indeed the
outcomes of their offspring (Currie and Moretti (2007), Almond and Currie (2011),
Bhalotra and Rawlings (2011)). Narrowing of gender differences in human capi-
tal also tends to be associated with higher growth rates and social change (Klasen
(2002b), Lagerlo¨f (2003)). Third, we find that excess girl mortality is falling more in
low-SES households. Together with the finding in Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010))
that female feticide is greater in high-SES households, this means that, over time,
the share of girls in low-SES households is increasing. This result aligns with the
predictions of Edlund (1999) and, as she discusses, has implications for marriage
and violence. Fourth, the fertility decline (concentrated in firstborn-girl families)
specification does not distinguish firstborn-girl and firstborn-boy families, then we are able to
replicate their result that there is no post-ultrasound change in EFM. But our estimates and the
raw data confirm large reductions. Third, as discussed above, their approach may not sufficiently
account for simultaneity and selection. We use information on the first imports of ultrasound
scanners and the initiation of local production to generate variation in nationwide availability of
prenatal sex-detection techniques, and we are able to include pre-ultrasound cohorts (our data for
estimation of both survival and investments contains several pre-ultrasound cohorts). In addition,
we employ a mother fixed effects estimator to account for selection. Given the longer span of
our data, many mothers have fertility histories that are interrupted by the arrival of ultrasound
technology.
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we observe not only benefits girls through increased resources per capita, it is also
potentially beneficial for the health of mothers, which is depleted by the high levels
of fertility motivated by the desire to bear sons (Milazzo (2014)). More generally,
fertility decline in developing countries has been shown to be associated with eco-
nomic growth, human capital accumulation, and women’s empowerment (Joshi and
Schultz (2007), Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009), Miller (2010), Ashraf et al. (2013)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the Indian
context. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 discuss the empirical strategy and the data. Section 3.5
presents results and Section 3.6 presents estimates of the implied magnitude of
substitution between postnatal discrimination and sex-selective abortions due to
ultrasound access. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Context
While son preference has characterized parts of Indian society for centuries, the
availability of affordable prenatal sex-diagnostic techniques combined with legal ac-
cess to abortion is more recent. Abortion was legalized in India with the passage of
the Medical Termination of Pregnancy (MTP) Act in 1971, effective in most states
in 1972. The Act specifies the reasons for which an abortion can be legally per-
formed and requires that it be performed by a registered medical practitioner in
certified abortion facilities.9 Abortion is legal if the pregnancy that it terminates
endangers the woman’s life, causes grave injury to her physical or mental health, is
a result of rape or contraceptive failure (the latter applies only to married women),
or is likely to result in the birth of a child suffering from serious physical or mental
abnormalities. Consent is not required from the woman’s husband or from other
family members; however, a guardian’s consent is required if the woman seeking
an abortion is either less than 18 years old or is mentally ill. The Act allows an
unintended pregnancy to be terminated up to 20 weeks’ gestation; however, if the
pregnancy is beyond 12 weeks, approval is required from two medical practitioners
(Arnold et al. (2002)). The stated purpose of the Act was to regulate and ensure
access to safe abortion, although it has been argued that the political motivation
was population control (Phadke (1997)).
Fetal sex determination first became possible in India with the advent of amnio-
centesis in the 1970s. This technology was introduced to detect genetic abnormalities
but was soon being used to detect fetal sex. As early as 1976, the government banned
the use of these tests for sex determination in government facilities (Arnold et al.
9More information on the certification criteria is available in Stillman et al. (2014).
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(2002)). The private sector remained unregulated but widespread use was limited
by the high direct cost and the invasiveness of amniocentesis. Fetal sex-selection
only really became feasible after 1980—becoming evident at the population level
after 1985 and widespread by 1995—with the arrival of ultrasound scanners. Ultra-
sound availability during the early diffusion period was driven by the liberalization
of India’s import sector. The first ultrasound scanner was imported in 1987 (Mahal
et al. (2006)). Thereafter, the quantity of imports rapidly increased (Figure 3.A.1)
as import duties on medical equipment were gradually lowered. The import tariff
on medical devices declined from 40 to 60 percent in the 1980s to 25 percent in the
late 1990s to 12.5 percent in 2003-04, and then to the currently uniform rate of 5
percent. Domestic production of ultrasound machines grew 15-fold between 1988
and 2003 (George (2006), Grover and Vijayvergia (2006)), following relaxation of
industrial licensing regulations. The bottom graph in Figure 3.A.1 shows that, once
domestic production began, it was orders of magnitude larger than imports.
Demand for ultrasound scans proliferated as a result of the technology being non-
invasive and its wide affordability at about $10-$20 for a scan or an abortion (Arnold
et al. (2002)).10 The trend in ultrasound use (also in Figure 3.A.1) closely tracks the
supply of ultrasound machines. Additionally, Figure 3.A.2 shows that the officially
reported number of abortions (that includes both sex-selective and other abortions)
follows a similar trend and is positively correlated with self-reported ultrasound
use during pregnancy. Clinics and portable facilities have mushroomed, advertising
availability of ultrasound with slogans conveying that the cost of a scan is much
lower than the future costs of dowry.11 Additional amendments to the MTP Act in
2002 and 2003 increased public sector provision and made abortion safer (Stillman
et al. (2014)). Other things equal, this could have contributed to a further increase
in feticide since 2002.
Since the late 1980s, sex-selection has become the dominant concern amongst
women’s and human rights organizations.12 Their campaigns led to the central
10These may be significant costs in a country where many live under the $1.25-a-day line. The
costs cumulate if repeated scans and abortions are needed before a boy is conceived and vary with
distance of the household from the clinic and with the safety of the procedures.
11Dowry is a ubiquitous feature of the Indian marriage market and payments from the bride’s
family to the groom’s family at the time of marriage can amount to several multiples of annual
household income (Anukriti et al. (2016)), and can motivate parents to eliminate female births
(Bhalotra et al. (2016)).
12Feminist and socialist groups in the United States and other richer countries have hotly de-
fended a pro-choice stance against a pro-life stance on abortion. The focus of public discussion is on
benefits for women rather than on benefits for children. For instance, http://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2014/oct/14/abortion-right-to-privacy-women-right-to-equality
and https://socialistworker.org/2013/11/01/abortion-every-womans-right. Indian
feminists, on the other hand, have been divided by the seeming contradiction of supporting a
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government passing the Prenatal Sex Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Pre-
vention of Misuse) (PNDT) Act in 1994. This act was effective from January 1,
1996. The PNDT Act made it illegal to use prenatal sex-diagnostic techniques (like
ultrasound) to reveal the sex of a fetus. Following the revelation in the 2001 Cen-
sus of a continuing deterioration in the sex ratio, the PNDT Act was strengthened
by a 2002 Amendment (effective 2003) incorporating a ban on advertising prena-
tal sex determination and increased penalties for violations.13 It is widely believed
that these regulations have made little difference (Visaria (2005)), although Nandi
and Deolalikar (2013) find that they did have some impact. These bans are diffi-
cult to enforce because ultrasound (or alternatives like amniocentesis) are also used
for medical purposes and in routine prenatal care, making it easy to cover up sex
determination as a motive.
In general, the fetal environment has improved in India. The growth in income
and the decline in poverty since the early 1980s has been widely documented; fertility
decline set in from 1981 (Bhalotra and van Soest (2008)); and neonatal mortality
rates have been decreasing. Maternal mortality is estimated to have declined (Bhat
(2002)) and maternal age at birth has risen. Improvements in fetal health tend to
favor boys, whereas our hypothesis is that the trend, driven by the availability of
ultrasound scanners, has been in favor of girls.
3.3 Empirical Methodology
The hypothesis we test in this paper is that the availability of prenatal sex-detection
technology (and, in particular, ultrasound) simultaneously modified the decisions to
conceive, to use prenatal sex detection and abort if the fetus is female, and to
invest, possibly differently, in surviving girls and boys. Observable outcomes of
these decisions are live birth, the probability that a birth is female (or, the sex ratio
at birth), gender-differentiated investments (like breastfeeding and vaccination) and
girl relative to boy mortality rates.
As mentioned in Section 3.1, we exploit exogenous variation in the supply of
ultrasound scanners, interacted with quasi-random variation in the family-level pro-
clivity to commit sex-selection (conditional on underlying preferences) to estimate
the impacts of ultrasound availability. Since we are interested in gender gaps in
parental investments, survival, and sibship size, we use the sex of the child as a
third interaction in a triple difference-in-differences (DDD) regression specification.
woman’s right to abortion while opposing sex-selective abortion (Kumar (1983), Gangoli (1998)).
13More details on the PNDT Act are available in Retherford and Roy (2003) and Visaria (2005).
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Since the first imports of ultrasound scanners and the initiation of local produc-
tion constitute structural breaks in supply at the national level, a simple pre-post
comparison of outcomes that relies upon differential exposure to ultrasound tech-
nology is at risk of reflecting correlated macro-events.14 The wave of economic
liberalization in India that lowered import tariffs and relaxed licensing of domestic
production was, for instance, also associated with greater exposure of women to
Western media and with rising incomes for large sections of the population. We ad-
dress this problem by interacting cohort variation in exposure to the new technology
with the sex of the firstborn child of the mother, which is a quasi-random variable
indicating the mother’s “willingness” to conduct sex-selective abortion.
The assumption that the sex of the first child is randomly determined is sup-
ported by the data. The top left graph in Figure 3.A.3 shows that the sex ratio at
first birth in India lies within the normal range during our sample period, and there
is no tendency to increase over time.15 Additionally, Table 3.A.11 shows that there
are no significant socioeconomic differences between families with a firstborn son
and a firstborn daughter. Exogeneity of first-born sex has also been previously de-
fended (Das Gupta and Bhat (1997), Visaria (2005), Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010))
and lines up with recent survey data that suggest that parents do not always prefer
having a son over a daughter. Jayachandran (2016) finds that although the vast
majority of families want to have a son if they can only have one child, at a family
size of two they prefer having one daughter and one son over having two sons. As
desired and actual fertility in India are well above one (Table 3.A.10), it is reason-
able to assume that parents are not averse to having one daughter, despite a strong
desire for at least one son.
Previous studies have established that parents randomly exposed to a “first-
born girl treatment” are more likely to practice sex-selection at higher-parity births
(Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010), Rosenblum (2013)) consistent with a documented
desire for at least one son. Figure 3.A.3 clearly depicts this pattern: after ultrasound
technology became available, second, third, and fourth births became increasingly
more male but only for families without a son. So, the interaction with first child’s
sex captures the differential incentives to sex-select among otherwise similar families.
If sex of the firstborn is random, excess female mortality (EFM) among fami-
lies with a firstborn girl and a firstborn boy should follow a similar trend before
14We do not use measures of state-specific adoption since it is endogenous; see Jayachandran et al.
(2010) for a similar argument pertaining to the introduction of antibiotics in the United States.
Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) document that access to ultrasound in India was widespread and
that the costs of ultrasound and abortion were not prohibitive even for relatively poor households.
15Figure 3.A.3 reproduces Figures 1-4 from Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010).
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the availability of prenatal sex-selection technology. Figure 3.A.4 plots the 5-year
moving average of EFM for firstborn-boy and firstborn-girl families for our sample
period and the differential trend for these two groups. Although EFM is significantly
higher for births preceded by a firstborn girl during the pre-ultrasound period, the
gap remained constant until 1985, providing support for the identifying assumption
of parallel pre-reform trends.
Even if our specification addresses potential concerns about omitted trends, one
might still worry that we identify compositional rather than causal effects. For ex-
ample, if higher SES women were more likely to change their behavior in response
to ultrasound availability, then the post-ultrasound composition of births will be
lower-risk than pre-ultrasound. If, in addition, the gender gap in outcomes among
high SES births is narrower (we discuss the evidence later), any causal effects of
ultrasound availability on post-birth gender gaps will be conflated with this compo-
sitional effect. More generally, if there was selection into conception, sex-selection,
and abortion after prenatal sex detection became feasible, then our estimates of
child mortality are subject to bias. We believe that this is not a first-order problem
since we effectively difference between first-daughter and first-son families condi-
tional upon SES. We nevertheless address this concern by introducing mother fixed-
effects, comparing outcomes for children born to the same mother but differentially
exposed to ultrasound technology.16 We also investigate sensitivity of our estimates
to conditioning upon stated preferences including desired fertility and the desired
number of sons versus daughters.
3.3.1 Regression Specifications
To capture the time variation in ultrasound availability, we split our sample into
three broad time-periods, defining 1973-1984 as the pre-ultrasound period, 1985-
1994 as the early diffusion period, and 1995-2005 as the late diffusion period when
ultrasound supply and use became widespread. Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) iden-
tify 1985 as a break-point in the trend of the average sex ratio at birth using non-
parametric plots and flexible parametric specifications. As an imbalanced sex ratio
at birth captures sex-selective abortions, the break-point also serves as a proxy for
the trend-break in ultrasound availability. Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) identify
1995 as a second break-point based on the sharp increase in supply of ultrasound
scanners following the acceleration of trade liberalization in the early and mid-1990s;
this trend-break is clearly visible in Figure 3.A.1. Our results are similar if we vary
16This involves selecting a sample of families with at least two children of opposite sex. We
therefore present estimates with and without fixed effects to assess coefficient stability.
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the precise thresholds used to define the three time periods.
For child i of birth order b born to mother j in year t and state s, we estimate
the following specification:17
Yijt =α + β1Gj ∗ Fi ∗ Post1t + β2Gj ∗ Fi ∗ Post2t
+ γGj ∗ Fi + ωtGj + σtFi
+ X
′
ijtτ + δsFi + νsGj + ψbFi + ξbGj
+ ρbt + ηbs + φst + ijt
(3.1)
The dependent variable, Yijt, is either a mortality indicator for child i or a measure
of parental investments in children, including breastfeeding and immunization.18
The indicator variable Gj equals one if the first child of mother j is a girl. The
variable Fi equals one if child i is female. Post
1
t indicates that t belongs to the early
diffusion period (1985-1994) and Post2t indicates that t belongs to the late diffusion
period (1995-2005). Attached to the two triple interaction terms are the coefficients
of interest.
A vector of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, X
′
ijt, comprises in-
dicators for household wealth quintiles, educational attainment of child’s parents,
mother’s birth cohort, mother’s age at birth, caste, religion, and residence in a rural
area. We also control for the main effects of Gj and Fi and fixed effects for state,
birth year (or cohort, of the child), and birth order. We allow birth cohort fixed
effects to vary by firstborn sex (ωtGj), by child gender (σtFi), and by birth order
(ρbt), which flexibly control for potential omitted trends. We also allow state and
birth order fixed effects to vary by firstborn sex and by child gender ( δsFi, νsGj,
ψbFi, ξbGj). In addition, we include state fixed effects specific to birth order (ηbs)
and to birth year (φst).
Child gender-specific cohort fixed effects (σtFi) account for any nationwide changes
that may influence gender gaps in the outcomes, including improvements in mater-
nal health or prenatal care which we expect benefit male fetuses more than female
fetuses given the evidence on greater sensitivity of males to prenatal inputs (Low
(2000)). They also account for any trends in son preference associated with mod-
ernization. Cohort fixed effects varying by sex of the firstborn child in the family
(ωtGj) control for nationwide trends that may have differentially affected mortality
of children in firstborn-girl versus firstborn-boy families. For instance, the “Trivers-
17The variable state refers to the mother’s state of residence at the time of survey and may differ
from the child’s state of birth. Restricting the sample to women who have not migrated between
their first birth and the survey date does not substantively change the estimates.
18More details on the variables used in the regression analysis are available in Appendix 1.
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Willards hypothesis” implies that firstborn-boy families are more often of higher
SES than firstborn-girl families, and it is plausible that trends in the outcomes dif-
fer by SES and that the SES-observables we control for do not capture every relevant
expression of SES.
Allowing the state fixed effects to vary with both child gender (δsFi) and sex of
the firstborn child (νsGj) allows state-level time-invariant factors, such as soil quality
(Carranza (2015)), to have gender-specific effects and ensures that we absorb any
cross-sectional heterogeneity that may be correlated with firstborn sex. We interact
indicators for child gender and sex of the firstborn with birth order (ψbFi, ξbGj)
given previous evidence that son preference varies with birth order and that sex of
the firstborn child influences the exercise of son preference.
Lastly, φst, ηbs, and ρbt control non-parametrically for, respectively, state-specific
time effects (e.g., differential growth rates of state GDP or availability of abortion
and other health services), state-specific birth order effects, and birth order specific
time effects. This rich set of fixed effects enables us to rule out a wide range of
confounding variables and trends that can interfere with a causal interpretation of
our findings.
We include first births in our sample and set Gj equal to zero for them.
19 The
“control” group comprises pre-ultrasound births, second- and higher-order births to
mothers whose firstborn is a boy, and first births. The coefficient γ measures the
difference in excess female mortality (EFM) or the gender gap in health investments
between the treatment and control groups during the pre-ultrasound period. The
coefficients β1 and β2 capture how these gaps evolved over the early and late diffusion
periods relative to the pre-ultrasound period. Standard errors are clustered by state.
Since our data comprise multiple births per woman, we also estimate specification
(1) including mother fixed effects, exploiting the differential exposure of siblings to
ultrasound technology. This addresses concerns pertaining to selection on underlying
preferences or socioeconomic characteristics correlated with both access to or uptake
of ultrasound technology and investments in girls versus boys. This approach also
addresses any potential bias arising from a preponderance of male births in higher
SES families (“Trivers-Willards hypothesis”) even in the absence of sex-selection.
Since we do not observe large differences in the socioeconomic characteristics of
firstborn-boy and firstborn-girl families (in Table 3.A.11), we expect that selection
is of limited concern, but we nevertheless allow for it.
We examine the impact of availability of prenatal sex detection on gender gaps
in fertility in two ways. First, we test if ultrasound altered the male-bias in the
19For higher-order births, Gj equals one if the first child of mother j is a girl and zero otherwise.
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hazard of birth in a given year for firstborn-girl versus firstborn-boy mothers.20 For
this specification, we utilize a retrospective mother-year panel in which a woman
enters the panel in her year of marriage and exits in the year of survey. For mother
i from state s of age a in year t, who has given birth to b−1 children by t and whose
last birth took place r years ago, we estimate the following logistic regression:
Birthit =α + β1Gi ∗ Post1t + β2Gi ∗ Post2t + γGi + ωt
+ X
′
iτ + φa + ψb + σr + δs + νsGi + θst + it
(3.2)
The outcome variable, Birthit equals one if the mother gives birth in year t
and is zero otherwise. Post1t , Post
2
t , and Gj are defined as earlier. The vector X
′
i
comprises indicators for household wealth quintiles, educational attainment of the
mother and her husband, caste, religion, residence in a rural area, and mother’s year
of birth. We include fixed effects for year (ωt), state (δs), mother’s age (φa), parity
(ψb), and years since last birth (σr), state-specific firstborn-girl fixed effects (νsGj),
and state-specific year fixed effects (θst).
21
Additionally, we attempt to estimate the effect on the “stock” of children a
woman has at the time of survey.22 Specifically, we estimate the following specifica-
tion for woman j in state s who has Njt children in the year of survey, t:
Njt =α + β1Gj ∗ Post1t + β2Gj ∗ Post2t + γGj + σPost1t + ψPost2t
+ X
′
jτ + δs + νsGj + θsPost
1
t + ωsPost
2
t + jt
(3.3)
We restrict the sample to mothers who either were always exposed or never
exposed to ultrasound for the year-span of their births. In other words, we retain
women who had all their births strictly within one of the three time-periods—pre-
ultrasound, early diffusion, or late diffusion. Post1t and Post
2
t indicate that a woman
began and completed childbearing respectively during 1985-1995 and after 1995. The
variable Gj is, as before, an indicator for the firstborn being a girl. The vector X
′
j
comprises indicators for household wealth quintiles, educational attainment of the
woman and her husband, caste, religion, residence in a rural area, woman’s birth
year, and woman’s age at the time of survey. We include fixed effects for the woman’s
20Since our empirical strategy relies on the sex of the first birth, the sample excludes the 11
percent of women in the data who had never given birth by the time of the survey.
21We also modify this specification by including mother fixed effects to test if ultrasound avail-
ability delays time to the next birth for a given mother, conditional upon the time since last birth,
in the post-ultrasound (relative to the pre-ultrasound) period and whether this delay is on average
greater in firstborn-girl (relative to firstborn-boy) families. The results from this specification are
available upon request.
22Like specification (2), here too we exclude women who had never given birth by the time of
the survey.
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birth year as fertility is right-censored for some women. Moreover, we include state
fixed effects (δs), state-specific firstborn-girl fixed effects (νsGj), and allow the effects
of the post-ultrasound indicators to vary by state (θsPost
1
t and ωsPost
2
t ). The
coefficient γ provides an indication of the extent to which the pre-ultrasound period
was characterized by son-biased fertility stopping. The coefficients β1 and β2 test
our hypothesis that after fetal sex determination became feasible, there was less
son-bias in fertility decisions, i.e., the fertility difference between families with a
firstborn girl and families with a firstborn boy narrowed.23
3.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The mortality and fertility equations are estimated using three pooled rounds of the
National Family Health Survey (NFHS) conducted in 1992-93, 1998-99, and 2005-
06. These nationwide, repeated, cross-sectional surveys are representative at the
state level and report complete birth histories for all interviewed women, including
children’s month, year, and order of birth, mother’s age at birth, and age at death of
deceased children.24 The sample comprises 503,316 births of 232,259 mothers that
occurred in 1973-2005.
For our mortality and postnatal health specifications, we pool all births of the
surveyed women to create a child-level dataset. The hazard of birth specification, on
the other hand, is a retrospective mother-year panel that is created from women’s
retrospective birth histories. Our third specification, that examines the fertility
stock, simply pools all surveyed women to form a woman-level dataset.
In the pre-ultrasound era, there were large gender gaps in post-neonatal child
mortality. Trends in EFM by the sex of the first child are depicted in Figure 3.A.4
and Table 3.A.1. During 1973-1984, girls preceded by a firstborn girl were 3 p.p.
more likely than boys to suffer post-neonatal child mortality. After 1985, following
introduction of ultrasound, there is a clear decline in the gender gap in mortality in
this group, to 1.78 p.p. during 1985-1994 and to 1.18 p.p. during 1995-2005. There
23In principle, the excluded mothers, whose fertility spans more than one period should be similar
to the included mothers. We checked for balance and found that in fact the excluded mothers are,
on average, of lower SES and are older. However, we always control for SES (education, wealth,
urban) and flexibly control for age, and, within the sample, our estimates identify differences by
firstborn sex. In any case, we also present fertility results separately for each SES group (within
our sample) and, as we show later, for most SES indicators, differences in the coefficients of interest
are small. Lastly, our results are robust to the inclusion of fixed effects for the years of first and
last birth of every women and fixed effects for their interactions with each other, with state fixed
effects, and with the firstborn sex indicator.
24Since the state of Sikkim changed its border during the period of analysis, we exclude it from
our sample.
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was also a marked decline in the gender gap in mortality in families with a firstborn
son, but from a smaller initial level. Among pre-ultrasound cohorts, the gap was
0.88 p.p. and this declined to 0.50 p.p. in the early diffusion period and 0.15 p.p.
during the late diffusion period.
Table 3.A.11 reports summary statistics for the main variables used in the anal-
ysis, by the sex of the firstborn child for pre- and post-ultrasound periods. The
fraction of female births, a marker of sex-selective abortion, declined from 0.48 in
the pre-ultrasound period to 0.47 in the late diffusion period for births preceded
by a firstborn girl, but not for births preceded by a firstborn boy. Fertility is
consistently higher for mothers with a firstborn daughter than for mothers with a
firstborn son, illustrating son-biased fertility stopping. This difference narrows in
the post-ultrasound period, consistent with our prediction that sex-selective abor-
tion substituted son-biased fertility behavior as a way of achieving the desired sex
composition of births. Mother’s age at birth has increased over time, and more so
for mothers with a firstborn girl, consistent with reduced fertility.
Firstborn-boy and firstborn-girl families appear well-matched in each period on
most relevant characteristics including rural residence, religion, caste, wealth, and
father’s education. More than 70 percent of the births occur in Hindu families and
close to 70 percent in rural areas. However, over time, births preceded by a firstborn
girl are increasingly born to less educated mothers relative to births preceded by
a firstborn boy. We investigate this more formally in exploring heterogeneity in
fertility responses to ultrasound by education of the mother and, as we shall see, our
results confirm that literate women exhibit greater reductions in son-biased fertility
stopping than illiterate women, consistent with the summary statistics. In the main
regressions, we consistently control for various markers of SES and, importantly,
specifications with mother fixed effects are free from any potential bias introduced
by differences in SES between firstborn-boy and firstborn-girl families.
Although the NFHS contain fairly rich data on investments in children, these
questions are asked only for children born in a few years preceding each survey and
there is no pre-ultrasound data on investments.25 For this reason, we utilize the 1999
round of the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS). REDS is restricted
to rural women from 16 major states and reports age at death for deceased children
but does not record the year of birth for children who did not survive to the date
of survey. To the extent that deceased children are likely to have received lower
health investments than surviving children and (as we show) excess girl mortality
25NFHS-1, 2, and 3 collected health investments for, respectively, the last three children born
after January 1988, the last two children born after January 1995, and all children born after
January 2001.
130
was higher during the pre-ultrasound period than in the post-ultrasound years, the
exclusion of deceased children will tend to bias the estimated effects downward. In
this sense, the estimates we present are conservative. We nevertheless also present
estimates using the NFHS data—which is not biased by the exclusion of deceased
children—by exploiting increasing penetration of ultrasound during post-ultrasound
years.
Table 3.A.12 reports summary statistics for the REDS sample. The definition of
pre-ultrasound and early diffusion period is the same as in Table 3.A.11 but the late
diffusion period is shorter (1995-1999). Vaccination rates have increased over time
for all children from about 70 percent probability of receiving at least one vaccine
in the pre-ultrasound period to above 90 percent likelihood in the late diffusion
period. In the pre-ultrasound period, children preceded by a firstborn boy were 3
p.p. more likely to be immunized than children preceded by a firstborn girl and
this gap was closed post-ultrasound. Breastfeeding is nearly universal for girls and
boys in India. The mean duration of breastfeeding was about 19 months in the
pre-ultrasound period and nearly 90 percent of boys and girls (who survived to the
survey date) were breastfed for at least 12 months. The gender gaps manifest in
terms of breastfeeding duration, after age one, though they are not apparent in the
sample means in Table 3.A.12, possibly because the mean breastfeeding duration
is mechanically lower in the 1995-1999 period because some of the children in that
group were of breastfeeding age at the time of survey. This is another weakness
of the REDS that we redress by showing results estimated from the NFHS data as
well.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Excess Female Mortality
In Table 3.A.2, we present estimates of the impacts of the introduction and diffusion
of ultrasound technology on neonatal and post-neonatal child mortality.26 We add
controls as we move across columns, with column (4) being the richest specification.
The coefficient of Firstborn girl * Female confirms that, during the pre-ultrasound
period, girls were significantly more likely to die neonatally (by 0.9 p.p.) and dur-
ing early childhood (by 1.5 p.p.) among children preceded by a firstborn sister
relative to a firstborn brother.27 The triple-interaction coefficients, Firstborn girl
26Table 3.A.13 reports estimates for infant and child mortality.
27The probability of post-neonatal child mortality for boys in the pre-ultrasound period was 6.2
percent in firstborn-boy families and 5.7 percent in firstborn-girl families.
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* Female * Post, indicate a 33 percent decline in the neonatal EFM gap between
firstborn-girl and firstborn-boy families, relative to the 1.765 p.p. baseline gap. For
post-neonatal child mortality, the EFM gap between firstborn-girl and firstborn-boy
families reduced by 2.167 p.p. once ultrasound technology became available, which
is very large relative to the baseline gap. These results are robust to the inclusion
of mother fixed effects.
We can decisively reject an increase in relative girl neonatal mortality, which
could arise if, having detected child sex, parents made smaller fetal investments in
girls. Larger reductions in post-neonatal than in neonatal mortality are consistent
with the increases in postnatal investments that we document below, given that
neonatal survival is less dependent upon postnatal investments and more closely
linked to maternal health and delivery conditions. Our findings are also congru-
ous with previous work; for instance, Almond et al. (2006) show that hospital
de-segregation after the Civil Rights Act led to a narrowing of the racial gap in
post-neonatal but not neonatal mortality.28 The significance of our results is en-
hanced by the fact that reductions in post-neonatal mortality also improve later life
circumstances, predicting adult height, a marker of health (Bozzoli et al. (2009))
and cognitive performance (Chay et al. (2009)).
Estimates by birth order are in Table 3.A.14. The coefficients indicate reductions
in post-neonatal mortality among girls across birth order, but the largest and only
statistically significant coefficients are among second births. This may reflect the
common finding that parents are particularly averse to having more than two girls
(which applies at order three and above),29 so there remains a girl-boy differential
in post-neonatal mortality at higher orders.
We also estimate specification (1) for a sample of first births, re-defining Post1t
and Post2t as indicators for the second child being born during the early and late
ultrasound diffusion periods, respectively (see Table 3.A.15). If, in violation of our
assumption, ultrasound access also led to sex-selection for first births, we would
also expect to see a decline in EFM for first births. The results confirm no pre-
ultrasound difference in the risk of death by gender, and no post-ultrasound change.
This validates our assumption that parents do not manipulate the sex of first births.
28Similarly, The Million Deaths Study (2010) in India shows that only 3.2 percent of neonatal
deaths were caused by diarrhea—a function of clean water and nutrition—in contrast to 22.2
percent of post-neonatal deaths.
29Almond and Edlund (2008) show that Indian, Chinese, and Korean families with no previous
sons exhibit male-biased sex ratios at third parity but not before in the 2000 US Census and Bhalo-
tra and Cochrane (2010)) show that the male-bias in the sex ratio at birth in India is increasing
in birth order.
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Changes in Preferences versus Technology
We utilize women’s self-reported preferences for fertility (i.e., ideal number of chil-
dren) and sons (i.e., ideal sex ratio of children) to test if trends in other factors, such
as women’s education, led to changes in preferences, which in turn influenced sex
differences in child investments and mortality. Our main specification is robust to
this source of bias as our identification strategy teases out structural breaks in the
outcomes that coincide with sharp changes in the availability of ultrasound technol-
ogy. We nevertheless assess the potential role of changes in preferences as follows.
First, we include them as controls in specification (1) and, to strengthen this test,
we interact the preference variables with the Female dummy and the Firstborn
girl dummy. The coefficients of interest are not changed by these additions (Ta-
ble 3.A.16). We then control for another measure of gender biased preferences—the
state-year gender enrollment ratio at ages 6-11 and 11-14 and, again, the results
are stable. The coefficients of these additional terms are interesting in their own
right, and are consistent with our expectations. The coefficients of Ideal Sex Ratio
* Female and Enrollment Gender Gap * Female are positive, implying that EFM
is higher in families with a stronger preference of sons. The coefficient on Ideal Fer-
tility * Female is negative, implying that, conditional on son preference, a declining
trend in fertility leads to higher EFM, a finding that is consistent with Jayachandran
(2016).
Second, we check if, post-ultrasound, girls are more likely to be born into fami-
lies with weaker son preference, as this would then be a reason that they do better.
This pattern would arise if families that commit female feticide have stronger son
preference than families that take their girl conceptions to term. We focus on the
behavior of firstborn-girl families because the data show that these are the families
that abort girls (Figure 3.A.3). We test for this channel by estimating specification
(1) with mother’s self-reported ideal fertility and ideal proportion of sons as depen-
dent variables (Table 3.A.17). The triple-interaction coefficients indicate that female
children born post-ultrasound in a firstborn-girl family relative to a firstborn-boy
family are no more likely post-ultrasound than pre-ultrasound to be born to mothers
with lower son preference. This suggests that feticide depends more upon charac-
teristics like wealth and education (this is demonstrated in Bhalotra and Cochrane
(2010), who also show that these characteristics are negatively correlated with de-
sired fertility) than on stated son preference. Indeed, stated son preference is lower
in wealthy and educated families even though they commit more female feticide; a
vivid portrayal of this is in Figures 3.A.5 and 3.A.6.30
30The finding that girls in India are increasingly being born in (Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010))
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Exploiting Variation in Self-reported Ultrasound Use
Thus far, we have chosen not to use the available individual data on ultrasound use
because uptake is potentially endogenous and the data, being self-reported, may
be inaccurate. However, we now use these data to corroborate the previous results
which are based on changes in the availability of ultrasound driven by different
import and licensing regimes.31 We average individual-level data to obtain the
percentage of births in a state and a year for which the mother reports having a
prenatal ultrasound scan at some point during pregnancy (Ultrast).
32 The earliest
year for which this variable can be defined is 1996 so now, instead of comparing pre-
and post-ultrasound births, we compare births in states with varying intensity of
ultrasound use. The results in Table 3.A.18 suggest that ultrasound scan usage is
associated with decline in EFM, confirming the results in Table 3.A.2.
Other Robustness Checks
In the main analysis, we incorporate pre-ultrasound cohorts in the sample and
control for underlying trends in the outcomes. We nevertheless confirm that our
findings are not being driven by any pre-trends by restricting the sample to the
pre-ultrasound period and then re-estimating specification (1) with a single Post
indicator, one each for “placebo” (or fake) treatment years 1977 through 1982 (Ta-
ble 3.A.19). We find no evidence of an underlying convergence in mortality outcomes
for boys and girls that is unrelated to ultrasound availability.
Earlier we referenced previous research which verifies that the sex of the first-
born child was not manipulated upon the introduction of ultrasound (Bhalotra and
Cochrane (2010)). We nevertheless investigate this differently, restricting the sam-
ple to women whose first child was born in the pre-ultrasound period. We then
re-estimate equation (1) (Table 3.A.20) and although there are fewer observations
and surviving in (our results, discussed in detail shortly) low-SES families aligns with the predic-
tions of Edlund (1999). However, if the Trivers-Willards mechanism, which accounts for parents
caring not only about the sex of their offspring but also about the chances that their offspring
reproduce, were a key driver for this pattern, then we may expect this to express in stated son
preference. Our finding that high-SES parents report lower son preference even though they engage
in stronger son-preferring behaviors can be explained either by (i) high-SES parents being more
socialized into under-stating their true son preference or (ii) sex-selective behaviors being driven
by economic and social factors (lower desired fertility or greater affordability of safe ultrasound
and abortion facilities among high-SES women) rather than by the Trivers-Willards mechanism,
even if the latter is present.
31Notably, self-reported ultrasound use is larger among mothers with a firstborn girl relative to
a firstborn boy, consistent with the former being more likely to practice sex-selection at higher
parities.
32The denominator equals the number of births with a non-missing response on the question
pertaining to ultrasound use during pregnancy.
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(especially for the late diffusion period), the coefficients of interest remain negative
and statistically significant.
3.5.2 Postnatal Health Investments
The declining post-neonatal mortality among girls signals increased parental invest-
ments - we directly test for this in Table 3.A.3 with REDS data. The outcomes
are the number of months a child is breastfed, indicators for breastfeeding dura-
tion being at least 12, 24, and 36 months;33 a dummy variable indicating that the
child has received at least one vaccine; and medical expenditure (in Rupees) on the
child in the year prior to the survey.34 Pre-ultrasound, in families with a firstborn
girl, boys were breastfed for a longer duration and were more likely to be vacci-
nated and to receive expenditure during illness. The estimates show that the gender
gaps in breastfeeding and vaccination were virtually eliminated post-ultrasound in
firstborn-girl families.35 Previous literature estimates that breastfeeding differences
explain about 9 percent of the gender gap in post-neonatal child mortality in India
(Jayachandran and Kuziemko (2011)) and that sex differences in vaccinations ex-
plain between 20 - 30 percent (Oster (2009)). We estimate that the contributions of
breastfeeding and vaccination to the ultrasound-led decline in EFM are, respectively,
25 percent and 9 to 13 percent (details in Appendix 2).
We also present results using the NFHS data in Table 3.A.21. The NFHS con-
tains information not only on immunization and breastfeeding, but also reports the
number of antenatal checks during pregnancy. The results are broadly similar.36
Estimates by birth order (available upon request) are also congruous with the birth
33Here, the sample is restricted to children who are at least 12, 24, and 36 months old, respec-
tively.
34Medical expenditure is conditional upon illness and includes doctor’s fees, medicines, and costs
of special diets during the illness. The specifications are similar to those for mortality except that
we drop the urban indicator since REDS covers only rural households, the wealth quintiles (not
reported in REDS) and, since we have a smaller sample, we drop ρbt, ξbGj , and νsGj and replace
φst with state-specific linear time trends.
35There is a significant improvement in the total duration of breastfeeding and in breastfeeding
during the second year of life. Since most Indian children are breastfed through the first year of life,
it makes sense that gender gaps in breastfeeding duration emerge after age one. The coefficients
on breastfeeding for at least 36 months and for medical expenditure during sickness are positive
but imprecise.
36The estimates of gender gaps during the early diffusion period inTable 3.A.21 are similar to
the corresponding numbers (i.e., sums of the coefficients in the first two rows) in Table 3.A.3. The
coefficients in the second row of Table 3.A.21 capture the differences in gender gaps during the two
post-ultrasound periods, and are also similar to the corresponding estimates (i.e., differences of the
coefficients in the second and third rows) in Table 3.A.3. For instance, column (2) of Table 3.A.21
implies that the gender gap in the likelihood of receiving at least one vaccine was 2.5 p.p. lower in
the late diffusion period relative to the early diffusion period, while the corresponding magnitude
is 3.7 p.p. in column (6) of panel A in Table 3.A.3.
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order specific results for survival.
Consistent with there being no pre-ultrasound EFM for first births and no post-
ultrasound change, we find no significant pre-ultrasound gender gaps in breastfeeding
and immunization rates among first births and no differences in these outcomes for
first births whose younger siblings were born before versus after ultrasound access.
To the extent that the bulk of immunization and breastfeeding investments in the
first child are made before the second birth, these findings are not surprising.37
However, we find that pre-ultrasound, firstborn girls received lower medical and
educational expenditure than firstborn boys and that these gaps narrowed after
ultrasound became available (see Table 3.A.22).38 Overall, these result are consistent
with sex-selection driven fertility decline in firstborn-girl families raising per capita
resources that benefit all children.
3.5.3 Fertility
For reasons detailed earlier, in Tables 3.A.4 and 3.A.5 we investigate if son-biased
fertility stopping behavior changed subsequent to the availability of sex-selection
technology. The coefficient of Firstborn Girl is positive and significant in both tables
confirming that, pre-ultrasound, women whose first child was a girl were more likely
to give birth in a given year and had 0.155 more births than women with a firstborn
son. Our estimates show that these differentials were eliminated once ultrasound
technology became available.39 Controlling for mother’s fertility preference and son
preference does not significantly alter these effects, which suggests that the estimated
coefficients reflect changes in behavior in response to changes in technology rather
than changes in preferences.40
Since sex-selective abortion allows parents to avoid unwanted children, we also
test whether availability of ultrasound drove actual fertility closer to desired fertility.
Our estimates in Table 3.A.5 imply a significant drop of undesired fertility of 0.093
births, compared to the baseline difference at 0.117 in first-girl relative to first-boy
37However, breastfeeding acts as a natural contraceptive, and consequently girls relative to boys
at lower birth orders are breastfed for shorter period so that parents can start trying to have a son
(Jayachandran and Kuziemko (2011)); but the ability to sex-select is useful only post-conception,
so this channel is unlikely to get significantly affected by ultrasound access.
38Pre-ultrasound, even among firstborns, girls were 12 p.p. less likely to be provided allopathic
treatment if they were ill. Similarly, annual education and medical expenditure on firstborn girls
was lower by, respectively, Rs. 562 and Rs. 69 relative to firstborn boys.
39Estimates conditional upon mother fixed effects are not statistically significantly different, and
are available on request.
40As a robustness check, like for EFM, we also ran a specification where Firstborn girl * Post1
and Firstborn girl * Post2 are interacted with the preference variables; the results remain the
same.
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families. To put this in a wider perspective, the presence of HIV reduces the average
number of births a woman has during her life-cycle by 0.15 (Shapira (2013)). The
coefficients of interest (those on the triple-interaction terms) are similar for actual
fertility (in column 2) and for actual minus desired fertility (in column 3). This
confirms that the decline in actual fertility in first-girl families that we document is
not driven by a decline in desired fertility.
The coefficients of the stated preference terms reveal that actual fertility is,
as we may expect, increasing in desired fertility and in the desired ratio of sons
to daughters. However, excess fertility is decreasing in the ideal ratio of sons to
daughters, suggesting that desired fertility rises more steeply with son preference
than actual fertility.41 Since actual fertility is not fully in the control of parents, it
will tend to rise less than proportionately with desired fertility, given that the desire
to have sons leads to the widely documented phenomenon of son-biased fertility
stopping (which is evident from the baseline statistics in the first row).
Table 3.A.23 shows that the relative fertility decline in firstborn-girl families is
driven by a shift from having four or more children toward having two or three
children.
3.5.4 Heterogeneity
Although stated son preference is weaker among urban, educated, and wealthy
women (Figure 3.A.6), they exhibit higher rates of prenatal sex selection (Fig-
ure 3.A.5). This is consistent with their lower reported desired fertility (Figure 3.A.7),
with educated individuals being more likely to adopt a new technology (Lleras-
Muney and Lichtenberg (2005)), and with their being more efficacious in achieving
their targets (Rosenzweig and Schultz (1989)). Also, wealth may matter at the mar-
gin for affordability of ultrasound scans and (safe) abortion, especially if a woman
engages in multiple events. If there were a strict substitution of prenatal for post-
natal girl mortality, we may expect the reductions in mortality and fertility that we
document in this paper to be concentrated among educated and wealthy mothers.
However, it is possible that these responses occur at different margins.
We examine if our results differ by mother’s educational attainment (illiterate
versus literate), household wealth (bottom 40 versus top 20 percent), mother’s em-
ployment status (paid employment versus rest),42 household caste (scheduled caste
41Regressions of actual fertility and ideal fertility on the ideal sex ratio variable confirm this.
However, note that unobserved shocks that increase, say the (measured) desired number of boys,
would drive up both the ideal sex ratio and ideal fertility creating a positive upward bias on the
latter coefficient.
42The results are robust to using alternative comparisons, including employed (paid or unpaid)
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(SC) versus other),43 and rural versus urban residence. Tables 3.A.6 and 3.A.7
respectively present estimates for post-neonatal child EFM (using the mother fixed-
effects specification) and gender gaps in sibling size.44 In each regression, we continue
to control for all SES variables, except the one being used to examine heterogeneity.
The tables show the baseline gender gaps in firstborn-girl families (first rows)
and test to what extent they narrowed during the post-ultrasound period (second
and third rows). In the pre-ultrasound era, among firstborn-girl families, excess girl
post-neonatal mortality was greater in low SES groups (illiterate, poor, unemployed,
rural), but not significantly different for high versus low caste families. However,
baseline gender gaps in sibling size were larger among literate, rich, urban, and
non-SC women.45
Post-ultrasound EFM decline was steeper in poor and rural households, and
households in which women were in unpaid employment.46 This is consistent with
larger increases in investment but also with a given change in investment having
larger survival impacts in low-SES households where other causes of child mortality,
such as infection rates, are higher. However, the absolute decline in EFM was
broadly similar among literate versus illiterate mothers (and greater in relative terms
in the literate group given their lower baseline rates). The decline in son-biased
fertility stopping is greater among high-caste, literate, rich, urban women and women
in unpaid employment.
We also split each SES-subsample by caste.47 Unlike other dimensions of SES,
caste is exogenous in that an individual is born into a caste and remains in it. The
caste hierarchy has been preserved by the low prevalence of inter-caste marriages.48
The upper-castes have historically laid greater emphasis on ritual purity and adher-
ence to religious texts, which often compromises the position of women (Das Gupta
et al. (2003), Das Gupta (2010)). In accordance with this, pre-ultrasound excesses
in mortality and family size in girl-led families and post-ultrasound declines were, on
versus unemployed.
43We pool high castes and other backward classes (OBC) because the first survey round does
not distinguish them. Since OBC are better-off than SC households, the categories we use preserve
the caste hierarchy in India. We also pool scheduled tribes (ST) with the higher caste group based
upon finding that they take similar coefficients when included as a separate category.
44Table 3.A.24 presents the heterogeneity results for effects on the number of children.
45This is not the case for women’s employment but, in India, on average, low-SES women are
more likely to be employed, driven to work by poverty.
46Women’s labor force participation is hockey-stick shaped in India, being most common among
the poor (Das and Desai (2003).
47We include households of all religions and use the self-reported caste of the household for our
analysis while using religion as a control variable. These results are available upon request.
48According to the 2005 India Human Development Survey, only 4.4 percent of women were
married to a spouse from a different caste.
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average, larger in higher caste households. Interacting caste with other indicators of
SES shows that at the low-end of the SES distribution, low castes are more gender-
equal but at the high-end, low caste behavior is similar to that of high-castes. This
is consistent with the process of Sanskritization, wherein lower castes emulate the
upper castes in seeking upward mobility (Srinivas (1962)).
3.6 Estimates of Substitution
To assess the extent of substitution between postnatal and prenatal discrimination
due to ultrasound technology, we use our estimates to compute the number of female
child deaths that have been averted and compare them with the number of girls who
are missing, both due to prenatal sex-detection. These calculations are described in
Appendix 3. We find that for every girl that survived due to ultrasound technology,
five girls were aborted before birth.49
We calculate the proportion of discriminated births for which parents substituted
postnatal discrimination with prenatal discrimination as the decline in the number
of girls missing due to EFM (= -60,879) divided by the total number of missing girls
in the pre-ultrasound period (= 196,667). This calculation implies that, for nearly 31
percent of the births, parents who were practicing postnatal discrimination switched
to prenatal discrimination. This is much larger than the estimates in Lin et al. (2014)
who find that 4 percent of parents of second-parity births and 8 percent of parents
of third- and higher-parity births made the switch in Taiwan.
3.7 Conclusion
As ultrasound technology became increasingly available, the global annual number
of sex-selective abortions increased from nearly zero in the late 1970s to 1.6 million
per year in 2005-2010 (Bongaarts and Guilmoto (2015)), with India and China be-
ing the biggest contributors. The stark growth in female feticide has garnered a lot
of attention from academics, policymakers, and popular media. While most public
attention has focused upon the increasing deficit of girl children, it has also been
noted that a large share of sex-selective abortions in India are conducted in unsafe
environments. Complications due to unsafe abortion account for an estimated 9
49These estimates take into account the endogenous changes in fertility, ignoring which the
substitution is 5.5 rather than 5. Lower average fertility implies that the share of all births that
are lower parity is increasing and since sex ratios are closer to the biological norm at lower parities
(and consistent with the norm for first births), this will contribute (through a compositional effect)
to the average sex ratio being less male-biased than otherwise.
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percent of all maternal deaths in India (Stillman et al. (2014)).50 Moral arguments
can be made both in favor of parents’ right to choose the sex of their offspring as
well as against selective abortion of girls (Kumar (1983)). Abstracting from these
ethical dilemmas, there are several reasons why a significantly male-biased sex ratio
at birth is undesirable. The resulting scarcity of women on the marriage market
can substantially increase the number of unmarried and childless men,51 who may
face destitution in old age since children through marriage are the most important
source of support for the elderly in countries like India that lack institutional social
security (Das Gupta et al. (2010)). Rising sex ratios can lead to increased traffick-
ing of women,52 higher prevalence of sexually-transmitted diseases (Ebenstein and
Sharygin (2009)), and more crime (Edlund et al. (2007), Dre`ze and Khera (2000)).
Sex-selection may also result in girls being consistently born to lower-status par-
ents, thereby relegating women to lower social strata (Edlund (1999), Bhalotra and
Cochrane (2010)). On the other hand, a shortage of women on the marriage mar-
ket may increase their bargaining power and welfare.53 It has also been argued that
sex-selective abortions might be preferable to infanticide or postnatal discrimination
(Goodkind (1996)).
Our analysis shows that the increase in sex-selective abortions fueled by ultra-
sound technology substantially decreased postnatal gender discrimination against
girl children in India. Relative to available studies, we contribute new evidence and
present a more comprehensive analysis. We find that sex-selection eliminated gen-
der gaps in post-neonatal child mortality, postnatal health investments, and sibling
size among second- and higher-parity births in households with a firstborn daughter
relative to households with a firstborn son. Although fewer girls were born, those
that survived to birth were treated more equally and were more likely to survive to
age five. On account of higher investments in for instance breastfeeding and immu-
nization, we can project that they are more likely to do well as adults. However, our
evidence suggests that surviving girls in the post-ultrasound regime are more likely
to be in low-SES households, and for every additional girl that survived after birth,
five girls were aborted.
50The maternal mortality ratio in India was 178 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in
2010-12.
51Bhaskar (2011) estimates that one in five boys born in recent cohorts in China will be unable
to find female partners.
52Recent evidence shows that a shortage of women in north Indian states has led to the import
of brides from other poorer states in India (Kaur (2004), Ahlawat (2009)).
53See Chiappori et al. (2002) and related papers for the large literature on household bargaining
in developed countries. Stopnitzky (2012) shows that a relative scarcity of women in Haryana has
increased their bargaining power on the marriage market and they are able to secure improved
sanitation facilities at home as a result.
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Appendix
3.A Appendix of chapter 3
3.A.1 Variable Descriptions
• Excess Female Mortality: Female mortality - Male mortality
• Neonatal mortality: Death within one month of birth
• Post-neonatal child mortality: Death after the first month of birth but before
age five
• Post1t : indicator variable for t ∈ 1985− 1994
• Post2t : indicator variable for t ∈ 1995− 2005
• Fi: child i is female
• Gj: first child of mother j is female
• Ultrast: percentage of births in state s and year t for which the mother reports
getting an ultrasound test at some point during the pregnancy
• Allopathic treatment: an indicator variable that equals 1 if a sick child received
medical help from an allopathic doctor during the past year, and 0 otherwise
• Exp on education: amount (in Rupees) spent on fees, books, uniform, hostel
pocket money, transportation, and private coaching during last year
• Doctors’ fees: amount (in Rupees) spent on doctors’ fees last year
• Medicine and special food: amount (in Rupees) spent on medicine and special
food last year
• Medical exp: amount (in Rupees) spent on doctors’ fees, medicine, and special
food last year
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• Ideal sex ratio: Ideal number of sons/ Ideal number of daughters (as reported
by the mother)
• Ideal number of children: Mother’s self-reported ideal number of children of
any sex
• Education categories: no education, incomplete secondary education, and sec-
ondary or higher education
• Categories for mother’s birth cohort: 1942-1960, 1961-1970, and 1971-1987
• Categories for Mother’s age at birth: 12-15 years, 16-18 years, 19-24 years,
25-30 years, and 31-49 years
• Caste categories: Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Others
• Religion categories: Hindus, Muslims, and Others
Appendix 2: Contributions of Breastfeeding and
Vaccination
Our estimates suggest that ultrasound access reduced post-neonatal child mortality
by 1.490 p.p. (column (4) in panel B of Table 3.A.2) and increased the likelihood
of being breastfed for at least 24 months by 27.5 p.p. (triple-interaction coefficient
in column (5) of Panel B in Table 3.A.3). Since there was no significant effect on
breastfeeding during the first year of birth, we assume that the 27.5 p.p. increase
took place between 12 and 24 months from birth. According to the World Health
Organization (2000), breastfeeding between the ages one and two decreases mortality
by 50 percent relative to no breastfeeding. Applying this factor to the share of
children who are being breastfed and the mortality rate during 12-24 months,54 the
implied mortality rate for breastfed children is 1.35 percent55 and is 2.7 percent
(1.35 * 2 = 2.7) for non-breastfed children in the 12-24 months range. This implies
that not being breastfed during the 12-24 months age range increases the risk of
mortality by 1.35 p.p. (2.7 - 1.35 = 1.35). If breastfeeding disparities (during 12-24
months) were the only cause of post-neonatal child mortality differences by gender,
the EFM decline due to improvements in the breastfeeding gender gap would be
54We assume that the share of children who are being breastfed and the mortality rate during
12-24 months are the same as those for 12-36 months used in Jayachandran and Kuziemko (2011).
55Solving 0.481x + 2(1 − 0.481)x = 2.05 yields x = 1.35, where 0.481 is the fraction of children
aged 12 to 36 months that are being breastfed in the sample analyzed by Jayachandran and
Kuziemko (2011).
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0.16 p.p. (0.275 * 1.35 = 0.371). Thus breastfeeding explains about 25 percent
(0.371/1.490 = 0.249) of the estimated EFM decline.
Moreover, we find that ultrasound availability increased the probability of a child
receiving at least one vaccination by 0.075 to 0.112 (triple-interaction coefficient
in column (6) of Panel A in Table 3.A.3). The average number of vaccinations
(conditional on receiving at least one vaccination) for girls preceded by a firstborn
girl during the early diffusion period is 6.64 in NFHS data. Thus the estimated
effects for at least one vaccination translate into an average increase in the number
of vaccinations of 0.498 (6.64 * 0.075 = 0.498) to 0.744 (6.64 * 0.112 = 0.744).
Oster (2009) suggests that each vaccination reduces mortality during ages 1 to 4 by
0.26 p.p.. Thus the implied effect on EFM through vaccination is 0.129 p.p. (0.26 *
0.498 = 0.129) to 0.193 p.p. (0.26 * 0.744 = 0.193), which translates into 8.7 percent
(0.129/1.490 = 0.087) to 13 percent (0.193/1.490 = 0.130) of the decline in EFM.
Note that the mortality measure is 12-36 months in Jayachandran and Kuziemko
(2011) and is 1-4 years in Oster (2009). However, any exogenous change in these
mortality measures would generate an almost one-to-one change in the mortality
measure we use, i.e., death during 1 month to 5 years of birth.
Appendix 3: Substitution of Prenatal for Postnatal
Girl Mortality
Here we use our regression estimates to calculate the magnitude of substitution from
postnatal EFM to prenatal sex-selection as the ratio of the number of girls selectively
aborted and the number of girls who survived due to ultrasound (and would have
otherwise died postnatally). Let:
• N : annual number of births in India
• NFG: annual number of births in India that are preceded by a firstborn girl
• MFG: fraction of births that are male among NFG
• FFG: fraction of births that are female among NFG
• ∆: the pre-post (counterfactual) difference
Then, the number of “missing girls” each year, i.e., the difference between the ex-
pected number of female births (given the observed number of male births and the
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natural sex ratio at birth) and the observed number of female births is given by:
0.49
0.51
(NFG ∗MFG)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected #female births given the observed #male births
− NFG ∗ FFG︸ ︷︷ ︸
Observed #female births
= NFG(
0.49
0.51
−FFG
0.51
)
The change in the annual number of missing girls due to ultrasound access is then
calculated as the difference between the number of missing girls during the pre- and
the post-ultrasound periods:
NFG,post(
0.49
0.51
− FFG,post
0.51
)−NFG,pre(0.49
0.51
− FFG,pre
0.51
)
=NFG,post ∗ 0.49
0.51
−NFG,post ∗ FFG,post
0.51
−NFG,pre ∗ 0.49
0.51
+NFG,pre ∗ FFG,pre
0.51
=∆NFG ∗ 0.49
0.51
−NFG,post ∗ FFG,post
0.51
+NFG,pre ∗ FFG,pre
0.51
(Adding and subtracting NFG,post ∗ FFG,pre0.51 )
=∆NFG ∗ 0.49
0.51
−NFG,post ∗ FFG,post
0.51
+NFG,post ∗ FFG,pre
0.51
−NFG,post ∗ FFG,pre
0.51
+NFG,pre ∗ FFG,pre
0.51
=∆NFG ∗ 0.49
0.51
+NFG,post ∗∆FFG ∗ −1
0.51
−∆NFG ∗ FFG,pre
0.51
= ∆NFG ∗ (0.49
0.51
− FFG,pre
0.51
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(conception effect)
+NFG,post ∗∆FFG ∗ −1
0.51︸ ︷︷ ︸
(sex-selective abortions effect)
The change in the number of missing girls due to ultrasound can be decomposed into
a “conception effect” and a “sex-selective abortion effect,” as defined above. The sex-
selective abortion effect refers to the fact that a smaller fraction of post-ultrasound
births preceded by a firstborn girl are now female, where as the conception effect is
driven by the change in the number of births that are preceded by a firstborn girl.
The number of excess postnatal female deaths in a year equals:
NFG ∗ FFG ∗ EFMFG
where EFMFG refers to the difference between the probability of death by age 5
among children preceded by a firstborn girl and a firstborn boy.
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The change in the number of excess postnatal female deaths can thus be written as:
NFG,post ∗ FFG,post ∗ EFMFG,post −NFG,pre ∗ FFG,pre ∗ EFMFG,pre
=NFG,post ∗ FFG,post ∗ (∆EFMFG)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(behavioral effect)
+NFG,post ∗ (∆FFG) ∗ EFMFG,pre︸ ︷︷ ︸
(mechanical sex-selection effect)
+ (∆NFG) ∗ FFG,pre ∗ EFMFG,pre︸ ︷︷ ︸
(conception effect)
The change in the number of excess postnatal female deaths can also be decom-
posed into three components: the “behavioral effect” refers to the EFM decline due
to, say, better postnatal health investments in girls in the post-ultrasound period;
the “mechanical sex-selection effect” is driven by the decrease in the fraction of post-
ultrasound births that are preceded by a firstborn girl; and the “conception effect”
that reflects the change in the number of births that are preceded by a firstborn girl
itself.
The table below uses the aforementioned formulae to calculate the number of births
preceded by a firstborn girl during the pre-ultrasound (in column (1)), during the
late diffusion period (in column (2)), and the change in the number of missing girls
as the difference between columns (1) and (2) in column (3). EFMFG in column
(1) is the coefficient of Firstborn girl * Female and in column (2) is the coefficient of
Firstborn girl * Female * Post2 from column (4) in panel B of Table 3.A.2. During
the pre-ultrasound period, the fraction of females in births preceded by a firstborn
girl was 47.9 percent. Ultrasound access decreased this fraction by 1.8 p.p..56 We
calculate NFG
N
from the entire sample since the pre-ultrasound sample of births is
likely to be underreported due to recall bias. The number of births in column (1),
N , is the 1995 figure from UN Statistics Division. The number of mothers, m, is
obtained as N
General Fertility Rate
using the general fertility rate estimated from NFHS-2
by Retherford and Mishra (2001) as 131.53 per 1000 women. ∆NFG is estimated to
be equal to -0.0063 as is obtained from the fertility equation using the conversion
method described below.
Thus, the number of “missing girls” increased by 305,496 per year due to ul-
trasound access. The estimated decline in EFM, on the other hand, implies that
the annual number of postnatal female deaths by age 5 fell by 60,879. The ratio of
increase in sex-selective abortions and the decrease in EFM is 5.02, i.e., for every
5.02 girls aborted, one girl survived due to access to ultrasound technology.
56This number is derived from a regression specification similar to the one estimated by Bhalotra
and Cochrane (2010). These results are reported in Table 3.A.25.
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Table: Decomposition and Simulation
Pre Post ∆
(Pre-ultrasound) (Late diffusion) (Post - Pre)
(1) (2) (3)
A. Regression Estimates
EFMFG 0.0176 0.0040 -0.0136
FFG 0.4790 0.4605 -0.0185
NFG
N
0.3340
B. Decomposition
N 27,300,000
m (#mothers) ≈ 207,557,211
mFG (#mothers with a firstborn girl) ≈ 0.3340*m
NFG 0.3340*(N) 0.3340*(N)-0.0063*mFG -0.0063*mFG
= 9,118,200 = 8,681,458 = -436,742
∆ number of excess postnatal female deaths:
(1) NFG,post ∗ FFG,post ∗ (∆EFMFG) ≈ -54,370
(2) NFG,post ∗ (∆FFG) ∗ EFMFG,pre ≈ -2,827
(3) (∆NFG) ∗ FFG,pre ∗ EFMFG,pre ≈ -3,682
(4) = (1)+(2)+(3) = -60,879
∆ number of missing girls:
(5) ∆NFG ∗ (0.490.51 − FFG,pre0.51 ) ≈ -9,420
(6) NFG,post ∗∆FFG ∗ −10.51 ≈ 314,916
(7) = (5)+(6) = 305,496
∆ number of missing girls / ∆ EFM:
(8) = (7)/(4) = -5.02
– Conversion of treatment effect from the fertility specification (2) to
expected number of children born in a year.
Let N to be the number of total children born in a single year. Then
N = N1 +NFG +NFB
where N1 is the number of firstborn children and NFB and NFG are the number of
second or higher order births respectively preceded by a firstborn girl and a firstborn
boy.
• mFG: number of women in the 15-49 age-group with a firstborn girl
• Sa,FG and Sa,FB: share of women aged a who have a firstborn girl and firstborn
boy, respectively
• Pa,FG and Pa,FB: probability that a women who has a firstborn girl (firstborn
boy) and who is of age a in a given year gives birth in that year
=⇒ NFG = (
∑a=49
a=15 Pa,FGSa,FG) ∗mFG
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∆NFG = NFG,post −NFG,pre
=(
a=49∑
a=15
Pa,FG,postSa,FG,post −
a=49∑
a=15
Pa,FG,preSa,FG,pre) ∗mFG
=(
a=49∑
a=15
(Pa,FG,post − Pa,FG,pre)Sa,FG) ∗mFG
assuming that Sa,FG,pre = Sa,FG,post = Sa,FG. This assumption is reasonable since
ultrasound access had no effect on the decision to have a first birth or its sex ratio.
The treatment-on-the-treated effect we estimated in equation (2) equals
E[N |post, FG]− E[N |pre, FG]
=
a=49∑
a=15
(Pa,FG,post − Pa,FG,pre) ∗ S49,FG
+
a=48∑
a=15
(Pa,FG,post − Pa,FG,pre) ∗ S48,FG
+
a=47∑
a=15
(Pa,FG,post − Pa,FG,pre) ∗ S47,FG
+...
If we assume uniform impact of ultrasound access on the probability of birth across
age-groups, i.e., Pa,FG,post−Pa,FG,pre = PFG,post−PFG,pre and assuming Sa,FG = SFG:
E[N |post, FG]− E[N |pre, FG] = SFG ∗ (PFG,post − PFG,pre) ∗ (1 + 2 + 3 + ...+ 35)
a=49∑
a=15
(Pa,FG,post − Pa,FG,pre)Sa,FG
=SFG ∗ (PFG,post − PFG,pre) ∗ 35
=
35
(1 + ...+ 35)
∗ (E[N |post, FG]− E[N |pre, FG])
=
35
630
∗ (E[N |post, FG]− E[N |pre, FG])
≈0.056 ∗ (E[N |post, FG]− E[N |pre, FG])
≈0.056 ∗ (−0.112) = −0.0063
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Figure 3.A.1: Ultrasound use by mothers and supply of ultrasound scanners in India
NOTES: (1) The solid line in the top graph plots the fraction of births in a year for which the
mother reports getting an ultrasound test at some point during the pregnancy (the denominator
equals the number of births with a non-missing response on ultrasound use). The relevant question
was not asked in NFHS-1 but in NFHS-2 and NFHS-3, data on ultrasound use was collected for
births since January 1995 and January 2001, respectively. The years 1995 and 2000 have been
dropped due to extremely small sample sizes. (2) The dashed line in the top graph plots the
number of ultrasound scanners imported at the national level, the first records of which appear in
the import data in 1987; indeed, there was no category coding these scanners before then (Source:
Mahal et al. (2006)). (3) The bars in the bottom graph plot the number of ultrasound machines
produced domestically in India. Data source: George (2006).
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Figure 3.A.2: Number of abortions and ultrasound use by mothers in India
NOTES: The top graph plots the officially reported number of abortions (both sex-selective and
other abortions) by state and year using data from http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/
abortion/india/ab-indias.html. The bottom graph plots the state-year variation in the offi-
cially reported number of abortions and the fraction of births in a state-year for which the mother
reports getting an ultrasound test at some point during the pregnancy (other details in Figure 3.A.1
notes).
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Figure 3.A.4: Post-neonatal excess female child mortality, by firstborn’s sex
NOTES: Post-neonatal excess female child mortality equals the percentage of female births that
die minus the percentage of male births that die after the first month of birth but before age five.
The graph in Panel A plots the 5-year moving average of EFM among families with a firstborn
girl and families with a firstborn boy; Panel B plots the EFM for births in firstborn girl families
minus the EFM for births in firstborn boy families. The vertical line splits the years into pre- and
post-ultrasound periods.
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Tables
Table 3.A.1: Unadjusted mortality rates for treatment and control groups (%)
Firstborn boy families Firsborn girl families
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male Female EFM Male Female EFM
(2)-(1) (5)-(4)
1. Pre-ultrasound: 1973-1984
Neonatal 7.326 5.536 -1.79 5.060 5.035 -0.025
Post-neonatal Child 6.169 7.052 0.883 5.721 8.771 3.050
N 43,833 40,425 17,252 15,908
2. Early diffusion period: 1985-1994
Neonatal 5.692 4.528 -1.164 4.439 4.352 -0.087
Post-neonatal Child 4.380 4.880 0.500 4.246 6.021 1.775
N 82,579 77,699 43,547 39,519
3. Late diffusion period: 1995-2005
Neonatal 4.434 3.627 -0.807 3.450 3.554 0.104
Post-neonatal Child 2.507 2.658 0.151 2.523 3.702 1.179
N 46,504 44,196 27,713 24,141
NOTES: This table reports the percentage of second- and higher-order children, by firstborn sex
and child gender, who suffered neonatal or post-neonatal child mortality over the three time-periods
in the sample. Columns (3) and (4) report the difference between the mortality numbers in columns
(1) - (2) and (4) - (5), respectively.
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Table 3.A.2: Excess female mortality
A. Neonatal Mortality (1) (2) (3) (4)
Firstborn girl * Female 1.754*** 1.705*** 1.350*** 0.862**
(0.379) (0.373) (0.382) (0.417)
Firstborn girl * Female * Post1 -0.698 -0.665 -0.681 -0.213
(0.426) (0.422) (0.422) (0.460)
Firstborn girl * Female * Post2 -0.872** -0.875** -0.895** -0.369
(0.353) (0.348) (0.357) (0.429)
N 503,316
Baseline mean 1.765
B. Post-Neonatal Child Mortality (1) (2) (3) (4)
Firstborn girl * Female 2.171*** 2.123*** 1.758*** 1.476***
(0.333) (0.332) (0.313) (0.383)
Firstborn girl * Female * Post1 -0.919** -0.872** -0.954** -0.773
(0.402) (0.401) (0.404) (0.474)
Firstborn girl * Female * Post2 -1.191*** -1.229*** -1.355*** -1.490**
(0.397) (0.380) (0.362) (0.598)
N 478,843
Baseline mean 2.167
Female * Post1 and Female * Post2 x x
Firstborn Girl * Post1 and Firstborn Girl * Post2 x x
Xijt x x x
Firstborn Girl x Birth year FE x x
Female x Birth year FE x x
Female x State FE x x
Female x Birth order FE x x
Birth order x Birth year FE x x
Birth order x State FE x x
State x Birth year FE x x
Firstborn girl x State FE x x
Firstborn girl x Birth order FE x x
Mother FE x
NOTES: This table reports estimates of specification (1). Each column within a panel is a separate
regression. The outcomes are mortality rates, as % of births that do not survive. We always control
for Female and fixed effects (FE) for birth year and birth order and for Firstborn girl and state
FE in columns (1)-(3). The vector Xijt comprises mother’s age at birth and, except in column
(4), household wealth quintiles, caste, religion, residence in a rural area, educational attainment
of child’s parents, and mother’s birth cohort. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by
state. Baseline mean refers to the pre-ultrasound difference between EFM in firstborn-girl and
firstborn-boy families. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
154
T
ab
le
3.
A
.3
:
P
os
tn
at
al
h
ea
lt
h
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
M
on
th
s
b
re
a
st
fe
d
R
ec
ei
v
ed
≥
o
n
e
va
cc
in
e
R
u
p
ee
s
sp
en
t
o
n
il
ln
es
s
la
st
ye
ar
F
ir
st
gi
rl
*F
em
a
le
-5
.1
2
4
**
-4
.4
5
1
*
*
-3
.8
5
1*
*
-0
.1
3
0
**
-0
.0
9
1
*
*
-0
.0
67
-2
7
.1
5
0
-1
5
.5
8
3
-8
7
.5
9
9
(1
.8
7
9
)
(1
.8
4
6)
(1
.7
4
7
)
(0
.0
5
1)
(0
.0
3
8
)
(0
.0
4
8)
(5
0
.9
6
1
)
(5
0
.9
1
0
)
(5
6
.7
8
8
)
F
ir
st
gi
rl
*F
em
a
le
*P
o
st
1
4
.7
3
9
**
4.
0
40
*
2
.3
9
6
0.
1
1
2*
*
0
.0
96
*
0.
0
7
5*
1
7
.1
0
8
6
.1
86
7
0
.5
8
9
(2
.0
1
2
)
(2
.0
42
)
(2
.0
6
8)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
4
3)
(6
8
.6
4
5
)
(6
5
.1
0
0
)
(8
0
.1
0
8
)
F
ir
st
gi
rl
*F
em
a
le
*P
o
st
2
4
.1
6
2
3
.7
3
5
1
.5
3
6
0
.0
9
4
*
0.
0
6
8
*
0
.1
12
*
*
4
4
.9
5
5
31
.1
7
7
1
0
6
.4
4
4
(3
.1
4
0
)
(2
.5
94
)
(2
.4
9
9)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
3
3
)
(0
.0
4
1)
(5
0
.2
8
3
)
(5
1
.0
4
4
)
(6
4
.0
6
5
)
N
1
3,
0
84
2
0
,5
61
1
5
,1
5
6
B
as
el
in
e
m
ea
n
0
.1
7
-0
.0
3
5
-1
1
1
.5
8
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
B
re
a
st
fe
d
≥
1
2
m
on
th
s
B
re
a
st
fe
d
≥
2
4
m
on
th
s
B
re
a
st
fe
d
≥
3
6
m
o
n
th
s
F
ir
st
gi
rl
*F
em
a
le
-0
.0
9
6
-0
.0
8
3
-0
.0
27
-0
.2
6
9
**
*
-0
.2
69
*
*
*
-0
.2
2
6
*
*
-0
.1
0
3
*
*
-0
.0
8
3
*
*
-0
.0
7
5
(0
.0
7
1
)
(0
.0
9
0)
(0
.0
8
4
)
(0
.0
9
0)
(0
.0
7
9
)
(0
.0
7
9)
(0
.0
4
4
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
4
4
)
F
ir
st
gi
rl
*F
em
a
le
*P
o
st
1
0.
0
85
0
.0
9
2
-0
.0
0
0
2
0
.3
2
1
*
**
0.
2
7
5
**
0
.1
8
5
0
.0
87
0.
0
7
1
0
.0
29
(0
.1
1
0
)
(0
.0
8
7)
(0
.0
8
0
)
(0
.1
0
4)
(0
.1
1
4
)
(0
.1
2
0)
(0
.0
6
9
)
(0
.0
65
)
(0
.0
7
6
)
F
ir
st
gi
rl
*F
em
a
le
*P
o
st
2
0.
0
96
0
.0
4
7
-0
.0
4
6
0
.1
7
8
0
.2
22
0
.1
4
1
0
.0
5
3
0
.0
3
3
0
.0
4
2
(0
.1
0
1
)
(0
.0
9
4)
(0
.0
9
9
)
(0
.1
9
0)
(0
.1
6
1
)
(0
.1
4
3)
(0
.0
8
2
)
(0
.0
73
)
(0
.0
6
8
)
N
1
2
,4
4
7
1
1
,7
6
0
1
0
,9
4
2
B
a
se
li
n
e
m
ea
n
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
8
F
em
a
le
*
P
o
st
1
&
F
em
a
le
*P
o
st
2
x
x
x
x
x
x
1
st
G
ir
l*
P
o
st
1
&
1
st
G
ir
l*
P
o
st
2
x
x
x
x
x
x
X
ij
t
x
x
x
x
x
x
1
st
G
ir
l
x
B
ir
th
ye
a
r
F
E
x
x
x
F
em
a
le
x
B
ir
th
ye
ar
F
E
x
x
x
F
em
a
le
x
S
ta
te
F
E
x
x
x
F
em
a
le
x
B
ir
th
o
rd
er
F
E
x
x
x
B
ir
th
o
rd
er
x
S
ta
te
F
E
x
x
x
S
ta
te
-s
p
ec
ifi
c
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
s
x
x
x
F
ir
st
bo
rn
gi
rl
x
S
ta
te
F
E
x
x
x
F
ir
st
bo
rn
gi
rl
x
B
ir
th
o
rd
er
F
E
x
x
x
N
O
T
E
S
:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
or
ts
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
fr
om
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
(1
)
es
ti
m
a
te
d
fo
r
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
in
ch
il
d
re
n
u
si
n
g
th
e
R
E
D
S
d
a
ta
.
E
a
ch
co
lu
m
n
w
it
h
in
a
p
a
n
el
is
fr
om
a
se
p
ar
at
e
re
gr
es
si
on
.
W
e
co
n
tr
ol
fo
r
F
em
a
le
,
F
ir
st
bo
rn
gi
rl
,
a
n
d
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
fo
r
b
ir
th
ye
a
r,
b
ir
th
o
rd
er
,
a
n
d
st
a
te
in
a
ll
co
lu
m
n
s.
T
h
e
ve
ct
o
r
X
ij
t
co
m
p
ri
se
s
m
ot
h
er
’s
ag
e
at
b
ir
th
,
ca
st
e,
re
li
gi
on
,
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
a
tt
a
in
m
en
t
o
f
ch
il
d
’s
p
a
re
n
ts
,
a
n
d
m
o
th
er
’s
b
ir
th
co
h
o
rt
.
B
re
a
st
fe
ed
in
g
re
su
lt
s
a
re
b
a
se
d
o
n
th
e
la
st
tw
o
su
rv
iv
in
g
b
ir
th
s
of
a
m
ot
h
er
.
V
ac
ci
n
at
io
n
a
n
d
h
ea
lt
h
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
re
su
lt
s
a
re
b
a
se
d
o
n
a
ll
su
rv
iv
in
g
ch
il
d
re
n
o
f
a
m
o
th
er
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
b
y
st
at
e.
B
as
el
in
e
m
ea
n
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
p
re
-u
lt
ra
so
u
n
d
d
iff
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
g
en
d
er
g
a
p
s
in
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
in
fi
rs
tb
o
rn
-g
ir
l
a
n
d
fi
rs
tb
or
n
-b
oy
fa
m
il
ie
s.
**
*
1%
,
**
5%
,
*
10
%
.
F
u
rt
h
er
in
ve
st
m
en
t
re
su
lt
s
u
si
n
g
th
e
N
F
H
S
d
a
ta
a
re
in
T
a
b
le
3
.A
.2
1
.
155
Table 3.A.4: Fertility: Hazard of Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firstborn girl 0.173*** 0.185*** 0.155*** 0.168***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.038) (0.038)
Firstborn girl * Post1 -0.073*** -0.084*** -0.092*** -0.102***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
Firstborn girl * Post2 -0.190*** -0.211*** -0.220*** -0.233***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Ideal sex ratio 0.076***
(0.022)
Ideal no. of children 0.161***
(0.010)
N 2,455,630 2,455,553 2,455,553 2,276,192
Baseline mean 0.285
Year FE x x x x
State FE x x x x
Age FE x x x x
Parity FE x x x x
State x Year FE x x x x
Years since last birth FE x x x
Firstborn girl x Year FE x x
NOTES: Estimates of specification (2). The dependent variable is an indicator for birth in a given
year. Sample includes all mothers who have ever given birth, for each year from their year of
marriage to the year of interview. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state. Baseline
mean is the mean probability of birth in a given year during the pre-ultrasound period. *** 1%,
** 5%, * 10%.
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Table 3.A.5: Fertility: Number of Children
Number of births Excess Fertility
(1) (2) (3)
Firstborn girl 0.155*** 0.141*** 0.117***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.018)
Firstborn girl * Post1 -0.088*** -0.079*** -0.085***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.024)
Firstborn girl * Post2 -0.112*** -0.100*** -0.093***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.025)
Ideal no. of children 0.315***
(0.018)
Ideal sex ratio 0.052*** -0.345***
(0.018) (0.024)
N 118,663 88,475 88,475
Baseline mean 3.001 3.001 0.451
NOTES: Estimates of specification (3). The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is the number
of births at the time of interview and in column (3) is excess fertility which equals number of
births minus ideal number of children. Baseline means are average of the outcome variable in each
column for mothers who had both their first and last birth within 1972-1984. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by state. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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3.A.2 Additional Figures and Tables
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Table 3.A.8: Sample means: Mortality rates by period
(1) (2) (3)
Male Female EFM
1. Pre-ultrasound: 1973-1984
Neonatal 6.686 5.395 -1.291
Post-neonatal Child 6.040 7.539 1.499
N 61,085 56,333
2. Post-ultrasound: 1985-1994
Neonatal 5.259 4.469 -0.790
Post-neonatal Child 4.333 5.265 0.932
N 126,126 117,218
3. Post-ultrasound: 1995-2005
Neonatal 4.066 3.601 -0.465
Post-neonatal Child 2.513 3.027 0.514
N 74,217 68,337
NOTES: This table reports the percentage of second- and higher-order children, by child’s gender,
who suffered from neonatal, post-neonatal infant, or post-neonatal child mortality over the three
time-periods in our sample. Column (3) reports the difference between the mortality numbers in
columns (1) and (2).
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Table 3.A.9: Age distribution of missing girls in 2000
No. missing (in 000s) % of all missing women % of under-5 missing girls
Age group India China India China India China
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
At birth 184 644 11% 37% 37% 83%
0-1 146 109 9% 6% 30% 14%
1-4 164 23 10% 1% 33% 3%
< 5 494 776 29% 45%
5-14 93 2 5% 0%
≥ 15 1125 947 66% 55%
Total 1712 1727
NOTES: This table is based on Anderson and Ray (2010) and reports the number of missing girls
for various age groups (columns (1) and (2), missing girls as a percentage of all missing women
(columns (3) and (4)), and missing girls across age groups as a percentage of all under-5 missing
girls (columns (5) and (6)), separately for India and China.
Table 3.A.10: Sample means: Gaps between actual and ideal fertility and fraction
of sons
(1) (2) (3)
Actual Ideal Actual - Ideal
1. Pre-ultrasound: 1973-1984
Fertility 2.96 2.21 0.75
Fraction of Sons 0.58 0.57 0.01
N
2. Post-ultrasound: 1985-1994
Fertility 2.16 2.17 -0.01
Fraction of Sons 0.55 0.56 -0.01
N
3. Post-ultrasound: 1995-2005
Fertility 1.91 1.93 -0.03
Fraction of Sons 0.53 0.55 -0.02
N
NOTES: This table reports the percentage of second- and higher-order children, by child’s gender,
who suffered from neonatal, post-neonatal infant, or post-neonatal child mortality over the three
time-periods in our sample. Column (3) reports the difference between the mortality numbers in
columns (1) and (2).
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Table 3.A.11: Sample means, all variables
1973-1984 1985-1994 1995-2005
First boy First girl First boy First girl First boy First girl
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of children 2.91 3.12 2.13 2.22 1.85 1.96
N (Mothers) 14,095 10,690 25,857 22,169 23,480 22,372
N (Births) 84,258 33,160 160,278 83,066 90,700 51,854
Female 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.47
Rural 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.71 0.63 0.67
Hindu 0.77 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.71
Muslim 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16
SC 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19
ST 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.16
Mother birth cohort:
1942-1960 0.60 0.73 0.11 0.19 0.01 0.01
1961-1970 0.40 0.27 0.62 0.67 0.17 0.28
1971-1987 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.14 0.82 0.71
Mother’s age at birth:
12-15 0.09 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.00
16-18 0.26 0.12 0.20 0.08 0.15 0.06
19-24 0.49 0.56 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.44
25-30 0.15 0.27 0.20 0.33 0.25 0.37
31-49 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.13
Mother’s education:
No education 0.61 0.63 0.56 0.62 0.43 0.53
Incomplete secondary 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.33 0.43 0.38
Secondary or higher 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.08
Father’s education:
No education 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.33 0.25 0.30
Incomplete secondary 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.56 0.55
Secondary or higher 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.15
Household wealth:
2nd quintile 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.21
3rd quintile 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19
4th quintile 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20
Richest quintile 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.16
Child can read and write 0.80 0.79 0.81 0.79 0.73 0.71
Child still in school 0.52 0.62 0.77 0.79 0.70 0.69
N 51,484 20,531 67,794 32,749 26,379 14,475
Full immunization 0.39 0.35 0.51 0.45
N 19,154 11,398 31,127 18,130
Number of months breastfed 13.04 13.34 13.64 14.10
N 19,871 12,057 32,324 19,228
Number of antenatal checks 2.62 2.11 3.75 3.07
N 23,571 13,865 34,197 20,892
NOTES: SC and ST denote Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Number of children refers to
fertility at the time of survey. Data are NFHS, three rounds.
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Table 3.A.12: Sample means, postnatal health investments
1973-1984 1985-1994 1995-1999
Variable First boy First girl First boy First girl First boy First girl
Female 0.44 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.45
SC 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.16
ST 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08
OBC 0.35 0.39 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.34
Hindu 0.88 0.90 0.87 0.91 0.89 0.90
Muslim 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.07
Sikh 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
Christian 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Mother’s age at birth 24.12 26.31 23.62 26.03 23.72 26.21
Mother is literate 1.52 1.49 1.47 1.47 1.36 1.43
Father’s years of education 5.23 5.54 5.83 5.71 6.93 6.15
At least one vaccine 0.73 0.70 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.94
N (Births) 5,788 1,962 6,440 2,744 2,960 1,268
Breastfed 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.77 0.79
No. of months breastfed 18.88 19.07 18.34 18.32 12.66 13.39
N (Births) 2,674 1,021 3,969 1,846 2,765 1,209
Breastfed at least 12 months 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.71 0.75
N (Births) 2,674 1,021 3,969 1,846 2,332 976
Breastfed at least 24 months 0.40 0.40 0.36 0.35 0.26 0.29
N (Births) 2,674 1,021 3,969 1,846 1,820 780
Breastfed at least 36 months 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.05
N (Births) 2,674 1,021 3,969 1,846 1,217 527
Expense on illness (last year) 160.78 227.01 168.16 152.01 216.64 184.66
N (Births) 192 643 6,253 2,665 2,877 1,240
NOTES: Sample from 1999 REDS data. SC, ST, and OBC denote Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Tribes, and Other Backward Classes. The sample is restricted to children who were alive at the
time of survey. Breastfeeding information is available only for a woman’s last two children who
were alive at the time of survey. Sample is restricted to children at least 12, 24, and 36 months
old while calculating the proportion of children who were breastfed for 12, 24, and 36 months,
respectively. Expenditure on illness is in Rupees.
Table 3.A.13: Further Results: Different age-exposures for childhood mortality
Neonatal Infant Post-neo Child Child
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firstborn girl * Female 1.350*** 2.067*** 1.758*** 2.893***
(0.382) (0.479) (0.313) (0.481)
Firstborn girl * Female * Post1 -0.681 -0.984* -0.954** -1.490**
(0.422) (0.536) (0.404) (0.550)
Firstborn girl * Female * Post2 -0.895** -1.175*** -1.355*** -2.059***
(0.357) (0.408) (0.362) (0.468)
N 503,316 503,316 478,843 503,316
NOTES: Estimates of specification (1) for different measures of mortality. The explanatory vari-
ables are the same as those in Column (3) of Table 3.A.2. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by state. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Table 3.A.14: Heterogeneity in effects on post-neonatal child mortality by birth
order
Birth order 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firstborn girl * Female 2.198*** 1.578** 1.384 1.104 0.843 7.630
(0.551) (0.741) (1.068) (2.213) (3.206) (10.26)
Firstborn girl * Female * Post1 -2.242*** -0.251 -0.141 2.004 -0.903 -7.292
(0.788) (0.782) (1.218) (2.617) (3.395) (11.94)
Firstborn girl * Female * Post2 -1.585** -1.458 -0.393 -0.927 -0.912 -10.69
(0.651) (0.994) (1.301) (2.759) (3.327) (10.35)
N 133,635 86,551 48,491 25,363 12,408 5,648
Baseline mean 6.97 7.10 7.97 9.43 9.15 13.00
NOTES: Estimates corresponding to the specification in column (3) of Table 3.A.2 estimated
separately for various birth orders. Each column is a separate regression. The outcome measureS
mortality as % of births that do not survive. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state.
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Table 3.A.15: Post-neonatal child mortality: Estimates for first births
Dependent Variable: Post-neonatal child mortality
Female -0.404
(0.855)
Female * Post1 0.0264
(0.615)
Female * Post2 -0.204
(0.731)
N 158,194
NOTES: This table reports the coefficients from a specification similar to (1). The sample is
restricted to first births. Post1 and Post2 indicate that the second birth took place during early
and later diffusion period, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state. ***
1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Table 3.A.17: Mother’s fertility preference and son preference
Ideal No. of Children Ideal Fraction of Sons
(1) (2)
Firstborn girl * Female -0.026 0.011***
(0.017) (0.003)
Firstborn girl * Female * Post1 0.013 -0.002
(0.017) (0.002)
Firstborn girl * Female * Post2 0.028* 0.001
(0.015) (0.003)
N 473,195 471,559
NOTES: Estimates of specification (1) with dependent variables changed to stated preferences.
Ideal fraction of sons =
idealboys+(0.5∗idealeither)
idealkids
if idealkids > 0, where idealboys is the ideal number
of boys, idealeither is the ideal number of children of either sex, and idealkids is the ideal number
of total children, as reported by a woman. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state.
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Table 3.A.18: Using variation in self-reported ultrasound use
Neonatal Post-neonatal Infant Post-neo natal Child
(1) (2) (3)
Female * Firstborn girl 0.930** 0.734** 0.760*
(0.335) (0.282) (0.376)
Female * Firstborn girl * Ultrast -1.302 -1.219 -1.006
(0.864) (0.855) (1.031)
N 113,170 108,837 108,837
NOTES: Estimates of a specification similar to (1) for childhood mortality rates, except that
Post1t and Post
2
t have been replaced with Ultrast. So, rather than use the timing of imports and
production of ultrasound scanners, we use self-reported use of ultrasound scans in the NFHS data.
Each column is from a separate regression. The sample is restricted to years after 1995. *** 1%,
** 5%, * 10%.
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Table 3.A.19: Placebo test: Fake treatment years in the pre-ultrasound era
Dependent variable: Post-neonatal Child Mortality
Treatment Year 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firstborn girl * Female 2.070** 2.004** 2.125*** 2.334*** 2.460*** 2.087***
(0.954) (0.836) (0.559) (0.504) (0.490) (0.405)
Firstborn girl * Female * Post 0.016 0.094 -0.053 -0.357 -0.642 -0.007
(0.967) (0.898) (0.659) (0.521) (0.587) (0.438)
N 110,295
NOTES: This table presents coefficients from a specification similar to (1), except that a single
Post indicator is used. The treatment year used to define Post varies across columns. Each
column represents a different regression. The sample is restricted to the 1973-1984 period (i.e.,
pre-Ultrasound period). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state. *** 1%, ** 5%, *
10%.
Table 3.A.20: Testing whether first births were subject to sex selective abortion
Neonatal Post-neo Infant Post-neo Child
(1) (2) (3)
Firstborn girl * Female 1.182*** 0.730** 1.790***
(0.381) (0.301) (0.400)
Firstborn girl * Female * Post1 -0.969* 0.0238 -0.485
(0.550) (0.350) (0.517)
Firstborn girl * Female * Post2 -1.270 -1.338 -2.139*
(1.550) (0.942) (1.124)
N 196,374 185,894 185,894
NOTES: This table reports the coefficients from specification (1) for the sample of women whose
first child was born before 1985. The explanatory variables are the same as those in Column (3)
of Table 3.A.2. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Table 3.A.23: Fertility: Investigating the margin of response by number of children
Number of children
= 1 = 2 = 3 ≥ 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firstborn girl 0.012** -0.067*** -0.015* 0.069***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Firstborn girl * post1 -0.010 0.021** 0.030*** -0.042***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
Firstborn girl * post2 -0.017** 0.040*** 0.035*** -0.058***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
N 118663 118663 118663 118663
Baseline mean 0.114 0.271 0.300 0.315
NOTES: This table presents estimates from specification (3) using indicators for the mother having,
respectively, 1, 2, 3, and ≥ 4 children at the time of survey in columns (1)-(4). Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by state. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Table 3.A.25: Impacts of ultrasound availability on the sex ratio at birth
Dependent Variable: Child is female
Firstborn girl -0.002
(0.004)
Firstborn girl * Post1 -0.008*
(0.005)
Firstborn girl * Post2 -0.018***
(0.006)
N 503,316
NOTES: This table reports the coefficients from the following specification: Gibjt = α + β1Fi +
β2Fi ∗ Post1t + β3Fi ∗ Post2t +X
′
ijtτ + Π
′γ + ibjt, where Gibjt indicates that child i of birth order
b born to mother j in year t is female; Fi indicates that the firstborn is a girl; X
′
iτ is a vector of
household characteristics and Π′γ is a vector of fixed effects that are analogous to equation (1),
except that all interactions with Fi are omitted. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by
state. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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